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Abstract 
All-cargo airlines carry over 50% of global airfreight, yet they are prone to bankruptcy.  
Many financial models are designed to predict a firms' financial health, but they do not 
assess many nonstatistical factors that influence the prediction capability of these models.  
In this study, qualitative grounded theory design was used to identify nonstatistical 
factors and explore how they influence bankruptcy prediction models in the all-cargo 
airline industry.  In the first phase of the study, financial data from 2005 to 2009 for 17 
all-cargo U.S. airlines were used to determine the bankruptcy prediction ability of the 
Kroeze financial bankruptcy model.  A sample of six all-cargo airlines (ABX Air, Arrow 
Air, Atlas Air, Cargo 360, Gemini Air Cargo, and Kitty Hawk Air Cargo) were selected 
containing a mixture of airlines for which the Kroeze model correctly and incorrectly 
predicted bankruptcy.  The sample was used as the starting point to explore the 
nonstatistical factors using grounded theory.  Data were obtained on the six airlines from 
company annual reports, SEC 10K annual reports, reports from professional journals 
such as Air Transport Intelligence and Traffic World, news reports and company press 
releases.  The data were coded and grouped into conceptual categories, which were used 
in theory generation to support the emerging theory.  Six categories (management, risk, 
operations, competitive advantage, financial, and external factors) that relate to the 
financial stability of an all-cargo airline emerged during the research.  Three themes 
emerged that may improve current quantitative bankruptcy prediction models.  The three 
themes are airline fleet type, type of aircraft flown, and aircraft utilization.  The three 
themes relate to the type, use, and make up of an airline’s fleet.  These themes influence 
bankruptcy prediction model and should be incorporated into failure prediction models to 
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improve their overall accuracy.  Future research should be conducted to verify these 
findings on a larger population, such as all-cargo airlines that operate outside the United 
States.  These airlines operate under different financial regimes that may affect the 
prediction models differently.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Within the air-cargo industry, two main types of firms carry air cargo: passenger 
airlines that carry cargo in the lower cargo hold of passenger aircraft and dedicated cargo-
only airlines that operate freighter aircraft.  Examples of all-cargo airlines include Arrow 
Air, Lynden Air Cargo Airlines, and Northern Air Cargo.  Such airlines carry over 50% 
of the global airfreight.  The demand for the carriage of air cargo can fluctuate by 15% to 
20% within a year (Hellermann, 2006).  This fluctuation is driven by the global economy, 
which drives world trade and the amount of cargo that needs to be carried (Boeing, 
2009).  The fast, secure transport provided by the air-cargo industry is important to just-
in-time production operations and the transportation of perishable goods throughout the 
world and; therefore, the world economy (Becker & Dill, 2007; Hellermann, 2006).  Like 
most of the aviation industry, the all-cargo airline industry operates on low margins and 
is prone to bankruptcy (Boeing, 2009; Kroeze, 2005; Ribbink, Hofer, & Dresner, 2009).  
Bankruptcy within the all-cargo airlines can reduce available capacity and affect the 
global economy.  
Many financial models found in the literature can be used to predict the financial 
health of a firm, and several have been used on the passenger airline industry (Altman & 
Hotchkiss, 2006; Chung & Szenberg, 1996; Kroeze, 2005; Ribbink et al., 2009).  The 
various bankruptcy prediction models typically use a combination of weighted financial 
ratios that provide a score used to predict bankruptcy (Kroeze, 2005); however, these 
statistical models do not consider nonstatistical factors that may influence their prediction 
capabilities (Gudmundsson, 2002).  This research was used to explore the nonstatistical 
factors, which may include management, cultural factors, aircraft type, route selection, 
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and market themes.  All of these may influence the accuracy of the Kroeze K-Score, a 
published bankruptcy prediction model.  The following sections include an outline of the 
problem to be addressed in this study, the goal for the study, the theoretical framework, 
the research questions, and finally an overview of the significance of the study. 
Background 
The all-cargo airline industry comprises a small group of airline companies that 
do not carry passengers, but instead, move cargo only.  Air transport, highway, rail, 
maritime, and pipeline are the five modes of global transportation for goods.  While all 
modes except pipeline can transport the same commodities, maritime and air are the only 
two that can support transoceanic freight transport.  Maritime transport is typically used 
for the low-cost transport of goods, whereas airfreight has the benefit of speed, reliability, 
and security (Boeing, 2009; Button, 2010).  Changes in world air-cargo traffic are linked 
to changes in the world gross domestic product (GDP); therefore, as the world economy 
expands, so does the demand for air transport (Boeing, 2009; Hellermann, 2006; 
International Air Transport Association [IATA], 2010a).  Between 1987 and 1997, 
worldwide demand for the transport of air cargo grew at an average rate of 7.1% 
annually; however, this growth slowed after September 11, 2001, to an annual growth 
rate of 4.1% (Boeing, 2009; IATA, 2010a).  After the terrorist attacks in the United States 
on September 11, 2001, the price of fuel increased, increasing the cost of air shipments 
and causing companies to migrate toward less expensive road, rail, and maritime 
transport (Boeing, 2009; IATA, 2010).  The high costs of providing air transport and the 
weak economy have pushed many all-cargo airlines to the brink of bankruptcy (Hofer, 
Dresner, & Windle, 2009; IATA, 2010b). 
3 
 
Of the many financial modeling techniques used to predict bankruptcy, no 
agreement exists within academia or the financial industry on which is best (Hensher & 
Jones, 2007; Ribbink et al., 2009; Ward, 2007).  Certain bankruptcy prediction models 
tend to work better than other models in certain industries, and most models need to be 
calibrated to specific industry groups (Kroeze, 2005).  The Altman Z-score model has 
been used in bankruptcy prediction research since the late 1960s (McKee, 2007).  
Altman's Z-score model uses multiple discriminant analysis to determine bankruptcy 
potential and has been tested on numerous industries with positive results (Altman & 
Hotchkiss, 2006; Chung & Szenberg, 1996; Kroeze, 2005; Ribbink et al., 2009; Scaggs & 
Crawford, 1986).  The Altman Z-score model was updated in 2006 as the Altman Z”-
score to improve its prediction capability; however, the model must be adjusted to 
specific industries (Altman & Hotchkiss, 2006).   
The Kroeze (2005) model (K-score) modified the Altman Z”-score model to 
improve the bankruptcy prediction performance for the passenger airline industry; 
however, the performance results of most statistical techniques used in failure prediction 
modeling provide similar results, and since there appears to be little “difference in the 
predictive abilities of statistical models, it is important to analyze the problems related to 
their use” (Ooghe, Spaenjers, & Vandermoere, 2009, p. 8).  Youn and Gu (2010) 
supported Ooghe et al.’s (2009) assertion, indicating that future research on statistical 
financial modeling should explore nonstatistical variables (e.g., qualitative factors) to 
improve prediction accuracy.  The Kroeze model has been used to predict bankruptcy in 
the passenger airline industry (Kroeze, 2005), but no literature was found to indicate that 
the Kroeze model has been used for bankruptcy prediction on the all-cargo airline 
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industry nor, like other models, have qualitative factors been explored.  This study 
attempted to explore qualitative factors influencing the effectiveness of the Kroeze K-
Score bankruptcy prediction model for the all-cargo airline industry. 
Problem Statement 
The problem addressed in this study was the inability of published financial 
prediction models to account for the nonstatistical factors that negatively influence 
bankruptcy prediction in the all-cargo airline industry (Kroeze, 2005; Ooghe et al., 2009; 
Ribbink et al., 2009; Wetter & Wennberg, 2009; Youn & Gu, 2010).  Although financial 
measurements are used to calculate the health of a company, there are many nonstatistical 
factors influencing the fiscal viability of the company.  Most, if not all, of the prediction 
models fail to account for these factors.  This research was used to identify and 
enumerate some of the nonstatistical factors influencing the reliability and validity of the 
Kroeze model (Kroeze, 2005).   
The all-cargo airline industry is critical to the world economy because it provides 
fast, secure trade over long distances for shippers of high value and perishable goods and 
carries over 50% of global airfreight (Boeing, 2009; Hellermann, 2006; Jones & Hensher, 
2005).  The importance of air cargo and the impact of its loss were witnessed in April 
2010 when a volcanic ash cloud shut most European airspace to flights; within days, 
companies started running out of parts and had to stop production lines (IATA, 2010b).  
Between 2005 and 2009, two of the 17 all-cargo airlines in the United States declared 
bankruptcy and liquidated, thus removing over 10% of the firms from the market 
(TranStats, 2010).  In addition, bankruptcies can inflict major social and economic cost 
on the world economy (Jones & Hensher, 2005).  Because of the significant economic 
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and social cost associated with bankruptcies, the development of accurate financial 
distress forecasting techniques is important to financial institutions, users of the services, 
suppliers, employees, and governments (Jones & Hensher, 2005).  A better understanding 
of the nonstatistical factors that lead to bankruptcy may provide airline management with 
the tools needed to make better management choices.  A sizeable body of literature on 
financial distress prediction exists, but there is no agreement as to which modeling 
technique is best, and most existing models do not consider nonstatistical variables, 
which are needed to improve bankruptcy prediction (Hensher & Jones, 2007; Jones & 
Hensher, 2005; Ribbink et al., 2009; Ward, 2007).  Of the sizeable body of financial 
distress literature, only a small portion focuses on the airline industry and even less 
specifically on the all-cargo industry (Hofer et al., 2009; Jones & Hensher, 2005).   
Purpose 
The purpose of this qualitative grounded theory research was to explore the 
nonstatistical factors influencing the accuracy of the Kroeze K-Score bankruptcy 
prediction model for the all-cargo airline industry.  Understanding the health of the all-
cargo industry is essential to government, lenders to the industry, academics, and 
investors in air-cargo companies (Jones & Hensher, 2005).  A grounded theory research 
strategy was used to explore nonstatistical factors that confound the Kroeze model and 
consequently make the model unreliable.  The total population of all-cargo airlines in the 
United States between 2005 and 2009 was 17 carriers (TranStats, 2010); however, 
grounded theory design does not start with a specific sample, but instead, draws on 
concepts and their properties and differences (Corbin & Strauss, 1990).  With the 
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application of emergent theory, the research identified some of the factors necessary to 
predict potential bankruptcy in the all-cargo industry more accurately. 
Theoretical Framework 
The theoretical framework for this research is based on both theoretical and 
applied material.  The prediction of bankruptcy using financial ratios was first developed 
in the United States at the turn of the 20th century (Altman, 1967).  Aided by the 
development of computers, Altman (1967) was one of the earliest researchers to use 
multiple discriminant analysis (MDA) to examine corporate bankruptcy (McKee, 2007).  
Since Altman’s 1967 seminal work, a number of other researchers (Chung & Szenberg, 
1996; Hofer at al., 2009; Kroeze, 2005; Ribbink et al., 2009; Scaggs & Crawford, 1986) 
have examined the use of MDA in bankruptcy prediction specifically in the passenger 
airline industry.  Most recently, Kroeze (2005) altered the Altman Z-score model to 
improve the prediction ability specifically for the passenger airline industry.  Most of the 
researchers reported a positive relationship between the various models’ bankruptcy 
prediction and actual bankruptcy events.   
The neural networks (NN) approach may also be used to assess airline financial 
performance.  While some research has shown a positive outcome for NN (Gritta, Wang, 
Davalos, & Chow, 2000), the complexity of the statistical methodology involved in an 
NN approach limits its utility to individual investors, airline management, and other 
stakeholders (Kroeze, 2005).  Overall, past airline bankruptcy prediction models have 
“not improved the understanding of failure processes much, but rather improved the 
statistical methodology” (Gudmundsson, 2002, p. 21).  The next step in the improvement 
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of a statistically based approach is to understand the nonstatistical variables that affect the 
existing models (Ooghe et al., 2009; Youn & Gu, 2010).   
The use of nonstatistical variables in bankruptcy prediction has been marginally 
examined (Gudmundsson, 2002, Kim & Han, 2003, Ooghe et al., 2009, Sun & Li, 2007, 
Youn & Gu, 2010).  Past research on nonstatistical variables have primarily focused on 
attempting to quantify qualitative variables and force them into a prediction model 
(Gudmundsson, 2002, Ooghe et al., 2009).  However, past research has not attempted to 
develop a comprehensive list of the nonstatistical variables that affect bankruptcy 
prediction models (Gudmundsson, 2002).  This research extended Kroeze’s (2005) work 
and provided a better understanding of the nonstatistical factors as advocated by Ooghe at 
al. (2009) and Young and Gu (2010). 
The grounded theory method was selected as the most appropriate research 
methodology to explore the qualitative factors that may influence quantitative bankruptcy 
protection models.  Grounded theory attempts to generate new theory directly from the 
data, as opposed to testing an existing theory (Birks & Mills, 2011).  The use of grounded 
theory is rooted in social and behavioral science research; however, it is increasingly 
being used to conduct research in other fields (Birks & Mills, 2011).  Grounded theory 
merges positivism and pragmatism into a systematic research approach in which constant 
comparative analysis is used to build categories that are then used to explain processes 
associated with the phenomena (Birks & Mills, 2011, Charmaz, 2006).  Grounded theory 
enables the researcher to take a fresh look at a problem and not be bound by preconceived 
notions and past research (Birks & Mills, 2011).     
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Research Questions 
Using grounded theory design the objective of this research was to discover and 
specify the nonstatistical influences that affect the accuracy of the Kroeze prediction 
model in predicting bankruptcy of all-cargo airlines.  The intent of grounded theory is to 
explain the phenomenon in the research question using constant comparative analysis 
(Glaser & Strauss, 1967).  Grounded theory is used to generate new theory directly from 
data, not test existing theory (Birks & Mills, 2011).  To address the purpose of the study, 
the following research question was explored: 
Q1. What nonstatistical factors influence the K-Score bankruptcy prediction 
models in the all-cargo airline industry?  
Nature of the Study 
The research design was a qualitative grounded theory study on nonstatistical 
factors that influence the prediction accuracy of bankruptcy prediction models in the all-
cargo airlines.  In this study, the researcher examined the Kroeze K-Score bankruptcy 
prediction model and the qualitative factors that influence the model.  The grounded 
theory approach revealed nonstatistical factors affecting the bankruptcy prediction 
accuracy of the Kroeze model in U.S.-based all-cargo airlines.  This research builds on 
the work of Scaggs and Crawford (1986), Kroeze (2005), Hofer et al. (2009), and others 
to improve bankruptcy prediction, specifically to the all-cargo airlines bankruptcy 
prediction, which is lacking in the literature.   
The findings and conclusions reached by this researcher provide a better 
understanding of the Kroeze K-Score bankruptcy prediction model and the model's use 
within the all-cargo airline industry.  Historical financial data from all-cargo companies 
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was used as the input data for the Kroeze model to determine the model's accuracy.  The 
financial data were obtained via data mining of specific financial data from the U.S. 
Department of Transportation (DOT), U.S. Bureau of Transportation Statistics, and 
Research and Innovative Technology Administration (RITA) database, also known as 
TranStats.  Data from the period of 2005 to 2009 were inserted into the Kroeze K-score 
model and the results compared to actual bankruptcy events within the industry.  The 
starting year for the data of 2005 was chosen to avoid the turmoil in the aviation industry 
after the terrorist attacks of September 2001, and 2009 was the most current data 
available at the start of this research.  The results provided a baseline from which to 
explore issues and features that influence the accuracy of the model.  The data for the 
grounded theory research were obtained from a multitude of sources, such as scholarly 
articles, industry related magazines, technical papers, books, government publications, 
company and industry literature, and websites (Birks & Mills, 2011; Corbin & Strauss, 
1990). 
Significance of the Study 
Understanding the health of the all-cargo industry is important to governments, 
lenders to the industry, academics, and investors in air-cargo companies (Boeing, 2009).  
Additionally, auditors require a bankruptcy risk model as part of their due diligence 
responsibilities (McKee, 2007).  The transport of cargo by air is an important part of the 
global supply chain.  Air cargo provides the ability to transport finished and unfinished 
goods quickly to factories dispersed around the globe and to satisfy market demand for 
goods produced great distances from their markets (IATA, 2010a).  Additionally, the 
transport by air of perishable goods allows producers to supply flowers and fresh fruit out 
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of season throughout the world (Becker & Dill, 2007; Hellermann, 2006).  The health of 
the air-cargo industry can have a direct impact on the ability to transport goods by air 
effectively and; therefore, can directly affect the supply chain and the world economy 
(Boeing, 2009; IATA, 2010a).   
This study examined the nonstatistical factors that influenced the Kroeze K-score 
bankruptcy prediction model, which is a variation of the Altman Z-score, a widely used 
bankruptcy prediction model (Wetter & Wennberg, 2009).  The Kroeze K-score model 
has an advantage over the Altman model because it has been specifically calibrated to the 
aviation industry (Kroeze, 2005).  This research provides insight into the nonstatistical 
factors that influence not only the Kroeze model, but could also affect any model based 
on the Altman Z-score.  This grounded theory research adds to the body of literature in 
two ways.  First, the research extends the literature on the financial modeling of firms and 
provides another tool to determine the financial health of a company.  Second, this 
research adds to the body of airline-specific papers and provides all-cargo airline 
management with a tool to help identify nonstatistical issues affecting the financial health 
of the company, which may allow management to alter decisions to improve a firm's 
financial situation.  
Definitions 
Below is a list of terms germane to this study.   
All-cargo airlines.  All-cargo airlines are airlines that specialize in transporting 
only freight (Wensveen, 2007). 
Altman Z”-score.  The Altman Z”-score is an updated Altman Z-score 
bankruptcy prediction model of the form Z” = 6.56(X1) + 3.26(X2) + 6.72(X3) + 
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1.05(X4) + 3.25.  In the Z”-score model, X1 = working capital/total assets, X2 = retained 
earnings/total assets, X3 = operating income/total assets, and X4 = book value of 
equity/total liabilities (Altman & Hotchkiss, 2006). 
Bankruptcy.  Bankruptcy occurs with a firm’s declaration of bankruptcy to a 
judicial organization, normally when a firm’s total liabilities exceed the value of its total 
assets (Altman & Hotchkiss, 2006). 
Book value of equity.  Book value of equity is total assets over total liabilities, 
sometimes referred to as net assets (Stickney & Weil, 2000). 
Cargo aircraft.  Cargo aircraft are aircraft built or converted to carry only freight 
(Wensveen, 2007). 
Cargo revenue ton-miles.  Cargo revenue ton-mile is a measure of efficiency in 
the air-cargo industry calculated as revenue-generating cargo times the miles transported, 
which can also be shown as revenue ton-kilometers (RTKs) (Wensveen, 2007). 
Default.  Default occurs when a firm violates a condition of an agreement with a 
creditor, such as missing a scheduled loan or bond payment (Altman & Hotchkiss, 2006). 
Distressed.  Distressed firms are firms that have had consecutive financial losses, 
but are not necessarily bankrupt (Ward, 2007).  Most bankruptcy models predict financial 
distress in a firm (Altman & Hotchkiss, 2006; Gritta & Lippman, 2010).  
Failure.  Failure occurs when the realized rate of return on capital is lower than 
prevailing rates on similar investments (Altman & Hotchkiss, 2006). 
Freight tonnes-kilometers (FTKs).  Freight tonnes-kilometer is an efficiency 
measurement in the air-cargo industry calculated as total freight tonnes carried times the 
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total number of kilometers flown (e.g., one tonne of cargo carried one kilometer)(Boeing, 
2010). 
Insolvency.  Insolvency occurs when a firm cannot meet its current obligations, 
possibly leading to bankruptcy if the obligations cannot be covered in the short term 
(Altman & Hotchkiss, 2006). 
Kroeze K-score.  The Kroeze K-Score bankruptcy prediction model is based on 
the Altman Z”-score model, altered to improve the bankruptcy prediction capability in 
the passenger airline industry.  The Kroeze K-Score model is of the form K = .268(X1) + 
.838(X2) + .111(X3) + έ, where X1 = working capital/total assets, X2 = retained 
earnings/total assets, X3 = book value of equity/total liabilities, έ = error term, and K = 
overall index (Kroeze, 2005). 
Operating income.  Operating income is the profit realized from a business 
operation, excluding operating expenses and depreciation from gross income (“Operating 
Income,” 2010).  Operating income is also known as operating profit and is calculated as 
gross income minus operating expenses minus depreciation (“Operating Income,” 2010). 
Retained earnings.  Retained earnings score is calculated as the net income over 
the life of a firm, less all dividends.  Retained earnings can also be stated as the owners’ 
equity less capital invested (Stickney & Weil, 2000). 
Total assets.  Total assets are the total items a firm owns, normally identified as 
current or fixed, current being items that will be consumed within 1 year.  Fixed assets 
are expected to provide benefits for more than 1 year, such as buildings or airplanes 
(“Total Assets,” 2010). 
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Total liabilities.  Total liabilities of a firm are the total debts or obligations, such 
as accounts payable, accrued liabilities, and other debts (“Total Liabilities,” 2010). 
Working capital.  Working capital is calculated as the current assets minus 
current liabilities.  Working capital is also called net working capital or net current assets 
(Stickney & Weil, 2000). 
Summary 
All-cargo airlines are an integral part of the global supply chain, and their 
financial health is important to maintaining an efficient supply chain (Boeing, 2009; 
Hellermann, 2006).  Cargo airlines tend to operate on low margins and are affected by 
economic cycles, so they are prone to bankruptcy (Boeing, 2009; Hofer et al., 2009; 
Kroeze, 2005).  Because of the significant economic cost associated with bankruptcies 
and the loss of air-cargo carrying capacity, the development of an accurate financial 
distress forecasting model is important to financial institutions, users of the services, 
suppliers, employees, and governments (Jones & Hensher, 2005). 
Using grounded theory, this research was used to explore a popular bankruptcy 
prediction model to determine external factors that may influence the model's prediction 
ability in all-cargo airlines.  This research expands on the work of Altman and Hotchkiss 
(2006), Kroeze (2005), Hofer et al. (2009), Scaggs and Crawford (1986), and others in 
relation to the financial modeling of firms and specifically to the all-cargo airline 
industry.  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
A review of the literature reveals the need for modifications to existing 
bankruptcy prediction models for the all-cargo airline industry that explore nonstatistical 
factors.  The use of multiple discriminant analysis (MDA) and neural networks (NN) for 
predicting financial distress in firms dominates the literature (Altman, 1968; Altman & 
Hotchkiss, 2006; Gritta et al., 2000; Kroeze, 2005; Scaggs & Crawford, 1986); however, 
statistical models have major limitations because they do not consider nonstatistical 
factors influencing the financial health of a company (Ooghe et al., 2009; Wetter & 
Wennberg, 2009).  Examples of some of these nonstatistical factors may include airline 
management, cultural themes, and the type of aircraft and route structure the airline uses.   
This literature review is organized by the following themes.  In the first section, 
the nature of bankruptcy is discussed and a baseline understanding of bankruptcy is 
provided.  In the second section, the air-cargo industry, industry economics, fleet 
management, air-cargo revenue management, and the difficulties related to revenue 
management within the industry are discussed.  In the third section, an overview of the 
current state of predicting financial distress is provided as well as a review of Hofer et 
al.’s study (2009) that examined the extent to which an airline’s financial distress affects 
pricing behavior is discussed.  The fourth and most extensive section is a detailed 
description of some of the financial models found in the literature, which is needed to 
understand how the models work and how qualitative factors may affect the models.  
Altman’s (1968) seminal research using MDA to predict financial distress was explored 
as well as the adjusted Kroeze K-Score model.  In addition, the use of NN by Gritta, 
Adrangi, Adams, and Tatyanina (2008) for predicting financial distress in firms is 
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reviewed.  The use of statistical methods are limited in bankruptcy prediction so the fifth 
section contains a discussion of nonstatistical factors that may affect a model's prediction 
capability, which may include management, cultural factors, and choices in aircraft and 
routes (Gudmundsson, 2002; Ooghe et al., 2009).  The final section provides an overview 
of the development of grounded theory from Glaser and Strauss (1967) to current 
literature on the use of grounded theory by Charmaz (2006) and Birks and Mills (2011).   
Nature of Bankruptcy 
The word bankruptcy originated from the Latin, meaning broken bench (Beraho, 
2010).  In Latin, bancusis a tradesman’s bench where Roman moneylenders conducted 
their trade, and ruptus means rotten or broken; thus, these two words combined mean a 
place of business that is rotten or broken (Beraho, 2010).  While bankruptcy as a legal 
recourse has been in place for over 2,000 years, the first authoritative bankruptcy laws 
were developed in 16th century England (Beraho, 2010).  At that time, bankruptcy was 
considered a criminal offense, but today bankruptcy is based on prevention or corporate 
reorganizations (Beraho, 2010). 
Legal bankruptcy results from a legal judgment in which a creditor has filed a 
petition against a debtor, or a debtor has voluntarily filed a petition of insolvency 
(Beraho, 2010).  Jones and Hensher (2005) noted that bankruptcy could inflict a major 
economic and social cost on the economy.  Ward (2007) echoed Jones and Hensher 
stating that “bankruptcy is a legal event and not an economic event” (p. 95).  Bankruptcy 
usually occurs when a company declares a state of bankruptcy to a judicial organization, 
normally when a company’s total liabilities exceed the value of its total assets (Altman & 
Hotchkiss, 2006); therefore, the total net worth of the company is negative and often 
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leads to an attempt to reorganize the company under the legal protection of the court 
system or the total liquidation of the remaining assets (Altman & Hotchkiss, 2006).  
While liquidation may occur after a formal declaration of bankruptcy, the intent of 
modern bankruptcy laws is for the rehabilitation of the firm.  In a bankruptcy, the firm is 
given the opportunity, under protection of the courts from debtors, to reorganize, remain 
viable, preserve employment opportunities, and retain whatever goodwill it still possesses 
(Altman & Hotchkiss, 2006; Beraho, 2010).  A firm having an economic value greater 
than its liquidation value is a candidate for reorganization, but if the firm's economic 
value is less than its liquidation value, then liquidation is generally the best alternative 
(Altman & Hotchkiss, 2006). 
Formal bankruptcy protection helps the economy by protecting businesses from 
devastating financial adversity (Beraho, 2010); however, Hofer et al. (2009) stated that 
current U.S. bankruptcy laws are intended for the dumbest competitor and undermines 
responsible management and calls for bankruptcy laws that are aimed at rewarding 
success and punishing failure.  “Financially distressed and bankrupt firms sell at lower 
prices than their healthier competitors” (Hofer et al., 2009, p. 239) and; therefore, cause a 
negative economic impact on the industry.  
Before a firm enters formal bankruptcy protection or moves straight to the 
liquidation process, the firm typically moves through a continuum of financial distress 
that may change from day to day (Ward, 2007).  According to Ward, financial distress 
occurs when a company has had consecutive losses, but is not necessarily bankrupt; 
therefore, financial distress is an economic situation, but not necessarily a legal event; the 
legal recognition of bankruptcy can occur whether or not a firm is economically insolvent 
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(Ward, 2007).  While the terms failure, insolvency, and bankruptcy are all terms of 
financial distress, they are often used interchangeably in the literature; however, they are 
distinct (Altman & Hotchkiss, 2006). 
 Goldratt and Cox (2004) noted that the goal of a business is to make money.  
Financial failure occurs when the realized rate of return on capital is lower than 
prevailing rates on similar investments, so again, like financial distress, failure is an 
economic event (Altman & Hotchkiss, 2006).  Failure only occurs with a formal 
declaration of bankruptcy before the courts.  Since failure is an economic situation, it 
may not lead to discontinuance of the firm; in fact, some firms may be in a status of 
failure for many years without failing because the firm meets its current obligations 
(Altman & Hotchkiss, 2006).  Normally, in the case of a failure in which the company 
sustains for some extended period, the decision to stay operational is based on the 
expected future returns (Altman & Hotchkiss, 2006).  The aviation industry is a classic 
example of an industry that operates in a constant state of failure (Hofer et al., 2009).  As 
a whole, the aviation industry often operates close to the realm of failure and often slips 
in and out of bankruptcy protection (Hofer et al., 2009; Ribbink et al., 2009; Vasigh, 
Fleming, & Tacker, 2008).   
Insolvency occurs when a firm cannot meet its current obligations, normally due 
to a lack of liquidity (Altman & Hotchkiss, 2006).  Insolvency can be a temporary 
condition, but can also possibly, though not necessarily, lead to bankruptcy if obligations 
cannot be covered (Altman & Hotchkiss, 2006).  Insolvency is often the cause of a formal 
bankruptcy filing (Altman & Hotchkiss, 2006). 
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There are many reasons why a firm may fail, but it normally comes down to 
negative cash flow.  While management failure is normally the core reason firms fail, 
there are often several contributing factors (Altman & Hotchkiss, 2006; Hofer et al., 
2009).  Altman and Hotchkiss listed reasons that firms fail that are germane to the 
aviation industry.  The first reason is that the aviation industry is considered a chronically 
sick industry; that is, the industry operates on low margins and is in a constant state of 
failure (Guzhva, 2008; Hofer et al., 2009; Vasigh et al., 2008).  The second reason is that 
the deregulation of the aviation industry in the late 1970s removed the protective cover of 
government regulation and its artificial price controls (Altman & Hotchkiss, 2006; Chung 
& Szenberg, 1996; Vasigh et al., 2008).  The third reason is overcapacity.  During the 
1990s, rising demand for air-cargo transport due to the expanding economy resulted in 
air-cargo carriers' adding capacity (Hellermann, 2006); however, since the events of 
September 11, 2001, and the economic downturn in the second half of the first decade of 
2000, the aviation industry has been forced to reduce capacity to the determent of 
passenger service and availability of cargo space for cargo operators (Becker & Dill, 
2007; Bisignani, 2006; Guzhva, 2008; Hellermann, 2006; Hofer et al., 2009; Vasigh et 
al., 2008).  Capacity; however, is difficult to alter because it must be adjusted in 
relatively large increments (Hellermann, 2006).  For example, adding one freighter to a 
cargo company’s fleet could increase the total capacity by 5%-20%, depending on the 
size of the existing fleet (Hellermann, 2006).  Lastly, a reason for aviation's high rate of 
failure is that the aviation industry is highly leveraged with high fixed and labor costs 
(Bisignani, 2006; Vasigh et al., 2008). 
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Air-Cargo Industry 
Sir Richard Branson, founder of Virgin Atlantic Airways, summed up the aviation 
business: “If you want to be a millionaire, start with a billion dollars and open an airline.  
Soon enough you will be a millionaire” (Vasigh et al., 2008, p. 1).  
Three types of aviation companies that deal with the transport of air cargo exist: 
(a) the integrators, also known as express carriers; (b) combination carriers, which are 
passenger airlines that offer lower deck or belly cargo space for the transport of cargo; 
and (c) the pure all-cargo air carriers (Hellermann, 2006; Wensveen, 2007).  The 
integrators, such as UPS, Federal Express, and DHL provide door-to-door transport as a 
packaged or integrated service (Hellermann, 2006; Wensveen, 2007).  Integrators 
typically own or control the entire supply chain from the pickup and delivery trucks, 
sorting facility, and air assets and focus on the transportation of small packages, normally 
less than 100 pounds (Hellermann, 2006).  The combination carriers are passenger 
airlines that offer belly cargo space for the transport of cargo.  Combination carriers 
typically offer point-to-point air transportation for cargo and rely on freight forwarders 
for pickup and delivery service (Wensveen, 2007).  About half of all air cargo moved is 
via belly space on passenger airlines, where a large majority of this supply is driven by 
unrelated market demand, the demand for air passenger transport in this case 
(Hellermann, 2006).  Belly cargo is a co-product of passenger service, so the combination 
carriers have a lower marginal cost and; therefore, can offer the service more cheaply 
than the integrators (Wensveen, 2007).  The third type of air-cargo carrier is the pure all-
cargo carrier.  All-cargo carriers operate dedicated freighter aircraft and do not service 
the passenger market.  All-cargo carriers tend to deal with a small client base with most 
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of the client base comprising freight forwarders that normally make large bookings 
(Becker & Dill, 2007, Hellermann, 2006).  Freight forwarders or intermediaries 
consolidate multiple smaller shipments from various clients into larger shipments, 
effectively buying cargo slots on aircraft wholesale and reselling retail to smaller shippers 
(Hellermann, 2006).  Freight forwarders conclude long-term contacts with all-cargo 
carriers to gain lower purchasing prices, guarantee slots, and hedge against price 
fluctuation (Hellermann, 2006).  Except for the express carriers, the extensive use of 
freight forwards essentially makes the air-cargo market a business-to-business (B2B) 
service (Hellermann, 2006).  Figure 1 depicts the typical air-cargo supply chain. 
 
 
Figure 1. Simplified diagram of the air-cargo supply chain.  Adapted from "Capacity 
Options for Revenue Management: Theory and Applications in the Air Cargo Industry," 
by R. Hellermann, 2006, p. 6. Copyright 2006 by Springer-Verlag Heidelberg, Germany. 
Used with permission. 
A number of small operators owning only a few aircraft dominate the air-cargo 
industry.  No definitive list of all of the world's all-cargo airlines from any source was 
available.  The most definitive list of U.S.-active, all-cargo airlines was adapted from the 
U.S. Department of Transportation, Research and Innovative Technology Administration 
(RITA) TranStats database (see Appendix A). 
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According to Wensveen (2007), senior management of passenger airlines 
considers freighter aircraft as unprofitable and a poor investment, especially when 
compared to the cargo carried in the belly of passenger aircraft (Wensveen, 2007).  Part 
of the senior airline managers may be due to the passenger-centric focus of the passenger 
airlines (Becker & Dill, 2007); however, some of the combination carriers make one third 
to one-half of their gross revenues from belly cargo (Wensveen, 2007).  The problem 
with the shipment of cargo by passenger aircraft is that capacity is uncertain until near 
departure time because capacity is dependent on the number of passengers and the 
volume and weight of their baggage (Becker & Dill, 2007; Hellermann, 2006).  
Additionally, since one of the advantages of transportation by air is speed, urgent or 
perishable cargo dominates the market (Becker & Dill, 2007).  This need for speed means 
that often the demand for air-cargo carriage is generated on short notice (Becker & Dill, 
2007).  The delay in booking hinders the air-cargo industry from maximizing its revenue 
management system.  More details on revenue management will be discussed in the air-
cargo revenue management section later in this chapter. 
Table 1 provides a ranking of the top 10 cargo airlines by freight tonne-kilometers 
(FTK).  Freight tonne-kilometers is an efficiency measure in the air-cargo industry and is 
calculated as total freight tonnes carried times the total number of kilometers flown (e.g., 
one tonne of cargo carried one kilometer; Boeing, 2010).  Table 1 lists two of the 
integrator airlines (Federal Express and UPS), but only one all-cargo carrier, Cargolux, in 
the top ten airlines by FTKs.  The remaining operators are passenger airlines that supply 
belly space and, counter to Wensveen’s (2007) assertion that airline management does 
not consider freighter profitable, they all also operate dedicated freighter aircraft.  The 
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table also confirms that the all-cargo industry comprises many smaller all-cargo carriers 
with no dominant players, since only one all-cargo airline, Cargolux, is in the top 10, and 
none of the U.S. all-cargo airlines is present on the list (see Appendix A).   
Table 1  
Top 10 Scheduled Airlines Ranked by Freight Tonne-Kilometers Carried for year 2010 
Rank Airline Millions of FTKs Industry sector 
1 Korean Air 8,225 Combination and freighters 
2 Cathay Pacific Airways 7,722 Combination and freighters 
3 Lufthansa 6,660 Combination and freighters 
4 Singapore Airlines 6,455 Combination and freighters 
5 Emirates 6,369 Combination and freighters 
6 Federal Express 5,808 Integrator 
7 China Airlines 4,903 Combination and freighter 
8 Air France 4,672 Combination and freighter 
9 Cargolux 4,652 All-cargo 
10 UPS Airlines 4,652 Integrator 
Note. Data obtained from “Top 50 Airlines,”AirCargoWorld.com, September 2010 and “World Air 
Transport Statistics,” IATA 2010b. 
 
According to Boeing (2010), in 2009 there were 1,755 freighter aircraft in 
operation worldwide.  Of these, 37% were standard-body aircraft with a carrying capacity 
of less than 45 tonnes (e.g., DC-9, A320) while 36% of the fleet were medium wide-body 
aircraft that carry between 40 and 80 tonnes (e.g., B777, A330, IL-76), and the remaining 
27% were large wide-body aircraft that carry in excess of 80 tonnes (e.g., B747, MD-11, 
AN-124) (Boeing, 2009, 2010).  The freighter aircraft fleet is projected to grow to almost 
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3,000 aircraft by 2029 with a shift to a larger percentage of wide-body aircraft according 
to the Boeing report (2010).  Table 2 lists the most common freighters grouped into size 
categories used by cargo airlines. 
Table 2  
Freighter Fleet Grouped Into Size Categories 
Standard-body 
(<45 tonnes) 
Medium wide-body 
(40-80 tonnes) 
Large 
(>80 tonnes) 
BAe 146 B767 MD-11 
DC-9 A300 B747 
B737 A310 B777 
B727 L-1011SF A340-600SF 
TU-204 DC-10 A350 
B-707 B787 A380 (cargo version not 
in production) 
DC-8 A330 IL-96T 
B757-200 A340-300SF AN-124 
A320 B777-A SF - 
- IL-76 TD - 
Note. Adapted from “World Air Cargo Forecast 2008-2009,” by Boeing, 2009. Copyright 2009 by Boeing. 
Used with permission. 
 
Of all of the freighter aircraft, the quintessential aircraft is the Boeing B747.  
Developed as the world’s first jumbo jet, the Boeing B747 entered into commercial 
service in 1970; today, the freighter version provides over half of the world’s total 
freighter capacity (Boeing, n.d., 2010; Wensveen, 2007).  The newest version of the 
Boeing B747 freighter is the -8F model, which has a range of 4,390 nautical miles and 
can carry 140 tonnes of cargo (Boeing, n.d.).  The retail price in 2008 of a Boeing B747-8 
freighter was just over $300 million (Boeing, n.d.).  After several years of production 
delays, Cargolux is slated to receive the first B747-8 freighter in late 2011 (Boeing, n.d.).    
Company background.  This section provides further background information 
for the six airlines that were selected as the sample for this study for analysis using 
grounded theory.  In grounded theory, theoretical sampling provides direction for 
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subsequent data collection in a process of constant comparative analysis.  This study 
started with initial purposeful sampling of 17 U.S. all-cargo airlines, and from the 17 
airlines, six were selected based on the results of the K-Score model.  Data from the six 
selected all-cargo carriers were collected, analyzed, and compared using grounded theory 
methodology.  This section provides an overview of each of the six all-cargo carriers that 
were selected.   
ABX Air, Inc.  Between 2005 and 2009, ABX Air, Inc. (ABX) provided 
scheduled and ad hoc charter air-cargo transportation along with package handling, 
warehousing, and line-haul trucking service to its main customer DHL Express (DHL) 
(ABX Air, 2006).  In 2005, ABX operated a network of 19 logistical hubs for DHL in the 
United States.  On a smaller scale, ABX offered aircraft, crew, maintenance, and 
insurance (ACMI) services, also known as wet leasing, for which ABX provided the 
aircraft, crew, maintenance, and insurance to a customer as well as selling aircraft parts, 
providing maintenance and repair services, and flight-training services (ABX Air, 2006).  
ABX was originally founded in 1980 as part of Airborne, Inc. and became an 
independent publicly traded company in August of 2003 as part of the breakup of 
Airborne and the subsequent merger between Airborne and DHL (ABX Air, 2006).   
The ACMI and hub service agreement with DHL, their main customer in 2005, 
provided for a cost-plus pricing structure with a mark-up of 1.75%.  In 2005, ABX 
operated a mixed fleet of 112 aircraft (Boeing 767, DC-8 and DC-9 aircraft) all 
manufactured prior to 1990, and some over 35 years old (ABX Air, 2006).  Older aircraft 
have a higher operating cost due to limited parts inventories, higher fuel burn rates, and 
higher maintenance cost.  On December 31, 2007, ABX merged with Capital Cargo 
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International Airlines and Air Transport International, and all three airlines became 
subsidiaries to the newly formed holding company Air Transport Services Group, Inc. 
(ATSG), a publicly traded holding company on the NASDAQ Stock Market (SEC, 
2010).  In 2008, DHL, ABX’s main customer began to restructure its operations in the 
United States because of substantial financial losses and closed its U.S. operations in 
2009 (SEC, 2010).  ABX continued to operate international delivery services to the U.S. 
for DHL and entered into a lease of 13 Boeing 767 aircraft to DHL through 2017.  At the 
end of 2009, ABX operated 62 aircraft (Boeing 767, Boeing 757, and DC-8s).  This 
represents about a 45% reduction in the number of aircraft over the 2005 fleet size.  For 
the five years included in this study, ABX Air had a negative K-score, indicating that the 
company was in financial distress during the entire study timeframe.  
Arrow Air, Inc.  Arrow Air was originally established in 1947 in California, and 
the company moved to Florida in 1964.  Arrow Air is most famous for the December 
1985 crash of Arrow Air Flight 1285 in Gander Newfoundland, killing 248 members of 
the U.S. Army’s 101st Airborne Division, and 8 crewmembers.  In January 2004, just 
prior to the 2005-2009 sample window of this study, Arrow Air Inc, (dba Arrow Cargo) 
filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection, but emerged 6 months later in June 2004 after 
court approved restructuring (South Florida Sun–Sentinel, 2005).  In 2004, Arrow 
operated the industry’s largest fleet of DC-8 freighter aircraft, older aircraft with high 
fuel burn rates and more costly to maintain, and had 520 employees (South Florida Sun–
Sentinel, 2005).  By the next year, 2005, Arrow employed 750 people (South Florida 
Sun–Sentinel, 2005).  After the 2004 restructuring, Arrow began to acquire larger, more 
fuel efficient DC-10 freighter aircraft and started to phase out the DC-8 fleet.   
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In 2008, MatlinPatterson Global Advisers acquired an 85% stake in Arrow Air 
and intended to increase the fleet of DC-10 freighter aircraft and finish the phase out of 
DC-8s (“MatlinPatterson Global Opportunities Partners,” 2008).  MatlinPatterson 
specialized in distressed debt ownership of firms (Stempal, 2010).  In 2008, Arrow 
operated 10 cargo aircraft (six DC-10s and four DC-8s) and served more than 3,500 
customers, mainly in the United States, Central and South America, and the Caribbean 
(“MatlinPatterson Global Opportunities Partners,” 2008).  By Midyear 2010; however, 
Arrow again entered Chapter 11, and the company was liquidated after failing to find a 
buyer, laying off its workforce of 540 employees (Stempal, 2010).  Arrow Air emerged 
from Chapter 11 the year before this study’s period (2005-2009) and reentered Chapter 
11 the year after this study window.  During the five years that this researcher examined 
financial data, Arrow retained a negative K-score for the entire period, indicating ongoing 
financial distress.  
Atlas Air Inc.  Atlas Air was founded in 1992 and was a wholly owned subsidiary 
of Atlas Air Worldwide Holdings (AAWW), which also owns Polar Air Cargo.  Atlas 
mainly operates in the ACMI cargo aircraft leasing market.  Atlas typically provides an 
aircraft with crew, maintenance, and insurance and is paid a fixed hourly rate with other 
operating expenses such as fuel, landing fees, and ground handling being paid for by the 
customer; this type of arrangement is called a dry lease (Atlas Air, 2006).  Atlas also 
operated in the Air Mobility Command (AMC) charter market, flying cargo under 
contract to the U.S. Military, although within AAWW, the majority of this business was 
flown by Polar Air.  In January 2004, Atlas, along with its holding company and other 
subsidiaries, entered Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection, reorganized, and reemerged 6 
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months later in July 2004 (Atlas Air, 2006).  This bankruptcy coincided with the 
bankruptcy and reemergence of Arrow Air.  In 2005 Atlas was the sole service provider 
of the Boeing 747-400 freighter aircraft, so it had no direct competition in this market; 
however, Atlas also leased older, less fuel-efficient Boeing 747-200 freighters, which had 
more market competition (Atlas Air, 2006).  The Boeing 747-400 had the best operating 
performance in the intercontinental airfreighter market at that time. As of 2005, Atlas 
operated a common fleet of 15 Boeing 747-400 freighters, which increased to 22 B747-
400s by 2009 (Atlas Air, 2010).  In 2009, the average age of Atlas’s B747-400 aircraft 
was less than 20.  Atlas emerged from Chapter 11 the year before this study’s window, 
but retained a positive K-score value throughout the five years covered by this research. 
Cargo 360, Inc and Southern Air Inc.  Cargo 360 was established in 2006 and 
was based in Seattle, Washington.  Oak Hill Capital Partners owned a majority of Cargo 
360 from the beginning and acquired Southern Air in 2008.  Oak Hill merged Cargo 360 
into Southern Air in 2008 and established operations in Norwalk, Conn, operating a fleet 
of 13 Boeing 747-200s (Santiago, 2007).  Cargo 360 provided ACMI services to the 
Pacific Rim mainly under contract with Korean Air Cargo.  Southern Air offered ACMI 
and charter cargo services including AMC charter flights supporting the U.S. military.  
Cargo 360 operated for two years (2006-2007) during the years of this study before 
merging with Southern Air.  For both of these years, Cargo 360 had a negative K-score 
value, indicating financial distress, which could be expected for a startup company.  From 
2005 to 2007 at the time of the merger, Southern had a positive K-score, which indicates 
no financial distress; however, from 2008 to the end of this study in 2009 (after the 
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merger) Southern had a negative K-score, indicating financial distress possibly caused by 
the merger of the weaker Cargo 360.   
Gemini Air Cargo Airways.  Gemini Air Cargo was founded in 1995 and 
provided ACMI using DC-10 freighter aircraft and was based out of Dulles, Virginia.  
Gemini also provided international and domestic scheduled service to international air 
carriers, airfreight forwarders, and AMC.  In 2006, Gemini operated seven DC-10 and 
four MD-11 freighter aircraft, servicing customers that included DHL, Air Canada, and 
FedEx (Boyd, 2006).  As with many airlines, after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 
2001, Gemini saw a downturn in business and went through an out of court financial 
restructuring in 2003 as Gemini started to receive increased business from AMC cargo:  
however, Gemini entered the formal Chapter 11 process in March 2006 after failing to 
comply with several financial covenants (Boyd, 2006).  Gemini emerged four months 
later with fresh capital from Bayside Holdings (Boyd, 2006); however, this fresh capital 
did not help, and Gemini entered Chapter 11 in 2008 and ceased operations.  For both 
years of data available during this study period (2005 and 2006), Gemini had a negative 
K-score, indicating financial distress, which proved to be true because Gemini entered 
Chapter 11 twice during the studies time period.  
Kitty Hawk Air Cargo.  Kitty Hawk Air Cargo was a cargo airline that was 
originally founded in 1989 and was based in Grapevine Texas.  Kitty Hawk Air Cargo 
was a wholly-owned subsidiary of Kitty Hawk, Inc.  Kitty Hawk Air Cargo mainly 
provided airfreight services, ACMI, and ad-hoc charter to a variety of customers (SEC, 
2006).  As of 2005, Kitty Hawk Air Cargo operated seven Boeing 737 freighter aircraft 
and 10 Boeing 727 freighters (SEC, 2006).  Kitty Hawk Air Cargo serviced over 550 
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freight forwarders and logistic company customers in 2005, with the top 25 customers 
accounting for more than 65% of their scheduled freight revenue (SEC, 2006).  Kitty 
Hawk employed 618 full and part-time employees in 2005.  Kitty Hawk Air Cargo, along 
with its parent company Kitty Hawk, Inc. was under Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection 
from 2000 to 2002 when it emerged after reorganization; however, the firm slipped back 
into bankruptcy and liquidation in 2008.  Kitty Hawk stated the reason for the failure was 
significant losses due to high fuel prices and weakness in demand for airfreight services.  
During the research window from 2005 to 2009, Kitty Hawk showed a positive K-score 
for the years 2005, 2006, and 2007, which incorrectly indicated a firm not in financial 
distress. 
This section contained an outline of the air-cargo industry, the types of air 
carriers, key firms in the industry, and type of aircraft typically used and included some 
of the challenges faced by the air-cargo industry.  Also included was background 
information of the six airlines that made-up the sample in this study.  The next section 
will delve into the economics of air-cargo operations. 
Industry Economics 
“The aviation industry is capital intensive and highly leveraged” (Chung & 
Szenberg, 1996, p. 135), and the need to buy and operate expensive aircraft requires 
extensive financing (Boeing, n.d.).  The airline industry’s debt load exceeds most 
industry averages.  In fact, the ratio of long-term debt to total capitalization has been 
estimated at more than 50% (Boeing, n.d.; Chung & Szenberg, 1996; Hellermann, 2006; 
Kroeze, 2005).  Because of the high capitalization of the aviation industry, the financial 
health of the industry is highly correlated with the global economy (Vasigh et al., 2008).  
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As debt loads increase from the purchase of expensive aircraft and high operating 
expenses, so does the likelihood of financial distress (Kroeze, 2005).  Vasigh et al. (2008) 
noted that this financial distress was not surprising, as the aviation industry is highly 
related to economic growth; thus, the industry suffers when the economy stalls.  
Hellermann (2006) supported Vasigh et al. by stating that economic fluctuation affects 
air-cargo carriers in an amplified way.  As the world’s economy expands, so does the 
demand for the movement of air cargo.  In 2009, fuel prices increased, putting additional 
financial pressure on the aviation industry (Boeing, 2009).  
The air-cargo industry, like the passenger airline industry, is reactive to national 
and world economies (Chung & Szenberg, 1996).  An expanding economy leads to 
increased production, which results in an increase in demand for air cargo.  Table 3 
shows the U.S. real gross domestic product (GDP) for the Years 2003-2009 and the 
growth of air-cargo traffic based on freight tonnes.  World air-cargo demand tends to 
drop off quickly as the world economy begins to stall, but also tends to be an early 
indicator of economic recovery, as demand increases early in the economic upturn.  This 
trend is evident in Table 3 in that the growth in air-cargo traffic peaked in 2006, whereas 
real GCP lags behind air-cargo traffic and starts to level in 2007 and decrease in 2009.   
An economic downturn can quickly result in an overcapacity in the cargo airlines, 
and an upturning economy can quickly leave the industry with too little capacity.  
Obtaining a new aircraft requires a long lead-time, so airline companies attempt to time 
the purchase of aircraft to coincide with a predicted future upturn in the economy 
(Hellermann, 2006).  If management gets it right, then the new aircraft arrive in time to 
meet the increase in demand as the economy heats up, but getting the timing wrong 
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means that management is left with an expensive asset that cannot be fully utilized 
(Hellermann, 2006).  For example, Cargolux was to receive their first new Boeing 747-8 
freighter aircraft in 2009.  At that time, there was overcapacity in the industry, not a good 
time to be adding capacity; however, due to production delays, Cargolux is currently not 
scheduled to receive their first B747-8F until the fall of 2011 (Boeing, n.d.).  Because of 
under capacity in the industry in 2010, Cargolux had to lease two older aircraft that were 
more costly to operate aircraft to meet demand (Cargolux, 2010). 
Table 3  
U.S. Real Gross Domestic Product (GCP) From 2003-2009 
 
 
Year 
Change from 
preceding period in 
real GDP (%) 
 
Real GDP (%) 
(Index 2005=100) 
Growth in air-cargo 
traffic (%) (based 
on freight tonnes) 
2003 2.5 93.69 -6.67 
2004 3.6 97.04 9.95 
2005 3.1 100.00 2.26 
2006 2.7 102.67 5.85 
2007 1.9 104.67 5.03 
2008 0.0 104.67 -3.11 
2009 -2.6 101.92 -8.89 
Note. Source for GDP, Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce. National Income 
and Product Account (NIPA) historical tables. Accessed 19 Jan 2011; Source for growth in air traffic was 
IATA Financial Forecast, December 2010. 
 
One of the reasons why the aviation industry has financial difficulties and low 
profit margins is that demand fluctuates constantly, but supply is relatively fixed. This is 
true for both passenger and cargo airlines (Vasigh et al., 2008).  This fluctuation in 
demand makes it hard to optimize the use of available capacity (Vasigh et al., 2008).  
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Yield or revenue management is the process the aviation industry uses in an attempt to 
level out the demand fluctuations (Hellermann, 2006; Vasigh et al., 2008).  The next 
section of this chapter includes the fleet management procedures used by airlines when 
deciding what type of aircraft to use, a potentially important nonstatistical aspect 
influencing the accuracy of bankruptcy prediction. 
Fleet Management 
To achieve economies of scale, airlines prefer to operate a limited number of 
different types of aircraft (Fleming & Tacker, 2008; Vasigh et al., 2008).  For example, 
Southwest Airlines only operates a common fleet of Boeing 737s, and Cargolux operates 
Boeing 747s (Cargolux, 2010; Vasigh et al., 2008).  Fleet management is the planning 
process to determine the type and mix of aircraft to operate.  Fleet planning is a 
cornerstone of airline operational efficiency and is essential for the medium- and long-
term planning process and the long-term financial survivability of an airline (Flouris, 
2010).  Aircraft are an expensive asset, and because of the high change over cost (re-
training of flight crews, maintenance crews, ground equipment, spare parts inventories), 
the introduction of a new fleet of aircraft takes times and is a strategic management 
decision (Flouris, 2010).  Once purchased, a typical aircraft type may be used for 10-20 
years by an airline (Flouris, 2010).  Operating a common fleet has the advantage of 
increased operational flexibility, because it is easier to find replacement aircraft or flight 
crew in the event of irregular operations (Vasigh et al., 2008).  Once the fleet mix is 
determined, strict air-cargo revenue management processes are needed. 
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Air-Cargo Revenue Management 
The all-cargo airline business is capital intensive because of the need to own and 
maintain aircraft (Kroeze, 2005).  The all-cargo airlines struggle for market share, operate 
on low margins, need high cash flow to stay solvent, and are heavily tied to economic 
cycles; thus, all-cargo airlines constantly live on the brink of bankruptcy (Boeing, 2009; 
Hofer et al., 2009; Kroeze, 2005). 
The air-cargo industry differs from the passenger industry in that cargo is 
normally not booked round trip, so cargo flow is unpaired and often unbalanced.  For 
example, there may be more demand for cargo moving in one direction than the other 
(Hellermann, 2006).  This situation often requires cargo airlines to fly less-than-full 
aircraft on some routes.  For example, an airline may have to fly a less-than-full aircraft 
to China and return with a full aircraft.  Unlike passenger aircraft for which there is a 
fixed capacity (i.e., seats), cargo is multidimensional (volume and weight), so the load 
must be balanced and optimized by mixing cargo of different volumes and weights to 
maximize the load.  Optimization of cargo loads requires in-depth planning, but some 
space can be sold twice (“e.g., to one customer with voluminous, light cargo and another 
with heavy-weight, high-density cargo”; Hellermann, 2006, p. 7).  All-cargo airlines also 
differ from passenger airlines in routing possibilities.  Cargo does not have to fly a direct 
route; the only constraint is the required delivery time (Hellermann, 2006). 
Revenue management planning in the air-cargo business is much more difficult 
than in the passenger airline industry (Becker & Dill, 2007).  Passenger airlines have a 
vast amount of historical booking data they use to determine demand and pricing on 
various routes, which the cargo airlines lack (Hellermann, 2006).  Because of the 
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differences between the supply and demand of the two airline industries, revenue 
management for cargo airlines is more complex than for passenger only airlines (Becker 
& Dill, 2007).  The capacity supply issues include the following: (a) uncertainty of 
capacity offer, (b) multidimensional capacity, (c) heterogeneous production platforms, (d) 
large number of routing possibilities, and (e) restrictions, and multisegment flights 
(Becker & Dill, 2007).  Meanwhile, market demand issues include stowage loss, unequal 
trade lanes, short booking periods, volatile business, continuous show-up rates, market 
structure, and data shortcomings (Becker & Dill, 2007).  For cargo shipments, the 
capacity for cargo is unpredictable until close to the time of departure (Becker & Dill, 
2007); that is, the weight or volume may fluctuate, taking up more or less room on the 
aircraft, unlike passenger airlines in which a seat is a seat.  Another issue is market 
structure.  Air-cargo airlines typically only provide capacity to a limited number of 
customers, such as freight forwarders, who make the most of the bookings (Hellermann, 
2006); therefore, the loss of one booking can have a large impact on the revenue for that 
flight.  Seasonal fluctuation can also affect air-cargo operations in the short term by 
leading to under capacity in the high season, such as the months leading up to the winter 
holidays, or overcapacity in the low season, such as after the holiday rush (Kroeze, 2005). 
Thus far, this chapter has included the nature of bankruptcy in general and 
provided some background on the air-cargo industry, the economics factors that can 
affect the industry, and the use of revenue management within the industry.  The next 
section of this chapter contains the use of various models to predict financial distress in a 
firm in general and specifically the use of these models in predicting financial distress in 
the aviation industry. 
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Predicting Financial Distress 
Research on financial distress in a company has produced various models since 
the 1960s (McKee, 2007), but there is no agreement on the best methodology (Hensher & 
Jones, 2007; Ribbink et al., 2009; Ward, 2007).  With the recent spate of highly 
publicized corporate failures, the need for management, investors, and other stakeholders 
to be able to predict impending financial distress has grown.  As noted above, all-cargo 
airlines operate on low margins and need high cash flow to stay solvent (Boeing, 2009; 
Hofer et al., 2009; Kroeze, 2005).  High fuel cost, high labor cost, and expensive fixed 
assets contribute to low-operating margins for air-cargo airlines and make them prone to 
bankruptcy (Boeing, 2009; Ribbink et al., 2009); however, the air-cargo industry is 
critical to the world economy because it provides fast, secure trade over long distances 
for shippers of high-value and perishable goods. 
Financial distress is the circumstance in which the liquidation value of a firm’s 
assets is less than the total face value of creditor claims (Chen, Weston, & Altman, 1995).  
During financial distress periods, airlines may file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection 
to obtain reductions in labor, leasing, and debt costs (Hofer et al., 2009).  This move, in 
turn, may give the distressed firm a competitive edge.  Because prior research had 
suggested distressed airlines lower their fares as they approached bankruptcy, Hofer et al. 
examined the extent to which an airline’s financial distress affects pricing behavior.  
Hofer et al. used the Altman’s Z”-score model to determine which airlines were in 
distress and then compared the level of financial distress to ticket prices.  Hofer et al. 
found financially distressed firms tend to reduce prices.  Airlines heading into Chapter 11 
bankruptcy protection tended to reduce fares by an average of 5.6% within 90-180 days 
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prior to filing for bankruptcy protection (Borenstein & Rose, 1995); however, even with 
reduced fares, firms that entered Chapter 11 tended to see a decline in market share on 
existing routes (Borenstein & Rose, 1995). 
Financial Models 
Bankruptcy financial models are used to predict the future financial health of a 
company.  Many financial modeling techniques are available, but there is no agreement 
within academia or the financial industry on which model is best (Hensher & Jones, 
2007; Ribbink et al., 2009; Ward, 2007).  In fact, certain models tend to work better than 
others in certain industries, and most models need to be calibrated to specific industry 
groups (Kroeze, 2005).  One of the more common financial bankruptcy models discussed 
in the literature is the Altman Z-score model developed by Altman in a 1967 dissertation 
and published in the Journal of Finance in 1968.  This seminal work has been altered 
over the last 40 years by Altman (Altman & Hotchkiss, 2006) and others (Chung & 
Szenberg, 1996; Kroeze, 2005; Ribbink et al., 2009; Scaggs & Crawford, 1986) and 
tested on numerous companies. 
Ward (2007) examined the construct validity of different financial models for 
predicting financial distress.  Ward scrutinized three response variables, compared the 
stability of the results to determine their validity, and theorized that unstable response 
variables would indicate that they were measuring different constructs.  Also posited was 
that previous studies had been dependent on the response variable used.  A financially 
distressed company is defined as a firm that has consecutive losses, possibly indicating a 
cash flow problem, but not necessarily headed to bankruptcy (Altman & Hotchkiss, 
2006).  Ward (2007) observed that companies typically do not fall into a simple bankrupt 
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or nonbankrupt status, but move through different degrees of financial distress that may 
vary from day to day, and bankruptcy is a legal event, not an economic matter.  Even 
though bankruptcy may take on different degrees of distress, many of the current 
financial models provide only a black or white (bankrupt or not) result.  The results of 
prior financial distress studies that used different measures of financial distress cannot be 
compared because they had different constructs (Ward, 2007). 
Not all financial models need to be complicated.  For example, Liu (2009) 
examined the link between an airline’s financial condition and its probability of entering 
new markets.  The model used for Liu’s research focused on financially distressed 
airlines and not bankrupt firms, so only basic financial ratios were used instead of the 
bankruptcy models proposed by Altman (1968).  Liu noted that a firm can be financially 
strong, but if faced with weak demand can quickly become economically distressed or 
can have strong demand, but be financially weak due to poor management.  Liu’s 
research also included nonfinancial variables, such as large hub and slot-controlled 
airports, which could be barriers for entry into new airport-pair markets.  To limit 
congestion, slot-controlled airports ration the number of landings and take-offs an airline 
can do each day.  Slot-controlled airports (i.e., in the United States, only Chicago O’Hare, 
Reagan National, New York LaGuardia, and New York Kennedy) tend to affect only 
passenger airlines; all-cargo airlines tend to stay away from these airports because of 
congestion and cost (Liu, 2009).  Liu found that legacy carriers are less likely to enter 
new markets as the carriers leverage increases and postulated that a distressed airline acts 
more conservatively in the end, but has an aggressive pricing strategy in the short run.  
Liu’s simplified model predicted short-term financial distress in the aviation industry; 
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however, an in-depth model is needed to predict bankruptcy accurately several years into 
the future. 
The use of statistical models has been questioned by some authors because of 
their inability to take qualitative information into consideration (Fabozzi, Chen, Hu, & 
Pan, 2010; Liu, 2009).  In some cases, quantitative models may classify a company as in 
financial distress, but the firm may never fail because of proactive action by management 
or other attributes that quantitative models cannot detect (Fabozzi et al., 2010).  The 
results of most statistical techniques used in bankruptcy prediction modeling provide 
analogous results (Ooghe et al., 2009).  As there appears to be little difference in the 
bankruptcy predictive abilities of most statistical failure models, it is important to explore 
nonstatistical factors, such as company management and economic and industry 
influences, which statistical methods cannot measure (Ooghe et al., 2009).  Recent 
research has concluded that stand-alone traditional statistical models are limited in their 
bankruptcy prediction ability and nonstatistical factors should be investigated (Ooghe et 
al., 2009; Youn & Gu, 2010).  Wetter and Wennberg (2009) supported Ooghe et al. 
(2009) and Youn and Gu's (2010) assertion that pure statistical methods have major 
limitations while nonstatistical factors should be explored.  The following section will 
discuss the more widely used financial bankruptcy models and the advantages and 
disadvantages of each.   
Altman Z-score model.  Throughout the literature, the Altman Z-score is touted 
as one of the seminal works on bankruptcy prediction (Wetter & Wennberg, 2009).  In 
Altman’s (1967) dissertation work, he developed a bankruptcy prediction model for 
manufacturing firms using multiple discriminant analysis (MDA).  For predictive 
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variables, the model used five independent financial ratios based on a company’s 
liquidity, profitability, solvency, and capital turnover.  The Altman Z-score model is of 
the form Z = .012(X1) + .014(X2) + .033(X3) + .006(X4) + .999(X5), where X1 = 
working capital/total assets, X2 = retained earnings/total assets, X3 = earnings before 
interest and taxes/total assets, X4 = market value equity/book value of total debt, X5 = 
sales/total assets, and Z = overall index.  Altman tested the model on 66 manufacturing 
firms and derived a discriminant function (or Z-Score) for each of the companies using 
MDA (Altman, 1967).  The dependent variable, the Z-score, was then used to classify 
companies as either bankrupt or nonbankrupt with some falling into a gray area when the 
model could not determine the bankruptcy potential of a firm (being too close to call or 
what Altman called the zone of ignorance) (Altman, 1967).  The model developed by 
Altman correctly predicted corporate bankruptcies in 94% of the samples (66 
manufacturing firms) 1 year in advance of failure (Altman, 1967).  Altman found the 
most serious deterioration in these ratios occurred 2 to 3 years before financial failure 
(Altman, 1967).  Additionally, the model was able to predict failure in 72% of the 
samples 2 years in advance and 48% 3 years in advance (Altman, 1967). 
Traditional financial ratios are input into the Z-score failure prediction model, and 
then MDA is used to derive an overall credit score (Z-score).  Firms with Z-scores above 
3.0 are considered to be in the safe zone while firms with scores between 1.8 and 3.0 are 
in the gray zone, and firms having a Z-score less than 1.8 are in financial danger (Altman, 
1967).  As of 1983, about 10% of U.S. manufacturing firms had a Z-score below 1.8, 
though Altman (1983) indicated not all of those firms would end up in Chapter 11 
proceedings.  In fact, the stigma of official bankruptcy and the expected cost in declaring 
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Chapter 11 motivates most firms to avoid court-regulated reorganization (Altman & 
Hotchkiss, 2006).  Altman provided background on the application of the Z-score to two 
manufacturing firms, Manville Corporation and International Harvester (IH).  Both firms 
had downward trending scores between 1972 and 1980, and Altman projected that, at the 
speed of the declining rate, both Manville and IH had little chance of survival because 
firms with such low Z-scores rarely recover from such depths (Altman, 1983).  Because 
of financial troubles, IH was sold to J.I. Case in 1984, and Manville Corporation filed for 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in 1982.  Kroeze (2005) stated that changing economic 
circumstances could affect the accuracy of the Z-score coefficients; therefore, the 
accuracy of the model will differ under various economic conditions.  For these reasons, 
bankruptcy models that do not take into account changing economic conditions need to 
be regularly updated. 
Furthermore, Scaggs and Crawford (1986) applied the Altman Z-score model to 
the passenger airline industry and found the Altman model accurately forecast airline 
failures one to five years in advance; however, for nonbankrupt passenger airlines, the 
Altman Z-score model failed to provide an accurate prediction.  Multiple discriminant 
analysis is used in the Altman model to categorize a population into groups based on 
quantitative features (Scaggs & Crawford, 1986).  To predict airline failures accurately, 
Scaggs and Crawford tested a revised Altman Z-score model in the form: Z = 0.012(X1) 
+ 0.014(X2) + 0.033(X3) + 0.01524(X4) + 0.075 (X5), where X1 = liquidity (working 
capital/total assets), X2 = profitability (retained earnings/total assets), X3 = leverage 
(earnings before interest and taxes/total assets), X4 = solvency (market value of 
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equity/book value of total debt), and X5 = interest expense (total operating 
income/interest expense).   
The variable X5is a revised ratio that replaced X5 = activity (sales/total assets) in 
the Altman model.  The new X5—interest expense ratio—was selected to reflect the high 
debt positions many of the airlines carried during the 1970s and early 1980s.  The 
updated model better predicted airline bankruptcy by accurately predicting failure at least 
three years in advance; thus, Scaggs and Crawford (1986) showed the Altman Z-score 
model could be calibrated to improve bankruptcy prediction capability.  Scaggs and 
Crawford also indicated the Altman model does not include all of the factors that could 
forecast bankruptcy in the airline industry; however, the model can be adjusted to include 
the characteristics of a particular industry.  This study (Scaggs & Crawford, 1986) 
spanned the airline deregulation period with the population drawn from the periods prior 
to and after deregulation.  During this time, there was turmoil in the airline industry with 
many new entries into the airline market, including a number of low-cost carriers.  The 
new entries forced some airlines to cut fares to stay competitive, putting pressure on 
airline revenue, while at the same time many airlines carried a high debt position (Scaggs 
& Crawford, 1986).  Ribbink et al. (2009) found similar results. 
Chung and Szenberg (1996) examined the effects of airline deregulation on the 
U.S. airline industry by calculating the Altman Z”-score for eight major airlines between 
1982 and 1996 (projections only for 1992-1996).  While the use of the Altman Z”-score 
is widely seen in the literature, this study was used to attempt to reduce the impact of the 
gross domestic product (GDP) on the data by examining the relationship between the Z-
score and the GDP.  The airline industry is capital-intensive and highly leveraged, so the 
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state of the economy directly affects this capital structure.  A growing economy tends to 
lead to increased demand for air travel, so the GDP should be taken into consideration to 
remove the economic influence on the model.  To detect any relation between GDP and 
the Altman Z”-score, Chung and Szenberg (1996) used a linear regression technique.  
The financial data were first scrutinized using the Altman Z”-score and classified into 
one of three groups: healthy, failure, or gray zone.  A linear regression was derived from 
the Z”-score and GDP data and showed that for every one percentage point of growth, the 
Z”-score increased by 0.18 with eight degrees of freedom and was significant at the 0.01 
level.  Additionally, the R2 value was 0.648, indicating almost 65% of the variation could 
be explained by the variation in the growth of GDP.  Chung and Szenberg found that the 
airline industry is dividing into two market segments.  The two market segments are the 
low-cost short-haul carriers, and the long-range legacy carriers.  In addition, the study 
found that a sustained growing economy of 2.5% of GDP over three or more years would 
bring the airline industry into financial profitability (Chung & Szenberg, 1996).  
The Altman bankruptcy formula has gone through several changes since Altman 
created it in the late 1960s.  The latest version of the Altman bankruptcy formula and its 
application were published in Altman and Hotchkiss (2006).  The current Altman Z”-
score model is as follows: Z” = 6.56(X1) + 3.26(X2) + 6.72(X3) + 1.05(X4) + 3.25.  In 
the Z”-score model, X1 = working capital/total assets, X2 = retained earnings/total assets, 
X3 = operating income/total assets, and X4 = book value of equity/total liabilities.  In this 
model, all Z”-scores below zero signify financially distressed conditions in a company.  
In the updated Z”-score model, all of the coefficients for variables X1 to X4 have changed 
from the original Z-score model (Altman & Hotchkiss, 2006).  Altman and Hotchkiss 
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stated that the Z”-score model is better than the original Z-score model for 
nonmanufacturers.  Altman and Hotchkiss also indicated that “models developed for 
specific industries (e.g., retailers, telecoms, airlines) are an even better method for 
assessing the distress potential of like-industry firms” (p. 249).  The current version of the 
Z”-score model has also been used to determine the financial health of non-U.S. 
corporations with high accuracy and reliability (Altman & Hotchkiss, 2006). 
Kroeze K-score model.  More recently, Kroeze (2005) used the Altman Z”-score 
model to test for bankruptcies in the passenger airlines business between 1998 and 2003.  
The updated Z”-score model (renamed Kroeze K-score) used only three financial ratios 
instead of the original five present in the Altman Z”-score model and modified the 
coefficients of the dependent variables.  Examining 16 passenger airlines between 1998 
and 2003, six bankrupt and ten nonbankrupt firms, Kroeze found Altman’s Z”-score 
model was 100% accurate at classifying bankrupt airlines, but correctly classified only 
18% of the nonbankrupt passenger airlines (Kroeze, 2005).  Kroeze then proposed a 
modified Altman’s Z”-score model, called the K-score model, to improve the prediction 
capability of the model for nonbankrupt passenger airlines.   
In the Kroeze model, scores below zero indicate a bankrupt condition, whereas a 
score above zero indicates that a firm is not in immediate danger of bankruptcy.  Using 
MDA, Kroeze determined that the X3 (productivity ratio) variable from the Altman Z”-
score model was negative for the dataset and so eliminated the variable when developing 
the K-score model.  Adjustments were also made to the coefficients to create a new 
discriminant function equation (Kroeze, 2005).  The K-score is of the form K = .268(X1) 
+ .838(X2) + .111(X3) + έ, where X1 = working capital/total assets, X2 = retained 
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earnings/total assets, X3 = book value of equity/total liabilities, έ = error term, and K = 
overall index.  The K-score proved to be better at predicting bankruptcies one year before 
failure than the Altman Z”-score model.  The K-score model correctly classified 69% of 
nonbankrupt passenger airlines one year before failure.  The Kroeze model is an 
improvement over the Z”-model and is simpler because it uses only three variables.  
Kroeze noted the K-score model might not be valid in light of the events of September 
11, 2001.  Nevertheless, Kroeze tested and provided ideas on improving Altman’s Z”-
score prediction model of financial failure as it applied to the passenger airline industry. 
Numerous financial ratios used in examining a company’s financial health exist.  
Kroeze used liquidity, profitability, and solvency ratios in the K-score model.  Liquidity 
is calculated as a firm's working capital divided by total assets (Kroeze, 2005).  Liquidity 
indicates a company’s ability to meet its current financial obligations (Kroeze, 2005).  
Because airlines tend to operate on low margins, liquidity is a vital factor when 
evaluating a company’s financial position (Kroeze, 2005).  The profitability ratio is 
calculated as retained earnings divided by total assets (Kroeze, 2005).  To attract 
investors and provide for the ability to obtain lower interest loans, management must 
show that the firm is profitable.  A solvency ratio is calculated by using the book value of 
equity divided by total liabilities (Kroeze, 2005).  The solvency ratio indicates how much 
debt financing the firm has used and is an indicator of how much a firm can absorb in 
operating losses (Kroeze, 2005).  The higher the solvency ratio, the more likely a firm 
can slip into financial distress (Kroeze, 2005). 
Figure. Form of data for a function analysis 
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Figure 2. Form of data for a discriminant function analysis.  Note. Adapted from “A 
Discriminant Analysis of Public Sector Financial Management Performance of the 
Economies of Sub-Saharan Africa,” by N.C. Nwezeaku, 2010, in Interdisciplinary 
Journal of Contemporary Research in Business, 1(11), 71-89.  Used with permission.  
 
Multiple discriminant analysis.  Thus far in this literature review, the financial 
models have all been based on multiple discriminant analysis (MDA), a statistical data 
analysis that can be used to categorize an observation into one of several a priori 
groupings (Kroeze, 2005; Nwezeaku, 2010).  Kroeze (2005) noted that MDA is used to 
form a linear model that classifies companies based on historical financial ratios.  
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Altman’s (1967) Z”-score model uses MDA to categorize firms as either bankrupt or 
nonbankrupt as does the Kroeze K-score model (see Figure 2).   
Figure 2 depicts the form of data for a discriminant function analysis.  Chung and 
Szenberg (1996) used MDA to examine the effects of deregulation on the U.S. airline 
industry, but normalized the results by considering change in the GDP.  So far, this 
section of the chapter has discussed the Altman Z-score model and various incarnations 
of the Altman model proposed by several authors using MDA.  The following sections 
include the use of neural network and mixed logit models in bankruptcy prediction.  
Neural network models and genetic programming.  Alternate models to the 
Altman Z”-score model involve neural networks (NNs), mixed logit, and genetic 
programming methodology.  NN models simulate the thinking of the human brain and act 
to provide qualitative relationships between variables by answering if-then questions 
(Slim, 2007).  Gritta et al. (2000) used an NN model to predict small air carrier 
bankruptcies.  Between 1982 and 2000, 134 U.S. air carriers filed for bankruptcy, and 
some carriers were still susceptible to financial distress because of heavy debt loads 
(Gritta et al., 2000).  Gritta et al. believed current MDA and neural network models did 
not accurately predict bankruptcy in small air carriers, so they explored a model that 
could better predict such bankruptcies.  Gritta et al. indicated the use of an NN would 
provide a better result than MDA because an NN has the ability to indicate relations 
among the data.  In addition, an NN is better at spotting patterns in small data sets.   
The NN model used in this study was found to predict bankruptcy accurately in 
91% of the samples.  An overall success rate of 88% was reported with only one Type II 
error and three Type I errors out of a sample of 28 correctly identified samples.  A Type I 
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error occurs when an airlines is forecast to remain solvent, but the airline failed.  A Type 
II error is the reverse, and, in this case, occurs when insolvency was predicted, but did not 
occur (Gritta, Adrangi, Davalos, & Bright, 2006).  Other models similar to NNs, such as 
fuzzy neural models and classical back-propagated neural networks, have been used to 
forecast corporate bankruptcy (Slim, 2007).  The Gritta et al. study determined the NN 
has advantages over MDA because NNs can better tolerate noise and missing data and 
have the ability to identify relations among the data.  Others have found; however, that 
when comparing NNs to discriminant analysis, the latter tends to perform slightly better 
(McKee, 2007).   
Another artificial intelligence data analysis method is genetic programming.  
McKee examined the variables used in the Altman model to determine individual 
significant of each variable.  Genetic programming is based on the concept of natural 
selection or survival of the fittest.  McKee noted that genetic programming has the 
advantage of not requiring any distributional assumptions to be made about the data 
being analyzed.  This study confirmed that some of the variables used in the Altman Z”-
score model were not statistically valid and noted that some of the variables could be 
dropped and still maintain the same level of accuracy (McKee, 2007).  Kroeze (2005) 
also found that all of the original Altman Z”-score variables were not needed and dropped 
two of the variables when developing the Kroeze K-Score model. 
Mixed logit models.  Jones and Hensher (2005) proposed using a mixed logit 
methodology to predict financial distress in a firm.  Jones and Hensher argued that a 
mixed logit is better at predicting bankruptcy than MDA, binary logistic, or rudimentary 
multinomial logit (MNL) models because of “their restrictive statistical assumptions and 
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their failure to incorporate firm-specific observed and unobserved heterogeneity” (p. 21).  
Fabozzi et al. (2010) supported Jones and Hensher by stating that mixed logit or logit 
regression analysis could overcome the flaws of multiple discriminant analysis related to 
some of the assumptions needed to run the model.   
The mixed logit model is based on discrete choice theory, which attempts to 
understand the behavioral responses of customers to the actions of a business, 
government, or market.  The results obtained from a mixed logit model are used to 
categorize firms into one of three states: solvent firms, insolvent firms, and firms that 
have filed for bankruptcy.  For this study, a sample of firms representing about 3,000 firm 
years was used to test the mixed logit model.  The data were also analyzed using MNL.  
Jones and Hensher found the mixed logit provided an overall goodness of fit and had 
95% accuracy for up to three reporting periods prior to failure and 78% accuracy at 
predicting failure five reporting periods out.  While the mixed logit model proved to be 
better than MNL at predicting insolvency and failure, the MNL proved to be better at 
predicting success of firms.  The mixed logit model was not tested against MDA, but 
Jones and Hensher (2007) noted that MDA is a popular method used extensively in the 
literature. 
Furthermore, another study by Hensher and Jones (2007) used a mixed logit 
model to explore its ability to predict bankruptcy across a broad number of industries.  
The purpose of the study was to consider the predictive performance of various mixed 
logit models using different distribution assumptions.  The sample for the study included 
5,209 firm years, which included 4,980 firm years for firms not yet failed, 119 for 
insolvent firms, and 110 for firms that had filed for bankruptcy protection or liquidation.  
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Of the five mixed logit models studied, the unconditional triangular distribution offered 
the best predictive performance.  Hensher and Jones (2007) concluded the multinomial 
mixed logit models seemed to be sensitive to the type of sampling methodology used.  
Unlike many authors who asserted bankruptcy models must be firm specific and focused 
for each industry type, Hensher and Jones (2007) noted that because of the inherent 
difficulties in precisely predicting corporate failures at the firm type level, there is no 
need to focus on one particular firm type. 
Comparison of Models 
The use of MDA or NN for predicting financial distress in firms is most prevalent 
in the literature.  Altman’s MDA Z”-score model has been shown to predict bankruptcy 
accurately in a sample of manufacturing firms 94% of the time (Altman, 1968); 
moreover, Scaggs and Crawford (1986) found the Altman Z-score, with alterations, could 
be used to forecast passenger airline failures accurately 1 to 5 years in advance.  In 1996, 
Chung and Szenberg furthered the work of Scaggs and Crawford by using the Altman Z-
score model to examine eight major passenger airlines between 1982 and 1996.  In 
addition, Chung and Szenberg used GDP data in an attempt to remove economic 
influences on the model.   
In the most recent passenger airline study using the Altman Z”-score, Kroeze 
(2005) extended the work of Scaggs and Crawford and proposed an altered Altman’s Z”-
Score.  This altered model was found to improve the prediction capability of the model 
for use in predicting passenger airline bankruptcies.  Ribbink et al. (2009) also used the 
Altman Z”-score model to determine financially distressed airlines and customer 
satisfaction and made no alterations to the model.  Airlines have increasingly started to 
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lease more aircraft, which removes these assets from the balance sheet and shifts them to 
short-term debt (Gritta & Lippman, 2010).  Because of this shifting around between 
assets and short-term debt, the Altman Z”-score and variations thereof are becoming less 
reliable (Gritta & Lippman, 2010).  For smaller sample sizes, Gritta et al. (2000) 
suggested using an NN while predicting bankruptcy in smaller passenger air carriers 91% 
of the time.  Both the MDA and NN models have been shown to predict bankruptcy 
accurately in various industries, but they must be focused for each particular industry.  
While the NN model may have advantages over MDA, such as better tolerance for noise 
and missing data as well as the ability to identify relations among the data, the data 
processing methodology is complicated and not realistic for use by an novice researcher.    
Table 4 provides a sample list of published bankruptcy prediction studies 
conducted on the aviation industry over the last 30 years.  The oldest study found was 
conducted in 1986, less than 10 years after U.S. airline deregulation.  Prior to 1977 (1978 
for the passenger airline industry), U.S. air-cargo airlines where heavily regulated by the 
Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) (Chung & Szenberg, 1996; Kroeze, 2005; Scaggs & 
Crawford, 1986).  Under regulation, the CAB controlled prices and limited the number of 
airlines that could operate on a particular route, essentially eliminating competition and 
therefore limiting the number of bankruptcies seen in the industry  
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Table 4  
Summary of Bankruptcy Prediction Studies in the Aviation Industry 
 
Researcher(s) (Year) 
 
Title 
Number of 
airlines used 
 
Methodology 
 
Ribbink, Hofer and 
Dresner (2009) 
Airline financial distress 
and customer satisfaction 
 
21 passenger 
airlines 
MDA tied to on-
time performance, 
mishandled 
baggage and 
ticket sales 
Gritta, Adrangi, 
Adams, and 
Tatyanina (2008) 
 
An update on airline 
financial condition and 
insolvency prospects 
using the Altman Z” score 
model 
15 passenger 
airlines between 
1997-2006 
MDA 
Davalos, Gritta, and 
Adrangi (2007) 
Deriving rules for 
forecasting air carrier 
financial stress and 
insolvency: A genetic 
algorithm approach 
 
19 passenger 
airlines 
Neural Network 
with a genetic 
algorithm 
Kroeze (2005) Predicting airline 
corporate bankruptcies 
using a modified Altman 
Z-score model 
11 passenger 
airlines 
MDA 
Gritta, Wang, 
Davalos and Chow 
(2000) 
Forecasting small air 
carrier bankruptcies using 
a neural network approach 
 
32 passenger 
airlines 
Neural Network 
Chung and Szenberg 
(1996) 
The effects of 
deregulation on the U.S. 
airline industry 
8 passenger 
airlines 
MDA normalizing 
for GDP  
Scaggs and 
Crawford (1986) 
Altman’s corporate 
bankruptcy model 
revisited: Can airline 
bankruptcy be predicted 
12 passenger 
airlines 
MDA 
 
In the 15 years after deregulation, 80 new airlines were established (including 
passenger, cargo, and charter carriers) with over half of the airlines going into bankruptcy 
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protection during that period (Chung & Szenberg, 1996; Scaggs & Crawford, 1986).  
Finally, the Altman Z”-score model has been shown to predict bankruptcy accurately in a 
number of different industries (Altman, 1968, 1983; Chung & Szenberg, 1996; Hofer et 
al., 2009; Kroeze, 2005; Ribbink et al., 2009; Scaggs & Crawford, 1986); however, the 
model must be calibrated to each particular industry group.  The most recent study that 
calibrated the Altman Z”-score model was conducted by Kroeze in 2005.  The Kroeze 
model simplified the Altman model while improving the model's prediction capability 
specifically for the airline industry.   
No matter which statistical method is used to predict bankruptcy, all of these 
methods have limitations that pure statistical methods cannot take into account (Fabozzi 
et al., 2010; Ooghe et al., 2009; Wetter & Wennberg, 2009; Youn & Gu, 2010).  Past 
research on airline bankruptcy prediction models have not enhanced the understanding of 
bankruptcy prediction, but instead just improved the statistical methodology 
(Gudmundsson, 2002).  Wetter and Wennberg (2009) outlined limitations that statistical 
methods cannot account for, such as the following:  
1. They use a dichotomous dependent variable, though business failure is not a 
well-defined dichotomy. 
2. The sampling method has some problems as there is a risk of using nonrandom 
samples and, thereby, oversampling the failing firms. 
3. Classical models can be criticized because of problems relating to 
nonstationary and data instability; in classical models, it is assumed that the 
relationships among the variables are stationary over time. 
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4. The use of accounting information can be questioned, especially with regard to 
small or new firms, as there are doubts that these statements give a fair view of 
the financial situation in the firm. 
5. The selection of independent variables is problematic as there is a general lack 
of theory regarding independent variable selection in accounting, and a purely 
empirical selection of variables may lead to over-fitting and, thereby, an unstable 
model with little general applicability. (p. 30) 
Fabozzi et al. (2010) stated that financial distress could be influenced by economic 
factors such as the deterioration of an industry, financial factors such as high debt loads, 
corporate fraud, mismanagement, and disasters such as natural catastrophes or terrorism. 
Nonstatistical Factors 
Some of the nonstatistical factors that may affect a bankruptcy model include 
management, cultural factors, and the type of aircraft and route structure the airline uses.  
First, management and airline leadership may be significant factors in the success or 
failure of an airline, though to what extent is unknown (McCabe, 1998).  Human capital 
theory states that an investment in education and new knowledge will provide for better 
managers and owners (Wetter & Wennberg, 2009), indicating that the more educated an 
airline management is, the more likely the airline will prosper.  Sun and Li (2007) used a 
factor of management and control when exploring early warning signed of financial 
distress, as did Kim and Han (2003).  Therefore, human capital theory may provide some 
insight into a firms failure potential.   
Culture can also play a role in the financial health of a company.  Giapponi and 
Scheraga (2007) used Hofstede’s five dimensions of culture to examine the airline 
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industry, as did Roberts, Walton, and Muldoon (2011).  Giapponi and Scheraga noted 
that organizations in an individualistic culture tend to be individualistic in nature, 
whereas organizations in a collectivist culture tend to bond together.  Cultures with high 
power distance tend to have problems with the delegations of authority and; therefore, 
reduced transparency (Giapponi & Scheraga, 2007).  In cultures that are considered 
feminine, discussion is favored over aggression and cooperation is favored over 
competition, (Giapponi & Scheraga, 2007), whereas in masculine cultures, fierce 
competition and basic mistrust is common.  Hofstede’s work related values for the United 
States as low power distance and uncertainty avoidance with high masculinity and high 
individualism (Giapponi & Scheraga, 2008).  Roberts et al. (2011) noted that the speed of 
innovation acceptance is also influenced by culture.  Cultures with higher uncertainty 
avoidance, masculinity, and power distance dimensions tend to have slower innovation 
acceptance rates (Roberts et al., 2011).  Because of these reasons, company management 
must adopt its management style to the type of workforce employed to maximize 
revenues (Roberts et al., 2011).   
Another factor that may affect the financial health of an airline is the type of 
aircraft and routes flown.  The advantages of obtaining the proper fleet mix were 
discussed above, but an additional factor of efficiency for an airline is the average fleet 
age (Gudmundsson, 2002).  Older aircraft cost more to maintain and typically have 
higher fuel consumption, making them more expensive to operate, which may be a trait 
of a poorer performing airline (Gudmundsson, 2002).  The routes and frequency of an 
airline’s services may also affect the financial health of an airline.  Economies of density 
from a consolidation of routes in the passenger market come from the hub-and-spoke 
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system in which airlines consolidate operations at a single airport, such as Delta Airlines' 
Atlanta hub (Gudmundsson, 2004; Vasigh et al., 2008).  All-cargo airlines also often 
operate through consolidated terminals where cargo can be trans-loaded onto other 
aircraft and benefit from economies of density.  Airline alliances are also used by both 
passenger and cargo airlines and so benefit from economies of scope by expanding 
locations serviced and optimization of their route structure (Vasigh et al., 2008).  
Subject matter experts (SMEs) have been used in financial distress prediction 
studies to improve prediction accuracy (Kim & Han, 2003; Sun & Li, 2007).  Sun and Li, 
(2007) stated that to improve financial distress prediction methods, SMEs and other 
nonfinancial data is needed.  Quantitative bankruptcy prediction models use past data, 
whereas the use of SMEs can provide near term insight into companies (Kim & Li, 
2007).    
The last section includes the grounded theory research design for this study.  
While this study used grounded theory design based on the idea that theory is derived 
directly from the data as it emerges with no preconceived notions (Mello & Flint, 2009), 
an understanding of how the aviation industry and the current bankruptcy prediction 
models work is essential to the research.   
Grounded Theory Design 
The literature review has focused on cargo airlines, bankruptcy models, and the 
factors that may affect a bankruptcy model's prediction capability; therefore, the 
background knowledge provided in this literature review provides a basis for the conduct 
of this study's use of ground theory design.  Grounded theory was originally developed 
by Glaser and Strauss (1967) in Discovery of Grounded Theory and expanded separately 
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by Corbin and Strauss (1990), Charmaz (2006), and Allen (2010).  Grounded theory is 
used to construct theory directly from field data such as interviews, observations, and 
document analysis (Mello & Flint, 2009), not just test existing theory (Birks & Mills, 
2011).   
Grounded theory is a systematic approach to research that assists the researcher to 
develop theoretical abstraction from field data through a course of constant comparative 
analysis (Mello & Flint, 2009).  Data are collected and coded into emergent categories, 
refined, and used to capture relevant topics of the phenomena (Allen, 2010; Corbin & 
Strauss, 1990; Mello & Flint, 2009).  These topics are then used to construct a verifiable 
theory, either quantitatively or qualitatively, that should be easily understandable for 
academics, students, and practitioners (Mello & Flint, 2009).  The aim of grounded 
theory is to move the analytical process beyond simple description to exploration (Birks 
& Mills, 2011).  
Grounded theory is based on the idea that theory is built directly from the data, 
and analysis begins as soon as data are collected (Luckerhoff & Guillemette, 2011).  The 
use of emergence research requires a flexible and “rudimentary research design” 
(Luckerhoff & Guillemette, 2011, p. 402), because the researcher must avoid 
preconceived notions of where the data may lead (Corbin & Strauss, 1990).  Charmaz 
(1995) summarized the research methods and design problems best by stating the 
following: 
The grounded theorist builds the research as it ensues rather than having it 
completely planned before beginning the data collection.  Similarly, you shape 
and alter the data collection to pursue the most interesting and relevant material.  
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This approach differs sharply from the traditional research design with its 
structured interments that are used in the same ways with each research subject. 
(pp. 47-48) 
It is a basic tenet of grounded theory design not to have a fully developed research 
plan before starting, since it is unknown at the start of a study as to which data or analysis 
instrument is best to use (Luckerhoff & Guillemette, 2011).  It is; however, important to 
plan the initial steps in the research and for the researcher to have a firm understanding of 
the process to ensure a successful and defendable research project.  Grounded theory was 
first developed by Glaser and Strauss in 1967 and published in The Discovery of 
Grounded Theory.  Glaser and Strauss’s work was later refined by Corbin and Strauss in 
1990 (Luckerhoff & Guillemette, 2011).  Corbin ad Strauss (1990) outlined the canons 
and procedures for grounded theory.  Current writers on grounded theory such as 
Charmaz (2006) and Birks and Mills (2011) generally accept these procedures as the best 
process to conduct a grounded study.  The cannons outlined by Corbin and Strauss (1990) 
are:  
1. Data collection and analysis are interrelated processes.  
2. Concepts are the basic unit of analysis.  
3. Categories must be developed and related.  
4. Sampling in grounded theory proceeds on theoretical grounds. 
5. Analysis makes use of constant comparisons. 
6. Patterns and variations must be accounted for. 
7. Process must be built into the theory. 
8. Writing theoretical memos is an integral part of doing grounded theory.  
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9. Hypotheses about relationships among categories should be developed and 
verified. 
10. The grounded theorist need not work alone. 
11. Broader structural conditions must be analyzed, however microscopic the 
research.  
Summary 
Several authors (Chung & Szenberg 1996; Kroeze, 2005; Ribbink et al., 2009; 
Scaggs & Crawford, 1986) have used the Altman Z-score or the newer Z”-score to 
predict financial distress in the passenger airlines industry.  Kroeze tested the Altman Z”-
score model on the passenger airline industry and developed an updated model called the 
Kroeze K-score; however, the literature does not indicate whether the Kroeze model has 
been tested on the all-cargo airline industry.  Other authors have argued that nonstatistical 
variables should be considered in financial models (Fabozzi et al., 2010; Gudmundsson, 
2002; Ooghe et al., 2009; Wetter & Wennberg, 2009; Youn & Gu, 2010).  Significant 
operational and economic differences exist between passenger and all-cargo airlines that 
may affect the financial stability of the two industries differently (e.g., demand, traffic 
patterns), and these differences along with other qualitative factors are explored in this 
study.   
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Chapter 3: Research Method 
Introduction 
The purpose of this study was to explore the nonstatistical factors influencing the 
accuracy of the Kroeze K-score bankruptcy prediction model for the all-cargo airline 
industry, using a grounded theory design.  The first step in this study was to determine 
the effectiveness of the Kroeze K-score model in predicting bankruptcy by comparing the 
model’s results to actual U.S. all-cargo airline bankruptcies between the Years 2005 and 
2009.  Once the prediction success rate was established, grounded theory was used to 
identify some of the nonstatistical influences that cause inaccurate predictions in the 
statistical model.   
Recent research has indicated that stand-alone traditional statistical models are 
limited in their bankruptcy prediction ability, and nonstatistical factors should be 
explored to improve this (Ooghe et al., 2009; Wetter & Wennberg, 2009; Youn & Gu, 
2010).  For example, by incorporating management decisions regarding airline routes into 
the prediction model, the accuracy of the model may be increased.  The model could then 
be used to avoid financial distress, in part by reconsidering routes.  Such connections can 
be explored as the researcher discovers the data; thus, a grounded theory method was 
determined to be the best approach for this research.  The project used financial data from 
U.S. all-cargo airlines from 2004 to 2009, applied a published financial bankruptcy 
model (Kroeze K-score), and compared the predicted results with the actual events.   
The results of the K-score model provided a starting point for the grounded theory 
design to explore the external influences that may affect the prediction model.  Grounded 
theory is one of discovery in which concepts are uncovered by systematically examining 
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a multitude of data from many sources (Corbin & Strauss, 1990; Mello & Flint, 2009).  
For this study, data were obtained from numerous sources, including, but not limited to, 
scholarly articles, magazines, newspapers, technical papers, books, government 
publications, company and industry literature, and company and professional websites.  
The data were coded and grouped into categories to expose concepts that describe the 
factors that influence the K-score model's prediction inaccuracies.  The research question 
for this study was as follows:  
RQ: What nonstatistical factors influence the K-score bankruptcy prediction 
models in the all-cargo airline industry? 
This chapter includes an overview of the research method and design for this 
grounded theory study.  The chapter includes a discussion of the population, data 
collection methodology, and analysis.  The chapter then contains the assumptions and 
limitations of the study and the process to ensure ethical research standards are met. 
Research Methods and Design 
Grounded theory is based on the idea that theory is built directly from the data 
and emergence research requires a flexible design.  It is a basic tenet of grounded theory 
design not to have a fully developed research plan before starting; however, it is 
important to plan the initial steps in the research, and for the researcher to have a firm 
understanding of the process to ensure a successful and defendable research project.  The 
rest of this chapter includes the steps used to conduct this grounded theory study. 
This study was used to explore nonstatistical factors that affect a quantitative 
model’s prediction ability.  The prediction ability of current quantitative bankruptcy 
prediction models has been honed to a point where little improvement can be made 
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(Gudmundsson, 2002), yet more accurate models are needed.  A better understanding of 
the nonstatistical (i.e., qualitative factors) variables is needed to advance bankruptcy 
protection (Ooghe et al., 2009; Youn & Gu, 2010).  Some of the nonstatistical data 
originated from human interactions such as the management practices and other 
processes germane to a real-life organization.  These human interaction factors are best 
explored using qualitative methods as quantitative data would be missing, hard to obtain, 
or would not provide the data needed (Mello & Flint, 2009).  Within the realm of 
qualitative methods, grounded theory can be used to gain insights into phenomena and to 
discover and understand the meanings and concepts surrounding the subject (Charmaz, 
2006; Mello & Flint, 2009).  Further, grounded theory is used to construct theory directly 
from field data (Mello & Flint, 2009).  Grounded theory, while rooted in nursing 
research, has been used in other disciplines to open up new avenues of research (Mello & 
Flint, 2009).  The literature review revealed one grounded theory airline bankruptcy 
study, conducted by McCabe in 1998.  The need to understand the social system within 
the organization, the ease of obtaining data, and the advantage of constant comparative 
analysis has led to the conclusion that grounded theory will be the best method to conduct 
this research.  Using grounded theory for a study of this type is to some extent uncharted 
territory; however, the need to explore the data, untainted, by connections and 
relationships suggested by previous approaches is paramount and allowed for exploration 
of the data in unconventional ways. 
The process as outlined by Corbin and Strauss (1990) was used as the road map 
for the conduct of this research.  Simplified, the three major phases of grounded theory 
research used in this study are as follows: (a) the discovery of categories and properties, 
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(b) the discovery of the relationship between the categories and properties, and (c) the 
discovery of theory as it emerges from the refinement of categories and properties (Birks 
& Mills, 2011; Charmaz, 2006; Corbin & Strauss, 1990; Mello & Flint, 2009; McCabe, 
1998). 
The first phase of the grounded theory research was the discovery of categories 
and properties that are likely to affect the bankruptcy prediction ability of the K-score.  
The data were coded and grouped into categories with similar properties.  Categories are 
abstract concepts into which other concepts can be grouped; this grouping includes 
specific characteristics or attributes of a category, which allows a category to be defined, 
and given meaning (Mello & Flint, 2009).   
The next phase of the research was the detection of the association and patterns 
between the categories and properties related to nonstatistical bankruptcy factors.  This 
phase continued until theoretical saturation occurred.  Saturation occurs when no new 
information is emerging from the data (Corbin & Strauss, 1990; Mello & Flint, 2009).  
Birks and Mills (2011) discussed the coding process as first fracturing the data then 
reconnecting “the data in ways that are conceptually much more abstract than would be 
produced by a thematic analysis” (p. 12). 
The final phase of the research was the refinement of categories and properties to 
reveal the theory.  Throughout all three phases of the research, constant comparative 
analysis of the data was ongoing, so as new categories are discovered, they were 
incorporated into the dataset and refined.  The constant comparison is directed toward 
similarities and differences in order to develop concepts that helped interpret and explain 
behavior (Mello & Flint, 2009).  Through this three-phase process, theory was 
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constructed from the categories and their properties to result in a theory that provides 
categories and verifiable hypotheses (Mello & Flint, 2009).  The next section of this 
chapter will discuss the population to be examined. 
Participants 
Grounded theory sampling progresses on theoretical grounds in which there are 
no “specific groups of individuals, units of time, and so on, but in terms of concepts, their 
properties, dimensions, and variations” (Corbin &Strauss, 1990, p. 8); therefore, in 
grounded theory design, there is no set sample size needed.  Instead, the size may be as 
few as one, or many may be needed to reach saturation (Corbin & Strauss, 1990; 
Luckerhoff & Guillemette, 2011; Mello & Flint, 2009; Mello & Hunt, 2009).  While 
grounded theory does not require a minimum sample size, the initial population for this 
study was all of the all-cargo airlines in operation in the United States between 2005 and 
2009 with operating revenues of $20 million.  The reason for this is that these companies 
must report financial data to the DOT quarterly in accordance with 14 Code of Federal 
Regulations (CFR) 241.   
A search of such airlines was performed through the TranStats database and 
revealed there were17 all-cargo airlines in operation during the years 2005 to 2009 (see 
Appendix A).  The TranStats database is maintained by the U.S. Department of 
Transportation (DOT), U.S. Bureau of Transportation Statistics, Research and Innovative 
Technology Administration (RITA); therefore, the starting sample of 17 all-cargo airlines 
and the population were the same.  During the research process, six of the 17 all-cargo 
airlines were selected for detailed analysis. 
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Data Collection Method 
The initial financial data for this study were obtained by data mining the U.S. 
Department of Transportation (DOT), U.S. Bureau of Transportation Statistics, and 
Research and Innovative Technology Administration (RITA) database (also known as 
TranStats).  The TranStats financial data are stored in the Air Carrier Financial Reports 
(Form 41 Financial Data) database.  All U.S. air carriers with annual operating revenues 
of $20 million or more must report financial data to the DOT quarterly in accordance 
with 14 Code of Federal Regulation (CFR) 241.  Their data are made available for 
research by the DOT as part of the TranStats database.  Failure to report financial 
information is an indication of cessation of operations.  In these instances, bankruptcy 
was confirmed using a literature search.  Gathering financial data using a survey is not a 
practical method to collect the detailed financial data necessary for this study, and 
because the financial data are publicly available, the survey method is unnecessary.  
Additionally, response rate to a survey from senior personnel who would have access to 
the required data from within the all-cargo industry was expected to be low.   
An electronic search of the TranStats database was conducted to extract the data 
for input into the K-score model.  The data extracted included working capital, total 
assets, retained earnings, book value of equity, current liabilities, and total liabilities.  
Using the financial information, the required financial ratios were calculated for input 
into the Kroeze K-score model.  Financial data were obtained for the 5-year period from 
2005 to 2009 for all U.S. all-cargo airlines with operating revenues of $20 million or 
more.   
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The results of the K-score model provided a starting point for the grounded theory 
design to explore the influences on the prediction model.  An initial sample of six all-
cargo airlines was chosen to provide a cross-section of airlines where the model correctly 
and incorrectly predicted bankruptcy.  Documentary data about these airlines and the 
industry as a whole were collected from scholarly articles, magazines, newspapers, 
technical papers, books, government publications, company and industry literature, and 
company and professional websites.  Both qualitative and quantitative data were used in 
this study, and data were collected from multiple sources.  The collection of rich and 
substantial data, from multiple sources, gave the study more quality and credibility 
(Charmaz, 2006).   
The literature, while downplayed by some grounded theorists, is an important 
starting point for the study.  Review of published scholarly literature provided general 
knowledge of the subject and helped define the terms and processes used in other 
researchers work.  Scholarly research is a source of data for the study and provides a 
context for this research in the field.  Another source of data for this study entailed 
personal communication with SMEs.  As with other sources of data, open-ended 
interviews with SMEs were used to provide data for this study.  Transcripts from 
interviews were coded just as other documentary data.  Coding of data was used to 
summarize and sort the data into general categories.  According to Corbin and Strauss 
(1990), in grounded theory protocol, as data were collected, ongoing analysis was 
conducted on the data to uncover concepts and categorize the data into phenomena that 
may represent patterns.  The direction of the research and further data collection events 
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were determined as data emerged.  Data collection continued until no new patterns in the 
data emerged and relationships among the categories were established. 
Measurement/Assessments 
A grounded theory design was used in this research on bankruptcy prediction with 
all-cargo airlines.  The research was used to explore the factors that affect the bankruptcy 
prediction ability of the Kroeze K-score model in the all-cargo airline industry.  For the 
study, a Kroeze K-score model was applied to 17 U.S. all-cargo airlines to determined 
which companies the model worked and in which it did not by comparing the prediction 
to actual bankruptcies.  For this study, the raw data for use in the Kroeber K-score model 
were assumed reliable and valid, since the data were obtained from a government 
database.  This study did not collect primary data by means of a survey instrument, but 
used only secondary data from the TranStats database and interview data from SMEs.  
Airline companies with operating revenues of $20 million or more are required to report 
certified financial data quarterly to the U.S. government for inclusion in the TranStats 
database.     
The outcome of the Kroeze model was analyzed and six all-cargo airlines were 
chosen as the sample to explore the nonstatistical variables affecting the accuracy of the 
Kroeze model using grounded theory.  Multiple sources of data were compared and 
grouped throughout the research until saturation of the data was observed.  After concepts 
emerged from the data, unstructured interviews with SMEs were conducted to gain 
insight into bankruptcies and how the emergent concepts fit into existing theories.    
The continual comparison and grouping process used in grounded theory guards 
against bias and achieves greater precision and consistency (Corbin & Strauss, 1990).  
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Additionally, triangulation of different data sources was used to add validity to the study 
(Guion, Diehl, & McDonald, 2011).  To provide external validity and transferability to 
the study, a detailed description of the information was provided to present an accurate 
description of the methods used.  Grounded theory requires the researcher to be open to 
all ideas and have no preconceived theories (Corbin & Strauss, 1990; Luckerhoff & 
Guillemette, 2011).  This openness to ideas helps to avoid bias in the research 
(Luckerhoff & Guillemette, 2011).  Strict grounded theorists reject any review of 
literature related to the research prior to starting data collection to avoid the temptation of 
the researcher to use a priori concepts during data analysis (Luckerhoff & Guillemette, 
2011); however, in reality all professional researchers have some understanding of their 
disciplines, and therefore, some level of a priori concepts (Luckerhoff & Guillemette, 
2011). 
Data Analyses 
The first step in the process was to run the Kroeze K-score model on the 17 U.S. 
all-cargo airlines in operation between the 2005 and 2009.  The predicted results were 
compared to the actual bankruptcies of the firms during this period, but no attempts to 
alter the model were made.  In the second phase of the research, cases in which the model 
failed to predict actual events and cases in which the model succeeded in predicting 
actual events accurately were explored using grounded theory.  The data used in 
grounded theory research come from a range of sources, such as newspapers, books, 
government documents, and videos, indeed, any data that can provide any insight into the 
research question (Corbin & Strauss, 1990).   
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The underlying theme in grounded theory is the search for concepts and the 
ongoing analysis of data, and as new data is uncovered, the direction of the research must 
change to account for the data (Birks & Mills, 2011; Charmaz, 2006; Corbin & Strauss, 
1990).  Extensive use of coding was used to compare events and interactions for 
similarities and differences (Corbin & Strauss, 1990).  Initial coding was used to fracture 
the data and once concepts emerged, categories of related ideas were organized and 
grouped together for further analysis (Birks & Mills, 2011; Charmaz, 2006; Corbin & 
Strauss, 1990).   
Coding is the process of naming segments of data that summarizes and 
categorizes each piece of data.  Codes are a synopsis of the essence of a segment of text 
and show action.  During initial coding, segments of data to be coded were groups of 
words, a sentence, paragraph, or a section of text.  Initial coding of data was provisional 
and provided an extensive list of codes.  As themes developed, codes were grouped into 
similar ideas and used to summarize and sort the data into general categories.  Focused 
coding, which identified and grouped the most significant data into conceptual categories, 
followed.  Finally, the third round of coding, or theoretical coding, produced theoretical 
codes that suggest possible associations between categories and show links in the data.  
Theoretical coding reassembles the data that was fractured during initial coding to reveal 
new ways to view the data and expose the story the data is telling.  
Throughout the coding process, memoing and sorting of the data identified 
incomplete categories and holes in the analysis that were further explored to assist in the 
theoretical integration of the categories.  Memos are free flowing analytical notes that 
helped to refine, compare, and understand the data.  Once the initial round of theoretical 
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coding was completed and themes started to emerge, theoretical sampling was conducted 
to expand and refine the categories of the emerging theory.  Unlike traditional 
quantitative research design, theoretical sampling in grounded theory research is used to 
obtain data to expand the categories that were identified during the theoretical coding 
process.  The sampling is not meant to represent a population, but to focus on the 
theoretical and conceptual development of the emerging theory.  This process continued 
until saturation of the data occurs and the phenomena explained. 
The atlas.ti qualitative data analysis software package was used to record and 
conduct data analysis.  The atlas.ti software allowed for the collection of text, audio, 
video, and image data.  As data were input into the software, they were labeled as codes 
that were later grouped into categories.  The software allowed for memo writing, 
whereby ongoing comparison between data was annotated and used to construct analytic 
notes.  The software allowed for the data to be searched, filtered, and grouped into codes 
and categories in various ways to support theoretical integration of the categories.  
Additionally, the atlas.ti software provided high-level quantification of the data through 
tracking the frequency of codes and words in the dataset, database searching, and filters 
to determine links between the data.  All data were input into the atlas.ti software and 
coded until categories emerge that were then used to determine patterns in the data that 
were related back to the failed financial model.  Data were collected and analyzed until 
no new patterns in the data emerged and the relationships among the categories were well 
established. 
After the data were collected and analyzed two SMEs were interviewed using 
open-ended questions relating to bankruptcy prediction.  The interviews where held by 
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phone, and the sessions taped and later transcribed.  The two SMEs were Dr. Robert 
Tompkins, professor of finance at the Frankfurt School of Finance and Management and 
Dr. Richard Gritta, professor of finance at the University of Portland. 
Methodological Assumptions, Limitations, and Delimitations 
Validation of grounded theory has been the center of considerable debate 
(Luckerhoff & Guillemette, 2011; McCabe, 1998; Mello & Flint, 2009) because some do 
not view grounded theory as a valid research method due to the circularity of the research 
method, the lack of references to normal theoretical frameworks, and theoretical 
sampling (Luckerhoff & Guillemette, 2011).  Grounded theory research is sometimes 
viewed as nonscientific, or is criticized for a lack of planning when compared to 
traditional scientific methods (Luckerhoff & Guillemette, 2011).  The initial sampling 
plan outlined in this document provided a starting point, but could not and did not 
determine the direction the research took; however, a carefully designed and executed 
study using a systematic approach can provide verifiable results (Mello & Flint, 2009).  
In addition, the continual comparison and grouping process used in grounded theory 
guarded against bias and helped achieve greater precision and consistency (Corbin & 
Strauss, 1990). 
Qualitative research is meant to provide an understanding of a particular social 
situation or interaction and is largely a process of comparing, contrasting, replicating, 
cataloguing, and classifying the subject (Creswell, 2009).  Grounded theory is based 
largely on the judgment of the researcher to contrast, compare, catalog, and classify the 
data in the study, and; therefore, may have inherent bias (Luckerhoff & Guillemette, 
2011).  There is risk of researcher bias, but this was minimized by the researcher keeping 
71 
 
an open mind and holding no preconceptions on the subject; however, there is more 
danger in bias from the actors involved than from the researcher (Luckerhoff & 
Guillemette, 2011).   
Creswell (2009) stated that researcher bias could also be reduced through open 
discussion of the researcher's background.  This bias cannot be completely removed since 
the researcher inherently has preconceived unselfconscious theories about the subject.  
Additionally, and in keeping with grounded theory design, to avoid a priori concepts, 
little literature review was conducted on the nonstatistical factors that may affect 
bankruptcy prediction models.  The literature was not reviewed in depth for the following 
reasons: (a) to avoid a priori concepts and (b) the literature is largely lacking in studies 
on the use of nonstatistical qualitative information in bankruptcy prediction. An extensive 
literature review was conducted on statistical bankruptcy prediction methods and the use 
of grounded theory. 
Internal validity was maintained through the triangulation of data in which data 
from multiple sources was used for cross-verification (Guion et al., 2011).  Cross-
verification is inherent in the research process of grounded theory with the expectation 
that data will appear in several forms before being considered in the theory.  The use of 
data triangulation increased the confidence in the research data through verification from 
several sources including, SMEs (Guion et al., 2011).  Additionally, detailed descriptions 
of the data were provided to give a thorough perspective of the data, adding validity to 
the research (Guion et al., 2011).  External validity threats arise when incorrect 
inferences from the data is drawn and generalizations cannot be made to other persons, 
settings, and times (Guion et al., 2011).  External validity threats were minimized using 
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the circularity that is inherent in grounded theory.  Ideas that emerge from one set of data 
were checked and re-circulated through other settings and different time frames to check 
for consistency of results (Luckerhoff & Guillemette, 2011).  While steps were taken to 
reduce external validity threats, results of this study can only be applied to the sample in 
the study and cannot be generalized across all of the all-cargo carriers. 
The initial financial data for this research were obtained from the TranStats 
database.  Reporting financial information to this database is mandatory under U.S. 
federal law for airlines in the dataset; therefore, it is assumed that the data were properly 
reported.  Financial data were collected from the TransStats database for all-cargo 
airlines for the Years 2005 to 2009.  Qualitative data were obtained from numerous 
sources, including, scholarly articles, magazines, newspapers, technical papers, books, 
government publications, company and industry literature, and company and professional 
websites.  A list of all of the sources used to obtain data is in Appendix B.  All data were 
obtained from known professional sources, and since this information is in the public 
domain, it is assumed to be correct; however, the data were crossed-checked using 
triangulation methods to confirm validity. 
Ethical Assurances 
 All ethical guidelines were stringently followed in the implementation of this study.  
Ethical rules and guidelines ensure that research is conducted to minimize risk to humans 
and that the potential benefits are balanced with the risk (Creswell, 2009).  The proposed 
research obtained the required publicly available financial data by the process of data 
mining of the TranStats database.  For the qualitative analysis, published materials, 
annual report, company websites, and other open sources of information were examined.  
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Names and backgrounds of some management personnel (e.g., education level, work 
experience, and management styles) used in this study were collected from previously 
published secondary sources (e.g., the Internet, company websites).  Although some 
names and identifying features were found in the literature, none was used in the writing 
of this study.   
 Personal communication with SMEs was conducted as part of this study to provide 
background information on the subject.  Personal communications with SMEs were in the 
form of open-ended interview questions, and interviews were conducted synchronously 
via personal interviews.  The role of the SMEs was to provide information on the subject.  
Interview questions were not focused on them personally.  Personal communications with 
SMEs are properly cited in this study and release forms were collected.  Northcentral 
University's Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval was obtained prior to any data 
collection; however, because the data for this research were obtained from secondary, 
previously published sources, the research falls into the exempt research categories as 
outlined in 45 Code of Federal Regulations 46.101b, since this research did not expose 
humans to psychological, social, or physical risks.  
Summary 
A grounded theory method was used for this research.  The research was used to 
examine the Kroeze K-score model, which uses various financial ratios to calculate a K-
score.  The K-score was then used to classify companies as being either bankrupt or 
nonbankrupt.  Finally, external factors that influence the model were examined using 
grounded theory. 
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Using grounded theory, the research was used to explore nonstatistical factors that 
affected the Kroeze K-score model.  The data for the proposed research were obtained 
from publicly available sources, such as published research, company annual reports, 
airline industry publications, and government publications and databases.  The testing of 
the Kroeze K-score model on the all-cargo industry and determining the qualitative 
factors that affect the model provide new insight into the financial stability of the all-
cargo airlines.  This research also adds to the body of knowledge on the use of predictive 
modeling and qualitative, nonstatistical factors that may influence bankruptcy predictive 
modeling. 
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 Chapter 4: Findings 
Introduction 
The goal of this qualitative study is to explain the nonstatistical factors that 
influence the Kroeze K-score qualitative bankruptcy prediction model.  Through the 
analysis of 34 publicly available documents (i.e., scholarly articles, magazines, 
newspapers, government records, and company literature), 35 unique codes emerged 
during the coding process.  After intermediate coding, six categories emerged that form 
the basis of the emergent theory.  Two subject matter expert interviews were also 
conducted to provide data for the study, along with a re-review of the literature for 
additional data as theoretical sampling directed and for comparison of previously 
published with the findings of this study.   
In the results section, a summary of the prediction accuracy of the Kroeze K-score 
model is provided followed by the open-coding and intermediate-coding process and 
results.  Finally, in the Evaluation of Findings section, the results are analyzed in 
relationship to the emergent theory, and the results of this research within the context of 
the existing literature on financial distress and bankruptcy prediction are discussed. 
Results 
The results section begins with an analysis of the prediction accuracy of the 
Kroeze K-score model for 17 U.S. all-cargo airlines.  Subsequently, the categories that 
emerged during the open-coding and intermediate-coding phases of this research are 
discussed in relation to the research question.  The data analysis and findings to support 
the research question (What nonstatistical factors influence the case for bankruptcy 
prediction model in the all-cargo airline industry?) will be addressed in the following 
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sections.  Because of the nature of qualitative research, the results section includes 
illustrations and observations with interpretive components. 
Prediction Accuracy 
The sample of all-cargo airlines (N = 17) included two firms that went bankrupt 
during the study timeframe, 14 all-cargo airlines that did not, and one cargo airline 
(Cargo 360)  that merged with Southern Air, Inc.  Bankrupt airlines were coded as 1, and 
nonbankrupt airlines where coded as 2.  The 76 discreet cases (one case per airline per 
year in operation), were used to calculate a K-score for each year for each airline in the 
sample.  For example, ABX’s K-scores were -0.54 in 2005, -0.44 in 2006, -0.26 in 2007, 
-0.12 in 2008, and -0.09 in 2009.  The all-cargo airlines were then classified as bankrupt 
or nonbankrupt according to the K-score model, using the appropriate cutoff value of 
zero as suggested by Kroeze (2005).  Table 5 indicates the airlines, financial statement 
dates, years data were available for the sample, and if the airline declared bankruptcy 
during the study.   
Table 6 indicates a summary of the K-score for the 17 U.S. air-cargo airlines in 
operation from 2005 to 2009.  A negative K-score indicates a company that is in financial 
distress and in potential risk of bankruptcy, whereas a positive K-score indicates a 
company that is not in financial distress.  The raw financial data obtained from the RITA 
schedule B1 forms and used in the calculations of the K-scores can be found in Appendix 
C.  The negative K-scores are marked by asterisk (*). 
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Table 5  
List of All-Cargo Airlines, Financial Statement Dates, Years Active During the Study and 
Bankruptcy Declaration 
Airline  
Financial statement 
dates 
Number of 
years Bankrupt? 
ABX Air, Inc.  2005 to 2009  5  No  
Aloha Air Cargo  2005 to 2009  5  No  
Amerijet International  2005 to 2009  5  No  
Arrow Air Inc.  2005 to 2009  5  No  
Astar USA, LLC  2005 to 2009  5  No  
Atlas Air Inc.  2005 to 2009  5  No  
Capital Cargo International  2005 to 2009  5  No  
Cargo 360, Inc.  2006 to 2007  2  No 
Centurion Cargo Inc.  2006 to 2009  4  No  
Evergreen Int'l Inc.  2005 to 2009  5  No  
Gemini Air Cargo Airways  2005 to 2006  2  Yes  
Kalitta Air LLC  2005 to 2009  5  No  
Kitty Hawk Air Cargo 2005 to 2007  3  Yes  
Lynden Air Cargo Airlines  2005 to 2009  5  No  
Northern Air Cargo Inc.  2005 to 2009  5  No  
Polar Air Cargo Airways  2005 to 2009  5  No  
Southern Air Inc.  2005 to 2009  5  No  
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Table 6  
K-Scores for Air-Cargo Airlines Between 2005 and 2009 
Company 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 
 
Abx Air, Inc. -0.09* -0.12* -0.26* -0.44* -0.54* 
Aloha Air Cargo 0.59 -0.69* -0.49* -0.86* -1.14* 
Amerijet International 0.07 0.06 0.15 0.06 0.09 
Arrow Air Inc. -0.68* -0.50* -0.18* -0.13* -0.05* 
Astar USA, LLC -0.55* -0.33* -0.28* -0.39* -0.32* 
Atlas Air Inc. 0.29 0.28 0.30 0.15 0.05 
Capital Cargo International 0.24 0.67 -0.49* -1.82* -0.58* 
Cargo 360, Inc.  Merged  -0.02* -0.41* New 
Centurion Cargo Inc. -0.61* -0.07* -0.62* -1.71* New 
Evergreen Int'l Inc. 0.29 0.33 0.31 0.31 0.26 
Gemini Air Cargo Airways  Bankrupt –– -1.34* -2.65* 
Kalitta Air LLC 0.75 0.87 1.47 1.27 1.32 
Kitty Hawk Air Cargo  Bankrupt 0.50 0.45 0.65 
Lynden Air Cargo Airlines 1.13 0.79 1.07 0.91 0.73 
Northern Air Cargo Inc. 0.34 0.21 0.27 0.39 0.24 
Polar Air Cargo Airways -0.26* 0.00* 0.10 0.42 0.50 
Southern Air Inc. -0.58* -0.04* 0.27 0.48 0.46 
Note.  * =K-scores  = < 0.0.  Company considered not in financial distress if K-score is > 0.0, and in 
financial distress if K-score is = < 0.0.  Source of data RITA Schedule B1 data.   
Note. –– = no data. 
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Testing the Original Kroeze K-Score Model 
The original K-score bankruptcy prediction model developed by Kroeze was 
based on the Altman Z-score and used multiple discriminate function analysis (MDA).  
Within the sample for this study, the K-score model correctly classified one of the two 
bankrupt firms (50.0% correctly classified) as bankrupt and seven of the nonbankrupt 
firms correctly (46.7% correctly classified).  The K-score model did not perform as well 
on this sample as in the Kroeze (2005) study in which the K-score model correctly 
classified 69% of nonbankrupt passenger airlines 1 year before failure.  Table 7 indicates 
the prediction accuracy matrix for the Kroeze K-score model. 
Table 7  
Kroeze K-Score Model: Prediction Accuracy Matrix 
  
 
 
 
Group 
 
Predicted group membership 
 
 
 
Total 
 
  
 
Bankrupt 
 
Nonbankrupt 
Original  Count Bankrupt 1 1 2 
Nonbankrupt 8 7 15 
% Bankrupt 50.0 50.0 100.0 
Nonbankrupt 53.3 46.7 100.0 
 
An initial sample of six all-cargo airlines was drawn from airlines for which the 
K-score model correctly and incorrectly predicted bankruptcy.  The six airlines were 
ABX Air, Inc, Arrow Air Inc., Atlas Air Inc., Cargo 360, Inc., Gemini Air Cargo 
Airways, and Kitty Hawk Air Cargo.  ABX Air and Arrow Air Inc. are both cargo 
airlines for which the K-score model predicted bankruptcy, but the airlines continued 
operations.  Atlas Air was correctly predicted and remained solvent throughout the 
sample window.  In the sample, two airlines entered Chapter 11 bankruptcy during this 
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period and both were examined using grounded theory.  One of the two, Gemini Air 
Cargo, was correctly predicted by the K-score to enter bankruptcy; however, Kitty Hawk 
Air Cargo entered bankruptcy in 2008, an event that the K-score model did not predict.  
The other firm that went out of operation during this study period was Cargo 360; 
however, Cargo 360 did not enter bankruptcy, but instead, merged with Southern Air.  
After the merger, Southern Air went from a positive K-score to a negative score.  Table 8 
indicates the 17 all-cargo firms in operation between 2005 and 2009 in a prediction 
accuracy matrix, and the six all-cargo airlines chosen as the initial sample for this study 
are marked with an asterisk. 
Table 8  
Kroeze K-Score Model: Prediction Accuracy Matrix With Airline Names 
   
 
 
 
Predicted group membership 
  
  Group  Bankrupt Nonbankrupt Total 
     
Original Bankrupt Gemini Air Cargo*     Kitty Hawk* 2 
  NonBankrupt ABX Air* 
Aloha Air Cargo 
Arrow Air* 
Astar USA 
Captal Cargo 
Centurion Cargo 
Polar Air Cargo 
Southern Air 
Amerijet Int’l 
Atlas Air* 
Cargo 360* 
Evergreen Int'l 
Kalitta Air 
Lynden Air Cargo 
Northern Air 
16 
Note: Airlines marked with an asterisk were the initial sample of airlines for this study. 
 Table 9 indicates the K-scores for the all-cargo airlines that were part of the initial 
sample.  Negative K-scores, which indicate financial distress, are marked with an 
asterisk.  This sample of airlines was chosen to give a mix of cases for which the model 
correctly and incorrectly predicted bankruptcy.  The next part of this chapter provides an 
overview of the six all-cargo carriers selected for this study.      
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Table 9  
 
K-Scores for Air Cargo Airlines Between 2005 and 2009 for Sample Airlines 
Company 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 
ABX Air -0.09* -0.12* -0.26* -0.44* -0.54* 
Arrow Air -0.68* -0.50* -0.18* -0.13* -0.05* 
Atlas Air  0.29 0.28 0.30 0.15 0.05 
Cargo 360  Merged -0.02* -0.41* New 
Gemini Air Cargo Airways   Bankrupt -1.34* -2.65* 
Kitty Hawk Air Cargo  Bankrupt 0.50 0.45 0.65 
Note: K-Scores  = < 0.0 are marked with an asterisk (*).  Company considered not in financial distress 
if K-Score is > 0.0, and in financial distress if K-Score is = < 0.0.  Source of data RITA Schedule B1 
data. 
 
Open-Coding Results 
Once the six all-cargo airlines were selected for further examination, data were 
collected on the operation of these airlines.  During the open-coding phase a total of 34 
documents were reviewed which included company annual reports, SEC 10K annual and 
quarterly reports, reports from professional journals such as Air Transport Intelligence 
and Traffic World, news reports, and company press releases from the period 2005 to 
2009.  A list of all of the sources used for data is in Appendix B.  The first phase of data 
collection included the uploading into Atlas.ti software and review of documents related 
to the six all-cargo airlines in the sample.  The Atlas.ti software is a commercially 
available database program that was used to organize, code, memo, and visualize the data 
and is specifically programmed to assist in qualitative data collection research.  The 
software also includes a search, filter, and query tool, which allows a researcher to 
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interrogate the data in many ways.  Documents were collected and reviewed, and codes 
were developed as they emerged from the text.   
Coding was conducted on a sentence-by-sentence or theme-by-theme basis in 
which a code or group of codes were assigned to each sentence or group of sentences 
with the same theme.  The codes that were assigned to the text was intended to identify 
the process being discussed, and was not limited by any particular theme or idea. As 
codes emerged, more documents were collected and coded until saturation in the data was 
observed.  Saturation occurs when no new data is emerging from the documents.  A total 
of 34 documents was examined before saturation was observed.  After the initial coding 
round, there were 35 unique codes that emerged from the data (see Table 10).  These 
codes are based on segments of the text and can be viewed as general concepts that 
summarize the text.  Definitions for the codes can be found in Appendix D. 
Table 10  
The 35 Codes Developed During Initial Coding 
Accidents Environmental Price 
Antitrust Fleet mix Regulation 
Bankruptcy Flight_frequency Reliability 
Capacity Fuel_efficiency Revenue 
Cash flow Geographic location Risk 
Competition Labor_Issues Routes 
Competitive Advantage Maintenance Security 
Cost Management Service 
Credit_markets Market Size 
Customers Merger Tax 
Earnings Operations Utilization 
Economics Ownership  
 
Since codes were established as they emerged, the entire set of 34 documents was 
re-reviewed a second time to ensure that all text was properly coded.  In total, 2,593 
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segments of text were categorized into 35 unique codes.  The code frequencies are shown 
in Table 11.  These codes represent themes or ideas that emerged from the data; however 
not all of these codes may not be significant.  During the intermediate-coding process, 
these codes were grouped to form several categories.  Throughout the process, memos 
were kept that were used to develop the ideas on what the data were indicating and were 
later used to assist in theory development. 
Table 11  
Code Frequencies (N =2593) 
 
Codes 
 
Code frequency 
 
Accidents 43  
Antitrust 5  
Bankruptcy 92  
Capacity 103  
Cash flow 59  
Competition 24  
Competitive Advantage 27  
Cost 238  
Credit_markets 166  
Customers 393  
Earnings 129  
Economics 85  
Environment 90  
Fleet mix 124  
Flight_frequency 12  
Fuel_efficiency 30  
Geographic location 19  
Labor_Issues 43  
Maintenance 123  
Management 59 (continued) 
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Table 11 
Code Frequency (continued) 
 
 
 
Code Code frequency 
 
 
Market 
Merger 
8 
21 
 
Operations 35  
Ownership 37  
Price 9  
Regulation 277  
Reliability 42  
Revenue 42  
Risk 77  
Routes 60  
Security 100  
Service 2  
Size 15  
Tax 1  
Utilization 3  
Total N (coded sections) 2593  
 
Table 12 indicates the percentage each code rated for that airline at the end of the 
open-coding process.  These percentages are based on the number of times the code was 
linked to a segment of text and may indicate the importance of the code to the company 
(reference, year).  The percentages vary between the different airlines; however, the 
highest percentages, those above 10%, were connected to the codes bankruptcy, cost, 
customers, earnings, fleet mix, management, merger, ownership, and regulation.  Of the 
codes with percentages above 10%, five (bankruptcy, cost, earnings, merger, and 
ownership) are associated with the financial factors category that will be discussed later 
in this chapter.  The list is presented in alphabetical order and is not based on actual 
rankings because these differ between airlines. 
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Table 12  
 
Percentage for Each Code Broken out by Airline 
  Airline 
Code  
Cargo 
360 
ABX 
Air 
Atlas 
Air 
Kitty 
Hawk 
Arrow 
Air Gemini 
Accidents 0 0 1 4 0 0 
Antitrust 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Bankruptcy 1 0 4 2 20 30 
Capacity 0 1 8 3 4 5 
Cash flow 0 4 2 2 4 0 
Competition 0 1 1 1 0 0 
Competitive advantage 2 0 3 0 2 0 
Cost 1 13 10 8 2 0 
Credit_markets 0 6 7 7 4 9 
Customers 9 8 17 21 4 7 
Earnings 0 13 3 2 0 0 
Economics 0 3 4 3 4 3 
Environment 0 4 1 6 0 0 
Fleet mix 16 4 6 2 18 9 
Flight frequency 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Fuel_efficiency 0 1 2 1 4 1 
Geographic location 5 1 0 0 6 1 
Labor_Issues 0 2 2 1 4 6 
Maintenance 6 11 1 5 0 1 
Management 14 2 2 1 8 7 
Market 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Merger 11 1 0 0 0 1 
Operations 6 2 1 0 0 2 
Ownership 7 1 1 0 8 13 
Price 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Regulation 11 10 7 17 0 0 
Reliability 0 2 1 2 0 0 
Revenue 2 3 1 1 0 2 
Risk 0 2 5 3 0 0 
Routes 2 2 3 2 6 1 
Security 0 2 4 6 0 0 
Service 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Size 6 1 0 0 2 1 
Tax 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Utilization 0 0 0 0 2 0 
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Throughout the open-coding process, that is the initial data collecting and coding 
generated from the documents, codes were developed to fracture the data.  Fractionation 
of the data during the open-coding process allows codes to be re-assembled into 
meaningful categories during the intermediate-coding phase of this research (Birks & 
Mills, 2011; Corbin & Strauss, 1990).  Ongoing review of these codes was conducted in a 
process of constant comparative analysis in an attempt to start to link the codes and 
concepts and was followed by additional theoretical sampling.  After theoretical 
saturation was observed in the data; that is, there were no new codes being identified, the 
next step in the process was intermediate coding.  Intermediate coding is the process by 
which the data was regrouped to form intermediate codes.   
Intermediate Coding 
After the initial codes were developed and theoretical saturation occurred, the 
research moved into the intermediate-coding phase in which codes were compared to 
identify relationships that may exist in the data (Birks & Mills, 2011; Corbin & Strauss, 
1990).  The initial 35 codes were synthesized into six categories.  The name of some of 
these categories came directly from code names (e.g., operations, competitive advantage) 
while the names of other categories were generated after grouping a set of codes together 
(e.g., financial factors, external factors).  The six categories that emerged during the 
research were management, risk, operations, competitive advantage, financial factors, and 
external factors.  Figure 3 graphically shows the six categories and the linkage of the 
code groups to these categories. 
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Figure 3. Graphic representation of codes and their linkage. 
 
Part of grounded theory methodology is to ensure validity through a rich 
discussion of the data that emerges throughout the research (Birks & Mills, 2011).  The 
data for this research is based on segments of text found in the documents that were 
reviewed.  Throughout the remainder of this chapter, many quotations will be provided 
from the 34 documents reviewed to support the theory development.  Table E1 in 
Appendix E provides a list of the six categories and examples of quotations and their link 
to individual codes.  The detailed quotes that support each of the six categories are 
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intended not only to provide examples of coded text, but also to provide a detailed 
description of the data so that a through perception of the data is presented, thus adding 
validity to the research (Birks & Mills, 2011).  Further discussion of these codes and 
links are discussed found in Table E1 (see Appendix E).     
The six qualitative categories that emerged from the intermediate-coding process 
that may influence bankruptcy prediction models are management, operations, financial 
factors, competitive advantage, risk, and external factors.  While these are broad 
categories, they are all linked to specific codes or ideas found in the data and form the 
basis of the emergent theory.  The following is a description of each of the six categories 
and their component codes. 
Management 
The main overarching code that emerged was management that was linked to 
categories such as operations, financial factors, competitive advantage, and risk.  The 
management category is not linked to any codes directly, but is linked to four other 
categories because management directly influences all of the categories except possibly 
for the external factors of economics and regulations.  As depicted in Figure 3, 
management is at the center of any organization and can be viewed as the hub around 
which all the other categories and codes revolve.  Management has both a strategic and 
operational function. 
Dr. Richard Gritta discussed management at length during the subject matter 
expert interview held on October 28, 2011.  Dr. Gritta stated that management has 
oversight of both operating strategies and financial strategies. 
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If it's operating strategies, one of the keys would be; do you have efficient routes, 
and are you flying aircraft that are matched to your route.  Are you minimizing 
your fuel bill by having your pilots fly more intelligently, and are you managing 
your labor issues properly.  Because that is part of your operating strategy.  The 
financial strategy part of management is how much debt that you have on the 
balance sheet, and how much disguised debt that you have in the form of leases, 
because obviously the more debt you have, the higher the probability of a 
financial problem.  That's the magic of the US system like with Southwest and 
Alaska as compared to the rest of the airlines, is they have low levels of debt.  
(Richard Gritta, personal communication, October 28, 2011) 
One of the categories directly linked to management is operations that encompass the 
day-to-day management of the firm. 
Operations 
Operations, linked to management, included codes such as security, service, flight 
frequency, maintenance, geographic location, labor issues, capacity, and fuel efficiency.  
Security, while a part of operations, is also considered part of regulation, which is an 
external factor that will be discussed in the external factors section.  Likewise, 
maintenance is also a part of competitive advantage and will be discussed in the 
competitive advantage section. 
The cost of fuel typically makes up about one third of the operating expenses for 
an airline (Atlas Air, 2006).  Arrow Air noted that “rising jet fuel prices outpaced its 
ability to boost prices for customers.  This resulted in significant recurring operating 
losses and a large operating deficit” (Stempal, 2010, para. 5).  Rising fuel prices had a 
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significant impact on Arrow Air since it “operated one of the industry's largest fleet of 
DC-8 freighters, older planes that guzzle fuel and are costly to maintain” (South Florida 
Sun–Sentinel, 2005, para. 5).  Because fuel is such a large portion of the operating 
expenses, the text associated with the code fuel is found throughout all of the documents 
reviewed with many of the airlines discussing the future plans for more fuel-efficient 
aircraft.  For example, Atlas Air and their 2009 annual report stated the following:  
The relative operating cost efficiency of our current 747-400F aircraft and future 
747-8F aircraft, including their superior fuel efficiency, capacity and loading 
capabilities, create a compelling value proposition for our customers and position 
us well to manage market conditions and for future growth. (Atlas Air, 2010, p. 
28) 
ABX Air stated that “the primary competitive factors in our industry are price, 
geographic coverage, flight frequency, reliability and capacity” (Atlas Air, 2006, p. 6).  
Kitty Hawk Air Cargo echoed these factors by stating that “the ability to compete 
effectively depends on price, frequency of service, cargo capacity, ability to track freight, 
extent of geographic coverage and reliability” (SEC, 2007b, p. 25).  Of these competitive 
factors, three (i.e., capacity, flight frequency, and geographic coverage) are directly 
related to the category of operations; however, the others are also affected by the 
operations department in an airline. 
Capacity can be viewed as the total lift capacity of the airline or the individual 
capacity of each of their aircraft.  Atlas Air Cargo and Cargo 360 operated Boeing 747 
freighters, which have the largest lift capacity compared to the smaller aircraft operated 
by the other four airlines, which were MD-11s, Boeing 737s, Boeing 767s, DC-8s, DC-
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9s, and DC-10s.  No matter how much lift capacity and airline may have, the most 
important aspect is the total utilization of that aircraft.  Total utilization of an aircraft 
refers to the maximization of both volume and weight of cargo for every leg of the flight; 
however, fluctuating demand makes it difficult to optimize the use of available capacity 
(Walton, 2011). 
Reliability can be viewed as the dependability of the aircraft or the optimization 
of flight operations to ensure reliable delivery.  Kitty Hawk Air Cargo was so concerned 
with aircraft reliability that “to enhance the reliability of our service, it is generally our 
policy to have available at least one operational spare aircraft” (SEC, 2007c, p. 9).  In the 
documents reviewed for this research, Kitty Hawk Air Cargo was the only airline that 
made a point of noting that they keep a spare aircraft in waiting.  It can be hypothesized 
that the underutilization of this aircraft may have negatively affected Kitty Hawk's 
revenues and could possibly be connected to its bankruptcy filing. 
The documents did not provide much detail on any of the airlines' flight 
frequencies.  In general, all the airlines have a global reach and serve the major cargo 
airports of the world.  During the timeframe of the study, ABX Air was the only 
exception to this in that it supported mostly U.S. domestic DHL cargo. 
Financial Factors 
Also linked to management was the category of financial factors, which was made 
up of the codes bankruptcy, market, credit markets, merger, earnings, ownership, 
revenue, costs, and cash flow.  The code bankruptcy falls under the category of financial 
factors and is germane to the study.  The data related to bankruptcy were mostly found in 
the documents for Gemini Air Cargo and Kitty Hawk Air Cargo, the two airlines in this 
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sample that went bankrupt.  References to bankruptcy were also found in the documents 
related to Arrow Air.  Arrow Air exited Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in June 2004 
just before the sample window of this study started and then reentered Chapter 11 
bankruptcy again in 2010 just after the sample window closed.  Arrow Air carried a 
negative case score throughout the entire sample window 2005-2009, so never seemed to 
be financially healthy even after exiting Chapter 11 in 2004.  Access to credit markets 
was also a recurrent theme throughout the documents, especially from the financially 
weaker firms such as Kitty Hawk Air Cargo; however, even financially sound firms such 
as ABX Air worried that “tight credit markets could impact [a] company's future access 
to liquidity” (ABX Air, 2010, p. 10).  In the 2009 annual report for ABX Air, officials 
stated that “Given the current tight credit markets, the interest rates and other costs of a 
renegotiated or new facility, if one can be obtained, would be more expensive and may 
require more rapid amortization of principal than under the terms of the current credit 
agreement” (ABX Air, 2010, pp. 10-11).   
During this sample, only one merger took place: Cargo 360 merged into Southern 
Air.  Cargo 360 had shown two years of negative K-score values before merging with 
Southern Air.  Up until the time of the merger, Southern Air had had a positive K-score, 
but at the merger, showed negative case score values for the years 2008 and 2009.  While 
mergers may be viewed as positive within the aviation industry due to a reduction in 
capacity and the removal of a competitor (R. Gritta, personal communication, October 
28, 2011), the Cargo 360 and Southern Air merger may have put Southern Air in 
financial peril.  In the company's 2005 annual report, Atlas Air officials stated that 
“ACMI [Aircraft, Crew, Maintenance and Insurance] maximizes yield and traffic demand 
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risk in the air-cargo business and provides a more predictable annual revenue and cost 
base” (Atlas Air, 2006, p. 3), which indicates that air carriers that operate only ACMI 
may have a more stable balance sheet.  Revenue is directly tied to financial factors and is 
a important part of the financial management of the company.   
For the firms in the sample, ABX in Kitty Hawk Air Cargo had a limited number 
of customers from which they received most of their revenues.  ABX had almost all of its 
revenue tied to one customer, DHL, and officials recognized this dangerous position in 
their 2005 annual report where they stated, “We rely on a single customer for 
substantially all of our revenue and operating cash flows” (ABX Air, 2006, p. 10).  The 
main competitors to DHL in the U.S. market were the established Federal Express 
Corporation (Fedx) and United Parcel Service (UPS), which had “significant resources, 
market penetration and brand recognition” (ABX Air, 2006, p. 10).  Due to this 
competition and ABX’s perilous position of only having a single substantial customer, 
DHL was able to place pressure on ABX to reduce costs and improve productivity.  This 
pressure from DHL limited ABX's revenues and may have been the reason that the K-
score model predicted ABX to go bankrupt throughout this sample.  So while DHL, as 
the sole customer, could pressure ABX to reduce cost and; therefore, reduce revenues, 
officials of DHL could not afford for ABX to go bankrupt.  Kitty Hawk Air Cargo also 
operated with a small client base, and officials of the company recognized the fact that 
they derived “a significant portion of [their] revenues from a limited number of 
customers, and the loss of their business or payment defaults by one or more of them 
could have a material adverse effect on results of operations” (SEC, 2006, p. 14).  The 
statement by Kitty Hawk Air Cargo seems to be a recurring comment and adds credence 
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to the idea that air-cargo airlines operate on tight margin, so much so, at least in this case, 
that even one nonpaying customer can jeopardize the entire company.   
Cost was another concept that was prolific throughout the data. The costs code 
was associated with the idea operating cost and referred mostly to the cost of fuel, which 
is the largest portion of an airline's operating costs.  For example Arrow Air operated DC 
8-freighters that company officials stated “guzzle fuel and are costly to maintain” (South 
Florida Sun–Sentinel, 2005, para. 1), before switching to newer, more fuel-efficient DC-
10s. Further officials of Arrow Air noted that “rising jet fuel prices outpaced its ability to 
boost prices for customers.  This resulted in significant recurring operating losses and a 
large operating deficit” (Stempal, 2010, para. 6).  The cost of jet fuel could also be 
considered an external factor. 
Cash flow is the last code associated financial factors and is probably the most 
important, since a lack of cash flow is what ultimately drives companies into bankruptcy.  
Dr. Tompkins (personal communication, October 15, 2011) noted that cash flow is the 
most important element because “that's really what causes a company to go bankrupt.”  
Cash flow is a qualitative indicator that is used in many of the published financial distress 
models, so it is no surprise that it appears in the data.  The next category to be explored is 
risk. 
Risk 
The category of risk with the code of accidents also was linked to the 
management category.  Risk is a factor that management must deal with on a daily basis.  
Whether the risk to a firm is from accidents, related to business decisions, external 
factors, or related to government regulation, management must put in place processes to 
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reduce the overall risk to the company.  Anecdotally, aviation is viewed as inherently 
risky due to the extensive press coverage anytime there is an aviation accident, and while 
aircraft accidents occur, they are a rare event.   
Although there was an indication of risk throughout the literature review, Kitty 
Hawk Air Cargo appeared to be more prominent in the discussion of risk and the articles 
reviewed than any other.  In their annual report, officials of Kitty Hawk Air Cargo 
outlined in detail the various risks the airline faces.  An indication that Kitty Hawk Air 
Cargo was in financial distress before going bankrupt in 2008 was a discussion in its 
2006 SEC 10K annual report in which Kitty Hawk Air Cargo officials stated that an 
“aircraft or truck accidents and the resulting repercussions could have a material adverse 
effect on our business” (SEC, 2007a, p. 21).  Although the loss of an aircraft for a small 
air-cargo company could be devastating, rarely do airlines go out of business because of 
the loss of an aircraft (R. Gritta, personal communication, October 28, 2011); however an 
indication of financial difficulty can be found in the statement by Kitty Hawk Air Cargo 
officials indicating that even the loss of a truck “could have a material adverse effect on 
[their] business” (SEC, 2007a, p. 21).   
The rising cost of jet fuel was also seen as a risk factor for the all-cargo 
companies in the sample, which in some cases exceeded 30% of total operating expenses 
(Atlas Air, 2006).  Even for the companies that have ACMI contracts, which require the 
customer to pay for aviation fuel, an increase in fuel costs is seen as a risk due to the fact 
that higher fuel payment may limit the viability of the ACMI business because of the 
inability of the customers to cover the cost of the increased aviation fuel (Atlas Air, 
2006). 
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Security, which is one of the codes that is part of operations, can also be 
considered under the category of risk.  The aviation industry is subject to extensive 
governmental regulations, and failure to comply with these regulations may have an 
adverse effect on the business (Atlas Air, 2006).  After the terrorist attacks on September 
11, 2001, the U.S. government adopted new rules and regulations to increase the security 
requirements in the aviation industry.  In a 2005 annual report, officials of Atlas Air 
stated that “These new regulations and others that potentially might be adopted could 
have an adverse impact on our ability to efficiently process cargo or could increase our 
costs” (Atlas Air, 2006, p. 12).   
Access to credit markets could also be considered a risk factor for the all-cargo 
industry.  Atlas air officials stated that “We are highly leveraged and our substantial debt 
and other obligations could limit our financial resources and ability to compete and may 
make us more vulnerable to adverse economic events” (Atlas Air, 2006, p. 13).  The 
officials of Atlas Air continued by stating that restricted access to credit markets would 
require “us to dedicate a substantial portion of our cash flow from operations for interest, 
principal and lease payments and reducing our ability to use our cash flow to fund 
working capital and other general corporate requirements” (Atlas Air, 2006, p. 13).  If a 
company's cash flow is restricted it may be forced to restructure or refinance its debt, sell 
assets, delay capital expenditures, obtain additional financing, limit future business plans 
(Atlas Air, 2006), or ultimately file for bankruptcy protection. 
Competitive Advantage 
The category of competitive advantage was supported by codes such as price, 
reliability, fleet mix, routes, competition, size, customers, and utilization.  Most business 
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textbooks will have a large section on competitive advantage.  Typically, after defining 
competitive advantage the author of these texts will go into a detailed discussion of how 
to determine a firm's strengths and weaknesses and how to minimize the weaknesses and 
take advantage of the firm's strengths to be more competitive in the marketplace.  The 
codes related to competitive advantage were found in every document reviewed.   
Officials of Atlas Air were probably more expansive in their discussion of 
competitive advantage than any of the other airlines in the sample.  Atlas Air clearly 
holds a competitive advantage in the ACMI wide-body aircraft marketplace, since the 
company was the only ACMI provider of the Boeing 747–400 freighters during the 
timeframe of the study (Atlas Air, 2010).  Not only does Atlas Air have a competitive 
advantage because the company is the only provider of Boeing 748-400 aircraft, but “By 
managing the largest fleet of 747 freighter aircraft, [they] achieve significant economies 
of scale in areas such as aircraft maintenance, crew training, crew efficiency, inventory 
management, and purchasing” (Atlas Air, 2010, p. 29).  Additionally, officials of Atlas 
stated, “The most important elements for competition in the air-cargo business are the 
range, payload and cubic capacities of the aircraft and the price, flexibility, quality and 
reliability of the cargo transportation services provided” (Atlas Air, 2006, p. 13). 
Reliability is one of the codes that support competitive advantage.  Reliability 
within the cargo industry refers to on time delivery and no damage to the cargo.  Officials 
of both ABX and Atlas Air in their annual reports stated that reliability is one of the key 
elements to their business model.  ABX officials state that all of their aircraft have 
Category II or III landing equipment on all their aircraft, which gives them the ability to 
land in limited visibility weather conditions, increasing their reliability (ABX Air, 2006).    
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The number and type of customers can provide a competitive advantage to the 
company.  ABX Air primarily sole sourced all of its cargo space to DHL, giving DHL 
more pricing power, whereas Atlas Air operated long-term ACMI contracts for five 
years, giving the company a more predictable cash flow (Atlas Air, 2006).  Officials of 
Kitty Hawk Air Cargo in their 2005 annual report stated that the company had “over 550 
active freight forwarders and logistics company customers…however [the company's] top 
25 customers accounted for more than 65.0% of [its] schedule freight revenue” (SEC, 
2006, p. 6).  Kitty Hawk Air Cargo officials met regularly with their top customers “as 
part of [their] strategic planning activities for [their] schedule freight network” (SEC, 
2006, p. 6).  While Kitty Hawk Air Cargo had a much larger clientele base than ABX it 
did not save the company from bankruptcy in 2007. 
Fleet mix is an important aspect of competitive advantage and plays a key role in 
the operation of an airline.  Fleet mix refers to the type of aircraft that the company flies 
and the age of those aircraft.  By operating a single aircraft type, an airline can achieve 
economies of scale and the strategy provides “increased operational flexibility, because it 
is easier to find a replacement aircraft for flight crew in the event of your regular 
operations” (Walton, 2011, p. 55).  In addition to the operational flexibility, airlines that 
fly a single aircraft type have lower crew training, maintenance, parts, and equipment 
costs.  Table 13 summarizes the type of aircraft fleet the airlines operated versus their 
actual and bankruptcy prediction membership as predicted by the K-Score.  Of the six 
airlines in the sample, four flew mixed fleets and two operated with a single aircraft type 
fleet.  The two airlines that operated a single type aircraft fleet, Atlas Air and Cargo 360, 
were the only two airlines that the K-score model correctly identified as nonbankrupt 
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airlines during the timeframe of the study.  Airlines for which the K–score incorrectly 
predicted bankruptcy, that is, Kitty Hawk Air Cargo, ABX Air, and Arrow Air, all 
operated a mixed fleet.  Gemini Air Cargo, the only airline for which the model correctly 
predicted bankruptcy, operated a mixed fleet.   
Table 13 
Type of Aircraft Fleet Mix versus K-Score Predicted Group Membership 
  
 
 
Predicted group membership 
 Group Bankrupt Nonbankrupt 
Original Bankrupt Gemini (mixed) Kitty Hawk (mixed) 
 Nonbankrupt ABX Air (mixed) 
Arrow Air (mixed) 
Atlas Air (single) 
Cargo 360 (single) 
 
Atlas Air, Cargo 360, and Gemini operated only wide-body aircraft, whereas the 
other three airlines operated a mixed fleet of both wide-body and narrow-body aircraft.  
Narrow body aircraft are defined as a single aisle aircraft having a cargo carrying 
capacity of less than 45 tonnes, whereas a wide-body aircraft has a carrying capacity of 
over 40 tonnes and twin aisles in the passenger versions (Walton, 2011).  Table 14 
summarizes the type of aircraft operated by the carrier versus the actual and K-Score 
prediction group.  For the three cases in which the K-score model correctly predicted 
bankruptcy or nonbankruptcy, the airlines all flew wide-body aircraft, and in the cases for 
which the K-score did not provide an accurate prediction, these airlines all operated 
narrow body aircraft as part of their fleet.   
 
100 
 
Table 14  
Type of Aircraft Versus K-Score Predicted Group Membership 
  Predicted group membership 
 Group Bankrupt Nonbankrupt 
Original Bankrupt Gemini (MD 11 & DC 10) Kitty Hawk (B737 & B727) 
 Nonbankrupt ABX Air (DC-8, DC-9, 
B767) 
Arrow Air (DC-10, DC-8, 
B767) 
Atlas Air (B747) 
Cargo 360 (B747) 
 
Changing or integrating different aircraft into a fleet adds a significant cost to an 
airline.  In 2004 and 2005, officials of Kitty Hawk Air Cargo stated that it  
incurred significant one-time costs to integrate these Boeing 737-300SF cargo 
aircraft into our current fleet and operations, including, but not limited to, costs 
relating to pilot training, maintenance training, purchases of additional tooling and 
spare parts and costs to modify our operational manuals and maintenance 
program. (SEC, 2006, p. 7)   
Two years later Kitty Hawk Air Cargo declared bankruptcy and liquidated. 
Along with fleet mix and the age of aircraft, maintenance, while considered part 
of operations, can also affect an airlines competitive advantage by improving mechanical 
reliability.  All of the firms in this study performed their own lower-level maintenance.   
The size of the company within any industry can also be a competitive advantage.  With 
increased size comes an increase in economy of scale for airline operation.  Officials of 
Kitty Hawk Air Cargo in their 2005 annual report noted that many of their “competitors 
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have substantially larger freight networks, serve significantly more cities, and have 
considerably more freight system capacity, capital and financial resources than we do” 
(SEC, 2006, p. 6), whereas Atlas Air positions itself as “the world's leading provider of 
outsourced cargo aircraft, crew, maintenance and insurance service to major international 
airlines” (“Atlas Air Inc. Named Best Air Charter,” 2007, para. 1).   
 Dr. Gritta stated that size is important because you have more staying power and 
carry more clout: “You're the big elephant in the room” (personal communication, 
October 28, 2011).  Dr. Gritta also indicated that some financial bankruptcy prediction 
models use a log transformation variable for size.  A successor model to the Altman Z-
Score, called the Altman ZETA credit score model uses a variable of firm size in 
calculating bankruptcy potential (Gritta et al., 2006).  The larger a company is, the more 
operational economies of scale the firm has, leading to potentially higher revenues and 
making the company less prone to bankruptcy.  The next section discusses the categories 
related to external factors. 
External Factors 
Categorized as external factors were the codes economics and regulations; the 
codes of antitrust, environment, and taxation are listed under external factors.  Cost is 
also a code that falls under external factors; although management does have some 
control over cost, managers are at the mercy of their suppliers.  For example, the cost of 
fuel steadily increased during the timeframe of the study, interspersed with large price 
changes.  In the 2009 annual report for Atlas Air, the impact of fuel prices on the air-
cargo business and the difficulties of management to project future operating cost are 
discussed.  While the cost of fuel is a variable cost that changes with utilization of an 
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aircraft, it is the largest single operating expense for an airline and affects all airlines 
equally (Atlas Air, 2010). 
The 2009 annual report stated the following:  
The average fuel price per gallon for the Scheduled Service and Commercial 
Charter businesses was approximately $3.35 for 2008, compared with 
approximately $2.24 for 2007, an increase of $1.11 or 49.6%. During 2008, 
aviation fuel prices rose steadily during the first seven months of the year peaking 
at an average of $4.33 per gallon in July before declining sharply from August 
through the end of the year to an average of $2.13 per gallon for the month of 
December.  (Atlas Air, 2010, p. 41) 
Under the external factor of regulation was environment.  Environmental issues 
are a growing concern to the public and to companies that must comply with 
environmental regulations.  Airlines and airports can affect the environment in a number 
of ways.  In 2010, a U. S. Government Accountability Office report on aviation and the 
environment listed possible environmental impact factors from airlines as noise, 
emissions, water pollution, and environmental sustainability (U.S. Government 
Accountability Office, 2010).  In the documents reviewed, all four types of impacts were 
discussed; however, noise and emissions seemed to be of greatest concern to the airlines.  
While quieter and lower emissions jets are being developed by the airline manufacturers, 
the short-term effects of the clean air act, Kyoto treaty, and local and federal noise 
compliance regulations are of greatest concern to the airlines (ABX Air, 2010).  Cargo 
airlines that fly noisier aircraft may be limited in the number of airports that they can 
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serve or their operation may be restricted to certain times of the day, affecting their 
revenue stream or limiting their route structure. 
Under the category of regulation was the code antitrust, which refers to a criminal 
investigation conducted by the U.S. Department of Justice for price fixing related to a 
fuel surcharge charged by many cargo carriers between January 2000 and February 2006 
(ABX Air, 2010).  The investigation, started by the U.S. Department of Justice, has also 
triggered regulators from Australia, the European Union, Korea, New Zealand, and 
Switzerland to open price-fixing investigations (ABX Air, 2010).  In addition to the 
antitrust investigation, other lawsuits and claims were also filed.  None of the cargo 
airlines in this sample were a party to the investigation; however, Atlas Air’s sister airline 
Polar LLC was a target of the investigation.     
Industry economics is another external factor that affects all of the airlines.  
Officials of ABX stated in their 2005 annual report that “An economic downturn in the 
U.S. is likely to adversely affect demand for delivery services [and] during an economic 
slowdown, customers generally use ground-based delivery services instead of more 
expensive air delivery services” (ABX Air, 2006, p. 10).  Officials of ABX also stated, 
“Cargo volumes within the U.S. are highly dependent on the economic conditions and the 
level of commercial activity [because] generally, time-critical delivery needs, such as 
just-in-time inventory management, increase the demand for air cargo delivery” (ABX 
Air, 2006, p. 6).  In addition to being vulnerable to economic conditions, global trade 
flows are typically seasonal and unbalanced.  The peak season for air cargo traditionally 
runs from September through mid-December to support the retail holiday season (Atlas 
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Air, 2010), and there is a far greater flow of goods out of Asia, which limits the full 
utilization of aircraft. 
Co-Occurrence of Data 
Co-occurrence can give an indication of related terms (Garcia, 2005).  Co-
occurrence is the idea that “concepts that co-occur more frequently tend to be related” 
(Garcia, 2005, para. 4).  Whenever a segment of text is coded with more than one code, a 
co-occurrence of codes occurs (Garcia, 2005).  Atlas.ti was used to produce a co-
occurrence table that provided a co-occurrence coefficient for each code group.  The co-
occurrence coefficient ranges between zero (codes that do not co-occur) and one (codes 
co-occur whenever they are used) (Muhr, 2009).  A higher coefficient would indicate 
more co-occurrence between codes and; therefore, a greater relationship.  The co-
occurrence data were used to extract a list of related codes generated by the study, and all 
codes with a co-occurrence index of 0.1 or above are shown in Table 15.  A list of the co-
occurrence coefficients for all of the codes can be found in Appendix F. 
Table 15 
Co-Occurrence of Codes with Index of 0.1 or above 
Code  Flight frequency 
Capacity 0.10 
Price 0.11 
Reliability 0.17 
Revenue 0.10 
 
All of the codes with the co-occurrence index of 0.10 or above were related to 
flight frequency, and no other codes reached this threshold.  There was no interco-
occurrence between the codes of capacity, price, reliability, and revenue.  The lack of 
105 
 
interco-occurrence indicates a high relationship between the code of flight frequency and 
the codes capacity, price, reliability, and revenue. 
Subject Matter Expert Interviews 
Following the intermediate-coding phase of the research, two SMEs were 
interviewed.  The intent of the interviews was to provide data for the study in relation to 
the codes that were developed during the open-coding and intermediate-coding phase of 
the research.  Using the data obtained during the initial- and intermediate-coding phase of 
the research, open-ended questions were developed for use in the interviews.  An 
unstructured interview format was used in which the SMEs were asked open-ended 
questions dealing with qualitative factors that may influence bankruptcy prediction 
models and specifically about any insight into bankruptcies in the all-cargo airline 
industry.  An unstructured interview format was selected to allow for the direction of the 
conversation to be dictated by the SME, thus allowing for the free flow of ideas (Birks & 
Mills, 2011).   
The main question posed to the SMEs was as follows: What qualitative factors do 
you feel may influence quantitative bankruptcy prediction models such as the (K-score) 
in the all-cargo industry?  Follow-up questions asked SMEs to provide any possible 
insight into the bankruptcy of Kitty Hawk Air Cargo or Gemini air cargo or of the merger 
of Cargo 360 with Southern Air in 2008.  Further, the SMEs were asked if they had any 
thoughts on the operation of ABX Air, Arrow Air, or Atlas Air during the years 2005-
2009.  Finally, the SMEs were asked their thoughts on the 35 codes that were developed 
in the initial coding round of this research study.  A list of all of the questions posed 
during the interview appear in Appendix G.  These interviews were conducted by 
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telephone and the interviews were recorded, and  transcribed.  The accuracy of the 
transcriptions was verified by reviewing the recordings.   
The first interview was conducted with Dr. Robert Tompkins.  Dr. Tompkins 
holds a doctorate from the University of Warwick and completed postdoctoral work at 
the University Technology in Vienna Austria.  Dr. Tompkins's postdoctoral work is in the 
research area of financial management and option pricing.  Dr. Tompkins is presently a 
professor of finance at the Frankfurt School of Finance and Management in Frankfurt, 
Germany, and an adjunct faculty member in the Business Department of Embry Riddle 
Aeronautical University Worldwide.  Dr. Tompkins is the author of several books and 
many articles in peer-reviewed journals on finance and financial related subjects.  The 
consent form to serve as an SME for Dr. Tompkins is in Appendix H. 
During the interview, Dr. Tompkins mentioned several items that seem to be 
germane to this research project.  Dr. Tompkins stated, “Well obviously the most 
important qualitative factor is perception of that particular firm in the industry by 
customers and suppliers” (R. Tompkins, personal communication, October 15, 2011).  
Because if customers or suppliers feel that a company is in financial difficulties, they 
may shy away from doing business with that particular firm potentially driving the firm 
further into financial difficulties (R. Tompkins, personal communication, October 15, 
2011).  Perception of a particular firm can possibly be linked to the following codes that 
were developed during the coding phase: service, management, customers, size, 
bankruptcy, and reliability (R. Tompkins, personal communication, October 15, 2011).  
Dr. Tompkins also noted that an increase in the flow of information on the Internet has 
been shown to be an important indicator of changes in a firm (R. Tompkins, personal 
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communication, October 15, 2011).  The indicator of change is due to the fact that as a 
firm has either positive or negative news to report, the Google Factor, that is the number 
of hits or the number reports on the Internet increases, popularizing the firm's news and 
influencing the company's customers and suppliers (R. Tompkins, personal 
communication, October 15, 2011).   
Regulating the flow of information, either negative or positive, can be linked to 
the management code discovered during the initial round of coding (R. Tompkins, 
personal communication, October 15, 2011).  When discussing the codes that were 
discovered in the first round of this research project, Dr. Tompkins noted that cash flow  
is the most important element because “That's really what causes a company to go 
bankrupt” (R. Tompkins, personal communication, October 15, 2011).  Related to that, 
deferred maintenance may also be an indication that an airline is having cash flow 
problems (R. Tompkins, personal communication, October 15, 2011).  While cash flow 
has been identified as one of the codes during the initial round of research and 
emphasized by Dr. Tompkins, cash flow is a quantitative factor and is often used in 
qualitative financial distress models. 
The second interview was conducted with Dr. Richard Gritta.  Dr. Gritta is a 
professor of finance at the University of Portland.  He holds a master's of business 
administration (MBA) from Indiana University and a doctorate from the University of 
Maryland.  Dr. Gritta teaches courses in financial management and investments and has 
research interests that include air carrier bankruptcy forecasting and risk/return in air 
transportation.  Dr. Gritta has published over 90 refereed articles in such journals as the 
Journal of the Transportation Research Forum, Transportation Journal, Financial 
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Management, and others.  He is currently an editor of air transportation for the Journal of 
the Transportation Research Forum and acts as an advisor to U.S. Sen. Ron Wyden on 
airline matters.  Some of Dr. Gritta’s research was outlined in the literature review 
section of this study.  The consent form to serve as an SME for Dr. Gritta is in Appendix 
H. 
Dr. Gritta felt that one of the biggest qualitative factors that may influence 
quantitative bankruptcy prediction models is the relationship between management, 
unions, pilots, and mechanics (R. Gritta, personal communication, October 28, 2011).  In 
addition, the quality of the management team must be taken into account when exploring 
qualitative factors.  As also noted by Dr. Tompkins, Dr. Gritta noted that “cash flow is 
highly correlated with bankruptcy” and “virtually all the models have some measure that 
directly or indirectly measures cash flow” (R. Gritta, personal communication, October 
28, 2011).  So cash flow while not a qualitative measure, “makes sense, the more cash 
flow you have the less probability you will go bankrupt and vice versa” (R. Gritta, 
personal communication, October 28, 2011).   
Dr. Gritta indicated that customers are also a key qualitative theme (R. Gritta, 
personal communication, October 28, 2011).  Also noted during the interview was the 
importance of fleet mix, flight frequency, and fuel efficiency to determine the financial 
health of a firm.  In response to the code mergers, Dr. Gritta stated, “If there are mergers 
in the works for the carrier that would be advantageous, because you're going to lower 
the capacity of the industry and you're going to remove competition” (R. Gritta, personal 
communication, October 28, 2011).  Dr. Gritta was asked the following question: To 
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what extent do you think airline management or airline leadership plays and success or 
failure of an airline?  In response, Dr. Gritta stated that it plays a  
huge role; it’s like a football coach in American football, you know you have a 
team that doesn't do anything and they hire this new coach and before you know it 
they turned the program around.  I don't think you can ever underestimate the 
quality of your management team. (R. Gritta, personal communication, October 
28, 2011) 
Before the final step of delineation of the theory, we return to the published 
literature.  In grounded theory, scholarly literature is used not as a theoretical framework 
to guide your research based on past research, as in traditional research methodologies, 
but is data itself.  Grounded theorists go to the literature when theoretical sampling 
directs them to do so.  The purpose of going to the literature in this research project was 
to gather more data as ground theory requires, but also to review and compare how this 
emergent theory relates to the published literature.  Additionally, by returning to the 
literature the data is triangulated, which gives the research more validity and allows for 
the findings of the study to be compared and contrasted to other studies in the published 
literature. 
Evaluation of Findings 
Through this grounded theory research process three ideas or themes have 
emerged.  For the sample group of six all-cargo airlines there appears to be a relationship 
between aircraft fleet mix (single fleet versus mixed fleet) and the K-score predicted 
group membership versus actual events.  The airlines that were predicted nonbankrupt 
and did not go bankrupt (Atlas Air and Cargo 360) both flew a single aircraft type, 
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whereas the other four airlines in the sample flew a mixed fleet of different types of 
aircraft.  The relationship between aircraft fleet mix is supported by Dr. Gritta who stated 
that he has “done some research that shows the fewer the types of aircraft you fly, the 
lower your cost per unit, and that's an advantage” (R. Gritta, personal communication, 
October 28, 2011). 
Further, the research indicated there might be a relationship between the type of 
aircraft flown by the airline and financial status.  The financial status of the three airlines 
that operated wide-body aircraft (Gemini, Atlas Air, and Cargo 360) was predicted 
correctly by the K-score model, and the three incorrect predictions made by the K-score 
model all involved airlines that flew narrow body aircraft (Kitty Hawk Air Cargo, ABX 
Air, and Arrow Air).  The finding of a relationship between type of aircraft flown and 
financial status is closely related to the first finding on aircraft fleet mix. 
The third idea that emerged during the research was there was a high co-
occurrence of codes among flight frequency and capacity, price, reliability, and revenue.  
Many of the codes and themes that emerged throughout the research come as no surprise.  
The ideas of competitive advantage, operations, financial factors, risk, and many of the 
other codes that emerged are germane not only to the airline industry, but to most 
companies in general.  The high co-occurrence of flight frequency with capacity, price, 
reliability, and revenue is supported by the statement made by Dr. Gritta, that if flight 
frequency  
resulted in higher hours of utilization per aircraft, it would be a good thing.  The 
higher your average flight hours for each day of utilization of the aircraft, the 
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lower cost that you have, so that would mean a lower probability of bankruptcy. 
(personal communication, October 28, 2011) 
The dominate research methodologies found in the literature on bankruptcy 
prediction are “classical cross-sectional statistical methods and multivariate discriminant 
analysis (MDA)… however, these methods have some major limitations” (Wetter & 
Wennberg, 2009, p. 30).  In addition, the performance of many of the failure prediction 
models based on statistical methods is similar, so other methods of failure prediction 
should be explored (Ooghe et al., 2009).  Ooghe et al. (2009) suggested that to improve 
the statistically based models it is important to understand first the nonstatistical variables 
that may affect these existing models.  This research has attempted to provide a better 
understanding of the nonstatistical themes that may affect traditional statistical based 
bankruptcy prediction models.  One of the underlying tenets of grounded research is to 
look at the data with an open mind and not be influenced by previous research; however, 
once new theory has emerged, it is essential to explore the published literature to 
determine where the new theory stands in relation to previous research. 
The literature on research into nonstatistical themes that affect bankruptcy 
prediction is limited; however, some research has been published.  Sun and Li (2007) 
developed a methodological framework for group expert decision making for predicting 
financial distress using qualitative risk factors.  The qualitative risk factors used by Sun 
and Li are listed in Table 16.  The qualitative risk factors used by Sun and Li fit well with 
the categories developed in this study with the exception that several of the risk factors 
used by Sun and Li are divided into several subcategories.  For example, the financial 
factors category, which emerged in this study, is divided into four categories by Sun and 
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Li (financial ability, investment risk, consciousness of debt risk, and corporate 
governance). 
Kim and Han (2003) developed a bankruptcy prediction model using a genetic 
algorithm based model and qualitative decisions by expert testimony.  The experts 
considered six qualitative risk factors (i.e., credibility, competitiveness, financial 
flexibility, industry risk, management risk, and operating risk).  Table 16 includes a 
comparison of the qualitative factors used by Kim and Han with those of the current 
study.  There appears to be a match between the six qualitative risk factors of Kim and 
Han in the categories developed in this study.  With the exception, like Son and Li 
(2007), the financial factors category of the study is divided into several qualitative 
categories.  The other deviation from Sun and Li (2007) and Kim and Han (2003) is that 
both studies considered all of the factors risk, whereas this study provides a separate 
category for risk.  Both of these studies support the six categories that emerged in this 
research. 
Table 16 Comparison of Qualitative Factors Used in Other Studies 
Current study Sun & Li (2007) Kim & Han (2003) 
Management  Management and control Management risk 
Risk  All a risk factor All a risk factor 
Operations  Management and control Operating risk 
Competitive advantage  Market information Competitiveness 
Financial factors  Financial ability 
Investment risk 
Consciousness of debt risk 
Corporate governance 
Credibility  
Financial flexibility 
External factors  Outside risk Industry risk 
 
Kim and Han (2003) advocated for a combined approach of both qualitative and 
quantitative methods to improve bankruptcy prediction model performance.  Kim and 
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Han noted that qualitative bankruptcy prediction models were limited because of the fact 
that they used historical data, whereas qualitative methods and the use of SMEs were able 
to provide better future predictions.  While this research independently developed a 
similar list of qualitative factors to Kim and Han that should be explored, it used subject 
matter expert testimony to confirm and support the categories, whereas Kim and Han 
used SMEs to provide an opinion on specific airline bankruptcies. 
Management was one of the categories that emerged during this research, and it is 
a central theme found in qualitative financial distress research.  Dr. Gritta noted that 
management was one of the biggest qualitative factors that influence financial distress in 
a firm (R. Gritta, personal communication, October 28, 2011).  Wetter and Wennberg 
(2009) developed a model that used variables for human capital and social capital of their 
management team, which performed better than the Altman Z-score model in a study of 
1,735 Swedish firms.  The variable for human capital took into consideration the 
company founder’s years of education, years of industry experience, and years of 
entrepreneurial experience, and for social capital used years of residency in a country and 
a dummy variable for parents who were entrepreneurs.  Using the variables human capital 
and social capital, Wetter and Wennberg (2009) had a prediction accuracy of 65.88% 
where as the Altman Z-score correctly classified only 52.56%.  The findings in the study 
showed that a variable for management in a bankruptcy prediction model should be 
considered. 
The first two themes that emerged in this research concerned aircraft fleet mix 
(single fleet versus mixed fleet) and type of aircraft flown by the airline (narrow-body 
versus wide-body aircraft).  In addition, the third theme that emerged concerned the 
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relationships among the following codes: flight frequency and capacity, price, reliability, 
and revenue.  Gudmundsson (2002) used a regression analysis with independent variables 
that were related to the codes uncovered in this research in developing a bankruptcy 
prediction model.  Unlike most financial prediction models, Gudmundsson’s model 
incorporates operating or traffic statistics instead of the traditional financial data.  
Gudmundsson used an independent variable for different types of aircraft operated as one 
of 10 independent variables.  Three other independent variables of load factor, number of 
passengers per departure, and number of departures per aircraft were used, all of which 
are related to capacity and flight frequency.  Gudmundsson also used the variables of 
average age of aircraft fleet and annual inflation rate; both of these variables can be 
related to fleet mix and economic factors uncovered in this research; therefore, six of the 
10 independent variables used by Gudmundsson were independently uncovered in this 
research.  Of the 10 independent variables used by Gudmundsson, only two were 
significant in the model; average age of fleet and the number of employees per aircraft.  
The findings of Gudmundsson provide credence that issues surrounding the makeup of 
the fleet may be significant.   
In another study by Gudmundsson (2004), productivity was positively related to 
financial distress in airlines.  Productivity in the aviation industry does not just refer to 
labor issues.  Economies of scale productivity increase related to the use, makeup, and 
deployment of the aircraft fleet as well (Gudmundsson, 2004). 
Gudmundsson (2002) found that airlines that fly single fleet wide-body aircraft 
are less prone to bankruptcy; however, Gudmundsson (1999) indicated in previous 
research “that carriers operating smaller equipment fared better than those operating 
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larger equipment” (p. 173).  The difference in results may be attributed to the fact that 
Gudmundsson’s findings were from a sample of passenger airlines between 1978 and 
1992.  This 5-year sample was immediately following airline deregulation in the United 
States, and 9 years before the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.  Both events caused 
many changes and upheaval within the aviation industry (Walton, 2011). 
The third theme that emerged concerned the relationships among flight frequency 
and capacity, price, reliability, and revenue.  The third theme is related to the utilization 
of an aircraft in a process called revenue management.  Revenue management is the plan 
for the maximization of the cargo scheduled to fly full aircraft and the optimization of the 
route structure to ensure full utilization of the aircraft (Walton, 2011).  Airlines can only 
increase capacity in large increments, so optimization of the capacity of the aircraft is 
critical to the maximization of revenue (Hellermann, 2006).  Airlines that are able to 
maximize the revenue are less prone to bankruptcy (Dr. Gritta, personal communication, 
October 28, 2011).  In addition, airlines that are able to maximize their utilization have 
higher economy of scale and lower cost per unit (Hellermann, 2006), making them less 
prone to bankruptcy. 
Emergent Theory and Theoretical Integration 
Three themes have emerged from this grounded theory research process.  There 
appears to be a relationship between aircraft fleet mix and the K-score prediction model; 
there appears to be a relationship between the type of aircraft flown by an airline and the 
K-score prediction model; and there is a high co-occurrence of codes among flight 
frequency and capacity, price, reliability, and revenue, which indicates the importance of 
flight related factors in qualitative financial distress prediction models. 
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While the literature is limited on qualitative financial distress prediction research, 
this study has confirmed the importance of considering fleet mix and type of aircraft 
flown as part of qualitative study.  In addition, the high co-occurrence of flight frequency 
and capacity, price, reliability, and revenue are also qualitative indicators that have been 
explored in other research.  Most published financial distress prediction models use a set 
of quantitative financial ratios; however, this research has shown that qualitative and 
traffic statistics should be considered in prediction models. 
Summary 
This research used grounded theory to explore the nonfinancial factors that may 
affect quantitative bankruptcy prediction models.  The results of a published bankruptcy 
prediction model (K-score) accuracy on 17 U.S. all-cargo airlines between 2005 and 2009 
were used as a starting point to draw a sample of six airlines.  The K-score model was 
originally developed to predict bankruptcy in the passenger airline industry for the years 
1999-2003.  Uncalibrated, for the air-cargo airlines, the model was able to correctly to 
classify 1 of the 2 bankrupt firms (50.0% correctly classified) as bankrupt.  For the 
nonbankrupt air-cargo airlines, the original Kroeze model predicted seven of the 
nonbankrupt firms correctly (46.7% correctly classified) for an overall accuracy of 47.1% 
of the original grouped cases correctly classified.  In total, 34 documents were coded and 
35 unique codes or ideas emerged from the documents.  Two SME interviews were 
conducted to provide additional background on financial distress in the all-cargo airline 
industry. 
Three relationships emerged from the data that provide insight into some of the 
qualitative factors that should be considered in financial prediction models.  First, there is 
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a relationship between aircraft fleet mix in the K-Score prediction model.  Second, there 
is a relationship between the type of aircraft flown by an airline and the K-Score 
prediction model.  Third, there is a relationship between traffic statistics relating to flight 
frequency and capacity, price, reliability, and revenue. 
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Chapter 5: Implications, Recommendations, and Conclusions 
The problem addressed in this study was the inability of published financial 
prediction models to account for nonstatistical factors that may influence the models.  
Financial prediction models, typically quantitative in nature, are used to determine the 
financial stability of the company.  These quantitative, statistical based models have been 
refined to a point where they provide similar results, so further improvement may be 
obtained through exploration of the nonstatistical variables that affect these models 
(Ooghe et al., 2009; Youn & Gu, 2010).  The population for the study was the U.S. all-
cargo airline industry between 2005 and 2009.  There were 17 U.S. all-cargo airlines in 
operation during this period.  Using grounded theory, the purpose of this research was to 
explore the nonstatistical factors influencing a published bankruptcy prediction model, 
the K-score.  A basic grounded theory research processes was followed in this study as 
outlined by Corbin and Strauss (1990) in which constant comparison analysis was used 
throughout the data collection process. 
Validation of grounded theory is questioned by some researchers; however, 
validity was maintained through the use of triangulation of data from multiple sources.  
Additionally, validity was added through the detailed description of the data that was 
provided in chapter 4.  Publicly available data was used in this study and did not involve 
any human subjects so there was no risk to humans; however, Northcentral University's 
Institutional Review Board approval was obtained prior to any data collection. 
In this chapter, the research question and the theory that emerged during the study 
will be summarized.  The chapter includes the limitations of the study and where it fits 
with existing literature.  The chapter will continue with a discussion of the managerial 
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implications of this research and its findings; moreover, the chapter will end with a 
discussion of recommendations and conclusions. 
Implications 
This research uncovered six categories (management, risk, operations, 
competitive advantage, financial factors, and external factors) that relate to the financial 
stability of an all-cargo airline.  The categories that emerged from the data are relevant 
not only to the all-cargo airline industry, but to most companies in general.  Several 
studies (Kim & Han, 2003; Sun & Li, 2007) have used similar qualitative factors in 
bankruptcy prediction modeling.  Figure 4 graphically displays the six categories that 
emerged during this research and their interrelations.  Financial factors, operations, risk, 
and competitive advantage are all part of management, and management has direct 
control over these categories; however, all of these categories are influenced by external 
factors outside of the control of management and set the parameters in which the firm 
must operate.  All of these factors influence the financial stability of the firm, and the 
long-term health of the company. 
The research question that was explored in this study was as follows: What 
nonstatistical factors influence the K-score bankruptcy prediction model in the all-cargo 
airline industry?  The findings of this research uncovered three themes that address the 
research question.  For the six all-cargo airlines examined in this study the research found 
a relationship between aircraft fleet mix and the K-score predicted group membership.  
The two airlines (Atlas Air and Cargo 360) both operated single fleet type of aircraft and 
both were correctly predicted nonbankrupt, whereas all of the airlines, except one 
(Gemini), that flew a mixed fleet of different type aircraft were correctly predicted as 
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either bankrupt or nonbankrupt by the K-score model.  The second relationship 
uncovered in this research was between the type of aircraft flown by an airline and the K-
score model.  Of the six airlines in this sample, three flew only a single body type aircraft 
(Gemini, Atlas air, cargo 360).  All three of these airlines were correctly classified by the 
K-score model.  The other three airlines (Kitty Hawk, ABX Air, and Arrow Air) all flew 
at least some narrow-body aircraft, and all three were incorrectly classified by the K-
score model.  The fleet type and mix of aircraft that an airline flies is a strategic decision 
for all-cargo airlines.  Although flying a mixed fleet may allow an airline to better size 
aircraft on certain routes, it increases the overall operational cost of an airline.   
Although the literature on qualitative financial distress modeling is limited, most 
qualitative research attempts to account for the type of fleet that an airline flies.  For 
example, Gudmundsson (2002) used an independent variable of different types of aircraft 
operated in a qualitative model that he developed.  The independent emergence of this 
data separately from previously published research adds validity to this study and to the 
previous work of Gudmundsson and others and indicates that the type of aircraft fleet 
affects the financial success or failure of an airline.  Airlines that operate older fleets tend 
to have higher fuel and maintenance costs and lower overall reliability, whereas airlines 
that fly newer aircraft have the advantage of fuel savings, reduced maintenance cost, and 
improved reliability. 
 
121 
 
 
Figure 4.  Six categories that affect financial distress in a firm. 
The third theme that emerged in this research concerns the relationships between 
flight frequency and capacity, price, reliability, and revenue.  These factors are related to 
the utilization of an aircraft.  To maximize revenue an all-cargo carrier strives for full 
utilization of its aircraft on all legs of a flight.  Full utilization of aircraft is difficult to 
manage because of the complexity of network planning and capacity allocation.  Unlike 
passenger airlines where a passenger can be assigned to exactly one seat, cargo shipments 
have multiple dimensions (volume and weight) that must be taken into account in an 
attempt to maximize utilization of an aircraft.  Additionally, cargo shipments typically are 
not round-trip, and imbalances in the trade lanes may require a cargo airline to operate a 
less than full aircraft in one direction (e.g., from China to the United States the aircraft is 
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full, but on return to China the aircraft is not fully utilized).  By maximizing revenue, an 
airline reduces its probability of bankruptcy.  The importance of the theme of revenue 
maximization was confirmed by Dr. Gritta (personal communication, October 28, 2011) 
who stated that airlines that have a higher utilization of their aircraft have a lower 
probability of bankruptcy.   
Figure 5 graphically illustrates the three themes that emerged during this research.  
These themes act as pillars to financial prediction models in the all-cargo airline industry.  
All three of these themes, fleet mix, type of aircraft, and aircraft utilization deal directly 
with the production unit of the firm, the aircraft.  Just as with a manufacturing company 
with a factory, the production unit is where the firm's key competency must be focused to 
maximize revenue and control cost in an attempt to maximize profits for all of the 
shareholders.  The three themes have emerged as the key factors that influence financial 
distress in all-cargo airlines and therefore affect financial distress models.  Qualitative 
bankruptcy prediction models have been unable to account fully for qualitative factors 
that affect their prediction capability.  The three pillars of fleet mix, type of aircraft 
flown, and aircraft utilization have not been taken into consideration by qualitative 
bankruptcy prediction models; however, this research has shown that these factors are 
important to improving bankruptcy predictions for the aviation industry. 
This research explored the nonstatistical factors that influence the accuracy of the 
Kroeze K-score model.  Using grounded theory, this research contributes to the body of 
literature.  This study indicates the importance of qualitative factors in financial distress 
prediction and provides some of the factors that may be important in improving 
bankruptcy prediction accuracy; additionally, this research confirms the importance of 
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the type of fleet, aircraft type mix, and maximizing aircraft utilization to profitable 
operation. 
 
Figure 5.  Factors that influence financial distress. 
Recommendations 
The qualitative factors uncovered in this research can be used to improve financial 
prediction models.  These findings can be used to identify themes and relationships and 
provide a better understanding of the failure process.  This research determined there are 
six themes (management, risk, operations, competitive advantage, financial factors, and 
external factors) that relate to the financial stability of an all-cargo airline.  Previous 
research has used some of these same themes in financial distress prediction modeling, 
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but not all of them (Kim & Han, 2003; Sun & Li, 2007).  Future research should explore 
the incorporation of all six themes into all-cargo airline financial distress prediction 
models to verify their relevance.  The six themes may be relevant to companies outside of 
the aviation industry, and their use in financial distress prediction of nonaviation-related 
firms should be explored to determine the transferability of the categories between 
industries.    
Factors that influence financial distress models in the all-cargo airline industry 
were determined to be related to fleet mix, type of aircraft, and aircraft utilization.  
Previous qualitative financial distress research has attempted to account for some of these 
factors (Gudmundsson, 2002).  These three factors make up the production unit of an 
airline and should be the focus of airline management to maximize revenue and minimize 
cost.  Because of the importance of these three factors to airline profitability, additional 
research on the relationship of these factors to financial distress modeling should be 
conducted.      
The main limitation of this study was the small population available, which 
precluded the possibility of testing the findings, which was, in any case, outside the scope 
of this research.  Future research should be conducted to verify these findings on a larger 
population.  The study researched U.S. all-cargo airlines, and used a sample of six of the 
17 all-cargo carriers in operation from 2005 to 2009.  Since the total population of U.S. 
all-cargo carriers is small, future research could be conducted on the entire population.  
Non-U.S. all-cargo airlines operate under a different financial reporting regime that may 
affect financial prediction models that are calibrated using U.S. company data, so future 
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studies should be conducted which consider these factors in relation to airlines which 
operate outside the United States.   
This research includes secondary data augmented by two interviews conducted 
with subject matter experts.  The use of secondary data in the grounded theory process 
has many obstacles and limitations for its use in theoretical sampling (Birks & Mills, 
2011).  The limitations of using secondary data are that it removes the researcher from 
the generation and collection of data, which is counter to the idea of grounded theory that 
the researcher will have some influence over the nature of the data that is gathered.  
When generating theory using secondary data, the researcher's philosophical position 
may impact how the data is interpreted, and “gaps may subsequently exist in the 
theoretical constructions” (Birks & Mills, 2011, p. 84) that hinder the generation of a 
cohesive theory.  Although the use of secondary data may hinder a comprehensive theory 
development, Birks and Mills (2011) noted that “attention to the application of essential 
grounded theory methods in your treatment of secondary data will minimize the potential 
disadvantages” (p. 85) and that the use of secondary data can provide a cost and time 
advantage in research.   
Traditional quantitative bankruptcy prediction models that use past data are 
limited in predicting financial distress that might occur in the future, whereas the use of 
qualitative data and SMEs may provide improved predictions further into the future.  The 
factors and the qualitative models; however, have not been fully developed.  Future 
research focused on the use of qualitative data and SMEs may be able to improve 
prediction performance. 
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In addition to a theoretical or research interest, this research also provides a list of 
factors that should be considered by airline managers when making decisions.  Most 
senior managers, no matter what industry, are trained to examine external factors that 
may affect their firm along with considerations of competitive advantage, financial 
factors, and risk factors.  In addition, one of the primary functions of management is 
overseeing operations.  These factors all emerged as part of six categories that may affect 
financial distress and a firm and confirms the importance to the company.  Specific to the 
aviation industry are the factors of fleet mix, type of aircraft flying, and aircraft 
utilization, which influence financial distress in a company.  Fleet decisions are strategic 
multimillion-dollar decisions that airline managers must make.  If management makes the 
correct fleet decisions they may avoid future financial turmoil; get it wrong and 
management may set firm on a path to destruction.  The third theme uncovered in this 
research in relation to flight frequency also impacts management’s decisions.  Managers 
must determine the price of providing air cargo services, and through fleet decisions 
determine the capacity and reliability of their aircraft.  These factors will affect the final 
revenue stream of company and therefore the financial health firm.        
Conclusions 
“Firms which cannot recognize financial distress and take measures at an early 
stage will run into bankruptcy, which not only brings great lost stockholders, creditors, 
managers and other interested parts, but also affects the stability of social economy” (Sun 
& Li, 2007, p. 885).  The findings in this study provide information that is important to 
both the theoretical academic community and the practical, managerial, day-to-day 
operations of an airline.  The research on bankruptcy prediction modeling is extensive, 
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and the findings from this research can be used to improve the financial distress modeling 
process.  For airline managers, an understanding of the factors that may cause bankruptcy 
will help avoid financial distress in their company.  The categories identified in this 
research that relate to the financial distress of a firm were management, risk, operations, 
competitive advantage, financial factors, and external factors.  Company managers must 
deal with many issues on a daily basis; however, this research has indicated that these six 
categories are related to the financial health of the company, so an effort should be made 
by management to specifically focus on these factors.   
The profit-making unit of an airline is its fleet.  The fleet mix, type of aircraft, and 
utilization are key to operating a profitable airline.  The findings showed that these three 
factors also influence the financial health of all-cargo airlines.  The decision on what 
types of aircraft and the proper mix of aircraft to support the route structure of an airline 
is a multimillion-dollar decision and can affect the long-term financial health of an 
organization.   
The theory that emerges from the data as discussed in this dissertation lead back 
to the fact that the qualitative themes uncovered in the course of this research have not 
been widely used in bankruptcy prediction models.  These themes influence the financial 
well being of an airline and should improve the prediction capability of financial 
bankruptcy models if incorporated into future model.  
This research has confirmed, but not quantified, there is a relationship between 
aircraft fleet mix, type of aircraft flown by airline, and a published prediction financial 
model.  The findings of the study have also confirmed the importance of aircraft 
utilization and revenue management and provided a list of categories (management, risk, 
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operations, competitive advantage, financial factors, and external factors) that influence 
the financial stability of an all-cargo airline industry.  The all-cargo airline industry in the 
as a whole operates on tight margins and is prone to bankruptcy.  The results of this 
research add to the body of knowledge on financial distress modeling and can be of 
benefit to governments, lenders, academics, and investors.  Additional research is 
recommended to verify the results using a larger population of all-cargo airlines and on 
companies outside of the aviation industry. 
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Appendix A 
 List of Cargo Airlines 
 
List of all-cargo U.S. airlines in business 2005-2009 
 
• Abx Air, Inc. 
• Aloha Air Cargo 
• Amerijet International 
• Arrow Air Inc. 
• Astar USA, LLC 
• Atlas Air Inc. 
• Capital Cargo International 
• Cargo 360, Inc. 
• Centurion Cargo Inc. 
• Evergreen Int'l Inc. 
• Gemini Air Cargo Airways 
• Kalitta Air LLC 
• Kitty Hawk Air Cargo 
• Lynden Air Cargo Airlines 
• Northern Air Cargo Inc. 
• Polar Air Cargo Airways 
• Southern Air Inc. 
 
Source: RITA TranStats database 
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Appendix B 
 
Documents Reviewed 
 
Table B1 
 
Title Source Published 
Oak Hill to buy Southern Air and merge it with 
Cargo 360 
 
Air Transport 
Intelligence 
2007 
Southern Air drops plans to add 747-400SF Air Transport 
Intelligence 
 
2008 
Cargo 360, Southern Air merger chugging along Aviation Daily 2007 
Oak Hill Capital Partners to acquire Southern Air; 
Southern Air to be combined with Cargo 360 to 
create a leading global Air cargo company 
 
PR Newswire 2007 
US DOT grants Cargo 360 air operator’s 
certificate 
Air Transport 
Intelligence 
 
2006 
Cargo 360: proving by selling Traffic World 
 
2006 
Oak Hill Capital Partners to acquire Southern Air Press release Oak Hill 
Capital Partners 
 
2007 
ABX Air 2005 Annual Report ABX Air 
 
2006 
U.S. SEC form 10-K for Air Transport Services 
Group, Inc annual report 2009 
U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission 
 
2010 
Atlas Air annual report 2005 Atlas Air 
 
2006 
Atlas Air annual report 2009 Atlas Air 
 
2010 
Atlas Air profits surge Journal of Commerce 
 
2009 
Atlas Air, Inc. named best air charter/ACMI 
operator 
 
Business Wire 2007 
Atlas Air recovery aids B747-400F values Aircraft Value News 
 
2005 
Panalpina, Atlas Air renew freighter pact Journal of Commerce 
 
2009 
ABX air cargo says Florida-based rival offering 
buyout 
Dayton Daily News 2007 
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Title Source Published 
U.S. SEC form 10-K for Kitty Hawk, Inc. annual 
report 2005 
 
U.S. Securities and 
Exchange commission 
2006 
U.S. SEC form 10-K for Kitty Hawk, Inc. annual 
report 2006 
 
U.S. Securities and 
Exchange commission 
2007 
U.S. SEC form 10-K for Kitty Hawk, Inc. 
quarterly report ending June 2007 
 
U.S. Securities and 
Exchange commission 
2007 
U.S. SEC form 10-K for Kitty Hawk, Inc. 
quarterly report ending March 2007 
 
U.S. Securities and 
Exchange commission 
2007 
MatlinPatterson takes majority stake in Arrow 
Cargo parent 
 
Air Transport 
Intelligence 
2008 
New appointments announced by Arrow Air Airline Industry 
Information 
 
2008 
Cargo carrier Arrow Air bankrupt, to liquidate 
 
Reuters 2010 
Arrow air exits chapter 11 bankruptcy protection Air Transport 
Intelligence 
2004 
Arrow Air expands DC-10 fleet, buys Miami 
facility 
 
Air Transport 
Intelligence 
205 
MatlinPatterson Global Opportunities Partners III 
acquires controlling interest in Arrow Air 
Holdings Corporation 
 
PR Newswire 2008 
Arrow air is ready to ascend cargo carrier rebounds 
from bankruptcy 
 
South florida Sun – 
Sentinel 
2005 
US cargo operator Gemini emerges from Ch 11 
bankruptcy 
 
Air Transport 
Intelligence 
2006 
Is outsourced air out? 
 
Traffic World 2008 
Gemini Air Cargo closes 
 
Journal of Commerce 2008 
Gemini Air reorganizes 
 
Traffic World 2006 
Gemini Air Cargo, Inc. announces emergence from 
Chapter 11; Bayside Capital takes majority stake; 
company eliminates approximately $50 million of 
Debt 
Business Wire 2006 
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Title Source Published 
Gemini cleared for takeoff 
 
Traffic World 2006 
Gemini files for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection 
 
Air Traffic Intelligence 2008 
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Appendix C 
 Financial Data 
 
Financial data used to calculate the K-Score for each airline 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ABX Air, Inc.
2009 2008 2007 2006 2005
Total Current Assets 2,386,866 1,960,010 775,645 421,493 469,713
Total Assets 3,894,583 4,108,751 3,175,464 2,248,354 1,976,776
Total Current Liabilities 653,641 681,774 538,835 570,729 585,362
Total Noncurrent Liabilities 2,470,165 2,797,912 2,065,288 1,168,788 971,926
Retained Earnings -1,103,466 -1,108,654 -1,161,636 -1,214,914 -1,298,537
Net Stockholders Equity 767,447 627,401 571,341 508,837 419,488
Kroeze K-score -0.091 -0.123 -0.262 -0.438 -0.536
Note.  Company considered not in financial distress if K-Score is >0.0, and in financial distress if K-Score is =<0.0.  Financial 
figures shown is Thousands of US$.  Source of data RITA Schedule B1 data.
Aloha Air Cargo
2009 2008 2007 2006 2005
Total Current Assets 36,605 98,282 290,345 346,820 412,782
Total Assets 90,282 259,315 891,046 691,650 646,287
Total Current Liabilities 16,444 274,364 840,468 617,645 834,060
Total Noncurrent Liabilities 176 35,250 126,563 383,513 472,606
Retained Earnings 3,904 -150,628 -334,973 -594,882 -704,271
Net Stockholders Equity 73,663 -51,595 -78,893 -310,215 -666,155
Kroeze K-score 0.588 -0.687 -0.490 -0.860 -1.144
Note.  Company considered not in financial distress if K-Score is >0.0, and in financial distress if K-Score is =<0.0.  Financial 
figures shown is Thousands of US$.  Source of data RITA Schedule B1 data.
Amerijet International
2009 2008 2007 2006 2005
Total Current Assets 152,624 163,466 148,605 138,690 129,227
Total Assets 207,916 214,505 195,982 186,052 175,840
Total Current Liabilities 163,975 172,308 123,337 133,260 122,461
Total Noncurrent Liabilities 14,293 16,727 39,613 32,460 30,636
Retained Earnings 17,561 13,383 21,255 9,490 12,270
Net Stockholders Equity 29,648 25,470 33,031 20,332 22,743
Kroeze K-score 0.075 0.056 0.148 0.064 0.085
Note.  Company considered not in financial distress if K-Score is >0.0, and in financial distress if K-Score is =<0.0.  Financial 
figures shown is Thousands of US$.  Source of data RITA Schedule B1 data.
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Arrow Air Inc.
2009 2008 2007 2006 2005
Total Current Assets 138,341 132,325 134,793 118,162 87,210
Total Assets 308,147 274,241 278,921 269,265 179,665
Total Current Liabilities 139,679 199,912 135,056 173,097 99,763
Total Noncurrent Liabilities 142,467 56,425 154,015 90,832 66,101
Retained Earnings -255,170 -145,096 -58,154 -26,243 -9,009
Net Stockholders Equity 26,001 17,904 -10,150 5,336 13,801
Kroeze K-score -0.685 -0.502 -0.179 -0.134 -0.052
Note.  Company considered not in financial distress if K-Score is >0.0, and in financial distress if K-Score is =<0.0.  Financial 
figures shown is Thousands of US$.  Source of data RITA Schedule B1 data.
Astar USA, LLC
2009 2008 2007 2006 2005
Total Current Assets 219,810 296,731 360,424 248,677 227,898
Total Assets 645,512 860,859 895,120 717,032 599,642
Total Current Liabilities 458,151 500,552 496,590 453,189 353,973
Total Noncurrent Liabilities 360,974 478,246 501,556 465,472 359,326
Retained Earnings -327,781 -264,753 -242,518 -246,609 -172,140
Net Stockholders Equity -175,165 -118,715 -103,442 -206,609 -132,140
Kroeze K-score -0.548 -0.335 -0.279 -0.390 -0.317
Note.  Company considered not in financial distress if K-Score is >0.0, and in financial distress if K-Score is =<0.0.  Financial 
figures shown is Thousands of US$.  Source of data RITA Schedule B1 data.
Atlas Air Inc.
2009 2008 2007 2006 2005
Total Current Assets 965,782 1,061,519 1,005,798 933,473 790,368
Total Assets 4,813,940 4,521,675 3,478,215 3,320,763 3,344,655
Total Current Liabilities 567,000 619,961 619,520 790,640 716,711
Total Noncurrent Liabilities 2,595,933 2,523,616 1,669,756 1,760,189 2,234,215
Retained Earnings 1,247,695 1,136,399 895,478 421,985 115,108
Net Stockholders Equity 1,386,432 1,265,478 1,167,960 713,965 308,473
Kroeze K-score 0.288 0.281 0.302 0.149 0.046
Note.  Company considered not in financial distress if K-Score is >0.0, and in financial distress if K-Score is =<0.0.  Financial 
figures shown is Thousands of US$.  Source of data RITA Schedule B1 data.
Capital Cargo International
2009 2008 2007 2006 2005
Total Current Assets 10,407 8,616 15,281 14,942 19,280
Total Assets 120,488 116,660 59,972 60,917 70,163
Total Current Liabilities 19,185 12,359 9,256 17,078 22,286
Total Noncurrent Liabilities 3,755 2,431 3,867 17,977 27,183
Retained Earnings -21,429 -7,657 -65,116 -137,651 -51,375
Net Stockholders Equity 83,736 97,511 46,567 25,789 20,675
Kroeze K-score 0.237 0.668 -0.489 -1.821 -0.579
Note.  Company considered not in financial distress if K-Score is >0.0, and in financial distress if K-Score is =<0.0.  Financial 
figures shown is Thousands of US$.  Source of data RITA Schedule B1 data.
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Cargo 360, Inc.
2009 2008 2007 2006 2005
Total Current Assets 56,056 46,269
Total Assets 1,052,861 55,092
Total Current Liabilities 73,055 15,113
Total Noncurrent Liabilities 978,429 44,467
Retained Earnings -20,171 -36,215
Net Stockholders Equity 927 -4,488
Kroeze K-score -0.020 -0.408
Note.  Company considered not in financial distress if K-Score is >0.0, and in financial distress if K-Score is =<0.0.  Financial 
figures shown is Thousands of US$.  Source of data RITA Schedule B1 data.
Centurion Cargo Inc.
2009 2008 2007 2006 2005
Total Current Assets 112,258 324,809 156,338 15,971
Total Assets 164,355 394,486 190,186 33,837
Total Current Liabilities 113,372 287,995 171,236 27,361
Total Noncurrent Liabilities 24,321 23,324 8,257 255
Retained Earnings -122,517 -60,601 -137,979 -66,437
Net Stockholders Equity 25,162 81,995 7,996 6,220
Kroeze K-score -0.606 -0.074 -0.624 -1.711
Note.  Company considered not in financial distress if K-Score is >0.0, and in financial distress if K-Score is =<0.0.  Financial 
figures shown is Thousands of US$.  Source of data RITA Schedule B1 data.
Evergreen International Inc.
2009 2008 2007 2006 2005
Total Current Assets 127,069 156,702 123,372 112,851 103,591
Total Assets 1,892,330 1,958,743 1,958,510 1,869,958 1,809,637
Total Current Liabilities 326,200 306,477 277,831 281,827 259,332
Total Noncurrent Liabilities 339,060 322,078 370,260 328,987 372,556
Retained Earnings 450,294 503,344 477,500 451,727 366,943
Net Stockholders Equity 739,897 792,947 767,103 741,330 656,547
Kroeze K-score 0.295 0.335 0.315 0.313 0.262
Note.  Company considered not in financial distress if K-Score is >0.0, and in financial distress if K-Score is =<0.0.  Financial 
figures shown is Thousands of US$.  Source of data RITA Schedule B1 data.
Gemini Air Cargo Airways
2009 2008 2007 2006 2005
Total Current Assets 97,497 83,619
Total Assets 275,986 251,933
Total Current Liabilities 187,916 184,581
Total Noncurrent Liabilities 184,532 302,547
Retained Earnings -401,878 -747,150
Net Stockholders Equity -97,099 -235,194
Kroeze K-score -1.337 -2.646
Note.  Company considered not in financial distress if K-Score is >0.0, and in financial distress if K-Score is =<0.0.  Financial 
figures shown is Thousands of US$.  Source of data RITA Schedule B1 data.
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Kalitta Air LLC
2009 2008 2007 2006 2005
Total Current Assets 704,687 483,413 603,640 468,565 357,869
Total Assets 1,921,402 1,766,426 1,414,689 1,193,751 976,391
Total Current Liabilities 462,234 274,243 212,636 225,123 174,575
Total Noncurrent Liabilities 304,829 302,389 0 0 0
Retained Earnings 1,249,259 1,277,617 1,288,904 1,052,830 885,582
Net Stockholders Equity 1,154,339 1,189,794 1,202,052 968,627 801,816
Kroeze K-score 0.746 0.867 1.465 1.271 1.320
Note.  Company considered not in financial distress if K-Score is >0.0, and in financial distress if K-Score is =<0.0.  Financial 
figures shown is Thousands of US$.  Source of data RITA Schedule B1 data.
Kitty Hawk Aircargo
2009 2008 2007 2006 2005
Total Current Assets 12,056 12,517 36,742
Total Assets 22,833 12,443 29,228
Total Current Liabilities 12,021 8,031 16,218
Total Noncurrent Liabilities 0 0 0
Retained Earnings 10,812 4,412 13,010
Net Stockholders Equity 10,812 4,412 13,010
Kroeze K-score 0.497 0.455 0.650
Note.  Company considered not in financial distress if K-Score is >0.0, and in financial distress if K-Score is =<0.0.  Financial 
figures shown is Thousands of US$.  Source of data RITA Schedule B1 data.
Lynden Air Cargo Airlines
2009 2008 2007 2006 2005
Total Current Assets 40,592 68,758 53,653 39,915 31,306
Total Assets 215,341 240,597 243,897 243,466 226,941
Total Current Liabilities 33,932 59,469 43,414 54,894 51,720
Total Noncurrent Liabilities 1,025 6,131 2,017 537 17,192
Retained Earnings 141,163 139,910 167,498 160,910 134,752
Net Stockholders Equity 180,460 175,019 198,496 188,144 157,924
Kroeze K-score 1.131 0.794 1.072 0.914 0.728
Note.  Company considered not in financial distress if K-Score is >0.0, and in financial distress if K-Score is =<0.0.  Financial 
figures shown is Thousands of US$.  Source of data RITA Schedule B1 data.
Northern Air Cargo Inc.
2009 2008 2007 2006 2005
Total Current Assets 19,413 20,904 22,401 25,186 27,916
Total Assets 126,506 129,161 141,000 99,983 73,734
Total Current Liabilities 46,292 49,735 39,478 29,848 41,737
Total Noncurrent Liabilities 331 0 0 0 9,726
Retained Earnings 31,781 14,529 3,640 16,810 21,471
Net Stockholders Equity 79,883 79,426 101,522 70,135 22,271
Kroeze K-score 0.344 0.212 0.275 0.389 0.242
Note.  Company considered not in financial distress if K-Score is >0.0, and in financial distress if K-Score is =<0.0.  Financial 
figures shown is Thousands of US$.  Source of data RITA Schedule B1 data.
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Polar Air Cargo Airways
2009 2008 2007 2006 2005
Total Current Assets 180,665 424,983 320,911 674,409 721,426
Total Assets 190,409 437,228 378,641 922,572 1,133,029
Total Current Liabilities 123,566 246,587 168,871 208,659 226,300
Total Noncurrent Liabilities 4,551 124,098 135,882 69,665 64,685
Retained Earnings -89,483 -69,490 -14,316 30,075 83,346
Net Stockholders Equity 62,293 66,543 67,293 644,247 842,044
Kroeze K-score -0.259 -0.004 0.100 0.420 0.500
Note.  Company considered not in financial distress if K-Score is >0.0, and in financial distress if K-Score is =<0.0.  Financial 
figures shown is Thousands of US$.  Source of data RITA Schedule B1 data.
Southern Air Inc.
2009 2008 2007 2006 2005
Total Current Assets 74,888 216,801 37,976 29,945 23,574
Total Assets 1,338,371 1,974,298 211,149 164,409 142,284
Total Current Liabilities 123,980 163,837 107,731 42,497 23,310
Total Noncurrent Liabilities 1,157,932 1,123,473 14,989 35,182 47,400
Retained Earnings -918,298 -251,643 70,292 74,731 59,574
Net Stockholders Equity 53,643 685,966 88,032 86,731 71,574
Kroeze K-score -0.580 -0.040 0.270 0.484 0.464
Note.  Company considered not in financial distress if K-Score is >0.0, and in financial distress if K-Score is =<0.0.  Financial 
figures shown is Thousands of US$.  Source of data RITA Schedule B1 data.
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Appendix D: Definition of Codes 
Accidents.  This code denotes mention of aircraft accidents. 
Antitrust.  This code refers to the impact of the fuel surcharge antitrust lawsuits started 
in Feb 2006. 
 
Bankruptcy.  This code is used when the segment of text discussed bankruptcy or the 
discussion of any sort of restructuring that has taken place or is being considered. 
 
Capacity.  This code indicates capacity issues related to air-cargo operations.  Capacity 
can be either the carrying capacity of the particular aircraft or the overall capacity of the 
airline. 
 
Cash flow.  This code represents cash flow issues within a firm. 
 
Competition.  This code is used to examine competition within the air-cargo industry 
 
Competitive Advantage.  This code indicates the competitive advantages a company 
may have over a competitor. 
 
Cost.  This code refers to cargo airline cost issues such as fuel and salaries. 
 
Credit_markets.  This code indicates when a carrier is looking to the credit markets for 
funding.  
 
Customers.  This code signifies issues related to customer service and customers in 
general.  
 
Earnings.  This code explores the earnings of an airline.  
 
Economics.  This code looks at the external economics that may affect an all-cargo 
operation (i.e. world GDP...). 
 
Environment.  This code is for all environment issues such as environmental protection 
agency (EPA), noise, or emissions regulations. 
 
Fleet mix.  This code is used to identify the fleet mix that the airline is operating in any 
issues with the current or future aircraft fleet. 
 
Flight_frequency.  This code represents flight frequency issues related to air-cargo 
operations. 
 
Fuel_efficiency.  This code signifies fuel efficiency issues related to air-cargo operation. 
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Geographic location. This code represents the physical location of a company's 
operations and the geographical reach or airports serviced and issues related to air-cargo 
operations. 
 
Labor_Issues. This code indicates labor issues or union agreements/issues. 
 
Maintenance. This code outlines aircraft maintenance issues. 
 
Management.  This code is used to identify managers, owners, and management issues. 
 
Market.  This code looks at market factors in the industry. 
 
Merger.  This code is used to identify issues related to a merger. 
 
Operations.  This code looks at issues in the day-to-day or short-term operations of the 
airline. 
 
Ownership.  This code indicates ownership and ownership issues. 
 
Price.  This code is for pricing issues related to air-cargo operations  
 
Regulation.  This code identifies issues with government regulations, both national and 
international. 
 
Reliability.  This code is for reliability issues related to air-cargo operations, such as on-
time delivery. 
 
Revenue.  This code refers to the revenue, imcome, or financial issues in an airline. 
 
Risk.  This code signifies issues of potential or real risk for the company. 
 
Routes.  This code designates routes the airlines fly and location served. 
 
Security.  This code symbolizes cargo security cost and issues. 
 
Service.  This code refers to the level of service and airline provides.  
 
Size.  This code indicates the size of the airline within the industry.  
 
Tax.  This code relates to taxation issues. 
 
Utilization.  This code signifies the amount of time and aircraft is used. 
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Appendix E 
 
Categories With Examples of Quotations 
Table E1 
 
Categories with Examples of Quotations Linked to Codes 
Category Examples of quotations (preceded by code name) 
Management Management - “We announced an operational excellence program 
focused on cost savings and revenue enhancement. This program, 
if successfully implemented, could benefit our operating 
performance by more than $100 million over the next several 
years.” (Atlas Air, 2006, p. 4)  
 
Management –“Gemini will keep its current management team, 
and should quickly show further improvement because "if you 
take out all the debt service, Gemini has been performing very 
well for over a year." (Boyd, 2006, p. 2)  
 
Management – “In the course of its ongoing evaluation, our 
management has identified certain areas requiring improvement, 
which we are addressing.” (SEC, 2006, p. 53)  
 
Management – “Our senior management team has extensive 
operating and leadership experience in the airfreight, airline…” 
(Atlas Air, 2010, p. 30)  
 
Management – “Our business depends on highly qualified 
management and flight crew personnel.: (Atlas Air, 2010, p. 30)  
 
Operations Operations - “Outsourcing provides a cost-effective and efficient 
alternative for passenger airlines to maintain and expand the air-
cargo portion of their business.” (Atlas Air, 2006, p. 2) 
 
Maintenance - “Maintenance is our third-largest operating 
expense…” (Atlas Air, 2006, p. 4)  
 
Security - “The TSA extensively regulates aviation security 
through rules, regulations and security directives.” (Atlas Air, 
2006, p. 6)  
 
Fuel_efficiency - “Aviation fuel is one of the most significant 
expenses for an airline.” (Atlas Air, 2006, p. 8)  
Financial factors Earnings - “We reported strong earnings, and we made 
tremendous progress in our efforts to strengthen our 
business.”(Atlas Air, 2006, p. 5)  
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Category Examples of quotations (preceded by code name) 
Revenue - “ACMI minimizes yield and traffic demand risk in the 
air-cargo business and provides a more predictable annual 
revenue and cost base” (Atlas Air, 2006, p. 3)  
Bankruptcy - “Chapter 11 filing had also helped facilitate the 
issuance of the new equity securities required by certain of the 
restructuring agreements” (Atlas Air, 2006, p. 10)  
 
Cost - “In addition, if fuel costs increase significantly, our 
customers may reduce the volume and frequency of cargo 
shipments or find less costly alternatives for cargo delivery, such 
as land and sea carriers” (Atlas Air, 2006, p. 11) 
 
Merger – “increased competition, including the possible impact of 
any mergers, alliances or combinations of competitors” (SEC, 
2007, p. 14)  
 
Competitive 
advantage 
Fleet Mix - “After all, our fleet consisted of 20 Boeing 747-400s 
and 23 Boeing 747 Classics” (Atlas Air, 2006, p. 4)  
 
Competitive Advantage - “The primary competitive factors in the 
Scheduled Service market are price, geographic coverage, flight 
frequency, reliability and capacity.” (Atlas Air, 2006, p. 8)  
 
Competitive Advantage - “With a sizeable fleet and sophisticated 
operations, we had a competitive advantage compared with 
smaller carriers.” (Atlas Air, 2006, p. 4)  
 
Fleet Mix - “renewing the fleet is at the heart of our multi-year 
strategy” (Atlas Air, 2006, p. 5)  
 
Competition - “The market for outsourcing cargo ACMI services 
is highly competitive.” (Atlas Air, 2006, p. 8)  
 
Competition - “We are the only service provider in the Boeing 
747-400 ACMI market, as there are presently no direct 
competitors.” (Atlas Air, 2006, p. 8)  
 
Competitive Advantage – “We believe that the most important 
elements for competition in the air-cargo business are the range, 
payload and cubic capacities of the aircraft and the price, 
flexibility, quality and reliability of the cargo transportation 
services provided.” (Atlas Air, 2006, p. 13)  
 
Size – “Atlas Air, Inc., the world's leading provider of outsourced 
cargo aircraft, crew, maintenance and insurance service to major 
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Category Examples of quotations (preceded by code name) 
international airlines” (Business Wire, 2007, para. 1) 
 
Customers – “In 2006, our top 25 customers accounted for more 
than 59.3% of our scheduled freight revenue, and our top five 
customers accounted for more than 27.4% of our scheduled 
freight revenue.” (SEC, 2007, p. 6)  
 
 
Risk Risk - “We rely on DHL for substantially all of ABX’s revenues 
and the majority of ABX’s net operating cash flows.” (ABX Air, 
2006, p. 10)  
 
Accident – “We are vulnerable to potential losses that may be 
incurred in the event of an aircraft incident or accident including 
damage to the aircraft due to FOD.” (SEC, 2007, p. 13)  
 
Risk – “increased competition, including the possible impact of 
any mergers, alliances or combinations of competitors” (SEC, 
2007, p. 14)  
 
External factors Economics - “An economic downturn in the U.S. is likely to 
adversely affect demand for delivery services…” (ABX Air, 
2006, p. 10)  
 
Economics - “We depend on worldwide demand and any 
economic decrease in the demand for cargo transport could 
adversely affect our business and operations.” (Atlas Air, 2006, p. 
11)  
 
Economics – “The as-needed nature of our scheduled freight 
business and the types of industries we serve subject our business 
to significant market fluctuations that are beyond our control, and 
a downward market fluctuation could have a material adverse 
effect on our results of operations.” (SEC, 2007, p. 15)  
 
Economics – “…overall demand for our freight services is 
primarily influenced by the health of the U.S. economy, which is 
cyclical in nature, the seasonality and economic health of the 
industries generating the freight we transport in our network and 
the availability, reliability and cost of alternative freight 
services…” (SEC, 2007, p. 15) 
  
150 
 
 
Appendix F 
 Co-Occurrence Table of All Codes 
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Appendix G 
 
Subject Matter Expert Questions 
 
What qualitative factors do you feel may influence quantitative bankruptcy prediction 
models such as the (K-score) in the all-cargo industry? 
 
Do you have any insight into the bankruptcy of Kitty Hawk Air Cargo or Gemini air 
cargo or of the merger of Cargo 360 with Southern Air in 2008.   
 
Do you have any insight into the operation of ABX Air, Arrow Air, or Atlas Air during 
the years 2005-2009.   
 
What are your thoughts on the following terms as they relate to bankruptcy or financial 
distress in the all-cargo airline industry? 
Accidents 
Antitrust 
Bankruptcy 
Capacity 
Cash flow 
Competition 
Competitive advantage 
Cost 
Credit_markets 
Customers 
Earnings 
Economics 
Environment 
Fleet mix 
Flight frequency 
Fuel_efficiency 
Geographic location 
Labor_Issues 
Maintenance 
Management 
Market 
Merger 
Operations 
Ownership 
Price 
Regulation 
Reliability 
Revenue 
Risk 
Routes 
Security 
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Service 
Size 
Tax 
Utilization 
 
Is there other insight you would like to provide in relationship to bankrupticy or financial 
distress?  
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Appendix H 
 
 Signed Consent Forms for Subject Matter Experts 
 
Consent form for Dr. Robert G. Tompkins 
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Consent form for Dr. Richard Gritta 
 
 
 
 
